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THE DEVIL, THE DETAILS, AND THE DAWN OF 
THE 2 1 ST CENTURY ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: 
Beyond the New Deal 
Sandra B. ~ellmer* 
Nothing is so embarrassing nor so mischievous in a great assembly as the 
details of execution. 
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More than half a century has passed since the New Deal, the era known 
for ushering in the modem administrative state, where broad-sweeping 
regulatory powers were delegated to over a dozen new executive agencies 
pursuant to a raft of social legislation. Until the later years of the New Deal, 
courts were highly suspicious of socially progressive legislation, and, for that 
matter, any legislation that upset common law systems supporting private 
property rights and freedom of contract. Regulatory enactments were 
especially vulnerable to invalidation for delegating policy-making authority to 
an executive agency or other non-legislative entity. Such delegations were 
considered a constitutional offense under the nondelegation principle of 
separation of powers. 
As the regulatory state grew, fueled by increasingly complex societal 
needs and technological advances, standards of judicial review were 
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developed to curtail abuses of agency discretion. Meanwhile, the 
nondelegation doctrine receded into the dustbin of Lochner Era 
juri~prudence.~ Since the New Deal, the nondelegation doctrine has been, 
for all practical purposes, a dead letter. The delegation of regulatory details 
to executive agencies, far from impairing the constitutional prerogatives of 
Congress, is now generally recognized as promoting efficient and effective 
government. So long as Congress provides policy objectives and some 
standards to guide the agency, along with procedural safeguards to ensure 
due process and unbiased decision-making, delegations have not triggered 
constitutional concerns. Contemporary courts have rarely questioned even 
the most extensive grants of power to federal executive agencies, viewing 
nondelegation arguments as "barely worthy of a footnote. "3 
Yet just last year, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the D .C. Circuit, a court 
widely recognized as the veritable hub of administrative law jurisprudence, 
opened a new chapter in the post-New Deal era by breathing life into the 
nondelegation doctrine. In American Trucking Ass 'ns v. EPA,~ the court held 
that the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") had overstepped its 
constitutional boundaries and usurped legislative prerogatives in issuing 
national ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS") for ground-level ozone 
and particulate matter under the Clean Air Act.' According to the court, the 
decision was unconstrained by any "intelligible principle," even though the 
EPA had considered a full range of data regarding the air quality level 
"requisite to protect public health" with an "adequate margin of safety," as 
directed by this detailed and comprehensive s t a t ~ t e . ~  
At the heart of the American Trucking decision lies the court's belief that, 
absent clear congressional parameters, an executive agency like the EPA 
would have unbridled power to send entire industries hurtling over the brink 
of economic ruin. Although the court couched its decision in terms of a 
search for intelligible principles, upon closer scrutiny, the opinion seems to 
have little to do with a lack of legislative or administrative standards. 
2. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1904); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS 
HONORABLE COURT 78-81, 132 (1985). During the Luchner Era (circa 1905-1937). redistributive 
laws, such as legislation regulating hours of employment and the use of child labor, were routinely 
invalidated as interfering with the freedom to contract and substantive due process guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. See infro note 56 and accompanying text. 
3. Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269, 1283 n.17 (6th Cir. 19%) (Boggs, J., 
dissenting) (citing United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817. 823 n.8 (8th Cir. 19n). 
4. 175F.3d1027@.C.Cir.l999),modifiedonpetitionforreh'g, 195F.3d4(D.C.Cir. 
1999), cerr. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000); 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000). 
5. Id. at 1033-34. 
6. Id. at 1034-35; see Clean Air Act 6 109@)(1), 42 U.S.C. 8 7409@)(1) (1994). 
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Instead, the opinion implicitly rests on dual themes, both of which were 
commonly found in pre- and early New Deal cases. 
The first theme views regulatory legislation effectuated by agency 
delegatees as too likely to upset settled expectations based on common law 
property and contract doctrines, adversely and arbitrarily affecting state and 
private interests and potentially tearing the fabric of the entire American 
economy. Although this concern was prevalent during the Lochner years, 
the D.C. Circuit failed to take note of the dramatic change in administrative 
ground rules, and the advent of procedural safeguards against arbitrary 
executive action, dictated by the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.' 
Judicial review of executive decisions was not a particularly meaningful 
alternative when the early nondelegation decisions were handed down. The 
Administrative Procedure Act's safeguards promote agency accountability 
and reasoned decision-making by providing a more regular and effective role 
for both the public and the judiciary. 
The second judicial motif is more subtle, though it too is reminiscent of 
an earlier line of jurisprudence. The American Trucking court scrutinized 
the Clean Air Act with what appears to be an especially acute sensitivity to 
the broad and pervasive federal role fostered by laws enacted under the 
auspices of the Commerce Clause. A restrictive view of Commerce Clause 
power enjoyed its heyday in the federal courts throughout the Lochner Era. 
But, like Lochner and the nondelegation doctrine, this approach had been 
dormant, if not defunct, until the mid-1990s, when the Supreme Court lent 
its imprimatur to a resurgence. In the past five years, several congressional 
enactments have been struck down as beyond the scope of the Commerce 
Clause powers,' and for a variety of related federalism  concern^.^ 
Both doctrinal threads woven through the American Trucking decision are 
consistent with a developing pattern where the judiciary more frequently, and 
in a wide range of contexts, reins in federal regulatory programs that affect 
the economic and sovereign interests of the states and the bottom line of 
business concerns. Whether the trend is characterized as the resurrection of 
federalism or of nondelegation, "history seems to be recycling," to borrow a 
7. 5 U.S.C. 58 551-559 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), amended by 5 U.S.C. 98 701-706 
(1994). 
8. E.g. ,  United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1759 (2000) (invalidating the Violence 
Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549. 561 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act). 
9. E.g. ,  Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 649-50 (2000) (concluding that 
Congress could not abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit under Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act); Printz v.  United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905-22 (1997) 
(invalidating a provision of the Brady Act on grounds that it imposed unconstitutional obkigations on 
state officers to execute federal laws). 
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phrase from Justice Souter." Seen in this light, American Trucking may be 
but another example of a conservative backlash against redistributive 
legislation, and more generally, big government. If so, perhaps the decision 
can be limited in scope to regulatory statutes like the Clean Air Act, enacted 
pursuant to the Commerce Clause, with pervasive effects on the entire 
American economy. While this leaves numerous environmental and social 
welfare statutes open to attack, it may effectively insulate other important 
governmental programs from challenges of this sort. 
This article has two objectives. First, it attempts to get to the bottom of 
the concerns voiced in American Trucking and determine whether a strict 
nondelegation principle, or some other principle of constitutional or 
administrative law, best satisfies those concerns. This analysis examines the 
parameters of a reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine in order to identify 
those statutes most vulnerable to challenge and to assess whether those 
statutes really do present a dilemma of constitutional dimension. The inquiry 
focuses on legislative semantics (are there intelligible principles to confine 
the agency's discretion?) as well as constitutional context (are certain kinds 
of constitutional powers more likely to raise nondelegation concerns than 
others?). 
The second goal is to suggest a normative alternative for the review of 
congressional delegations to executive branch entities. This proposal draws 
upon well-known canons of administrative law, fashioning them into a two- 
tiered analysis. Under the first prong, a court faced with an ambiguous 
statutory provision should apply the presumption of implied delegation 
handed down in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
~ n c , "  unless, given the overall context and subject matter of the statute at 
issue, it is unlikely that Congress would have granted broad-sweeping 
powers to the executive branch. If delegation can be implied, which it 
should be in the majority of cases, the court must reject nondelegation 
challenges, unless the delegation results in actual infringement of the core 
prerogatives of another branch of government. Once this constitutional 
threshold is met, the second prong of the proposal calls upon the court to 
give heightened scrutiny to the agency's implementation of vague statutory 
mandates to better ensure reasoned and unbiased decision-making and 
accountability. In short, the proposed analytical framework attempts to 
synthesize two fundamental principles of judicial review-Chevron deference 
and Overton Park "hard look" review." 
10. Morrison. 120 S. Ct. at 1768. 
11. 467U.S.837,843(1984). 
12 Id. at 842-43; Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe. 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971). 
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The article explores the historical and legal underpinnings of the 
nondelegation doctrine before, during, and after the New Deal, along with 
the rise of the administrative state and the role of executive agencies within 
the constitutional framework, in Section 11. Section III reviews the Supreme 
Court's application of nondelegation, Commerce Clause, and federalism 
jurisprudence over the years, and assesses the D.C. Circuit's opinion in 
American Trucking against this backdrop. These first two sections 
demonstrate that, although the nondelegation doctrine itself is an example of 
anachronistic legal dogma, its objectives-safeguarding the separation of 
powers and enhancing governmental accountability-are alive and well 
today, and worthy of judicial attention, albeit through other legal 
mechanisms. 
The dangers of "strict" nondelegation review, based on a search for 
intelligible principles as employed in the early New Deal cases and 
resurrected in American Trucking, are highlighted in Section IV. Regulatory 
statutes are loosely categorized and placed in a spectrum, ranging from least 
to most discretionary, based on their legislative language. The spectrum 
illustrates that, for the vast majority of regulatory provisions, whether the 
standards expressed by Congress are intelligible is largely in the eyes of the 
beholder. Section IV predicts that, if strict nondelegation review were to 
become the law of the land, Congress may respond with a variety of tactics 
to avoid the ambiguities and trade-offs that often result from the normal 
legislative process. One such tactic may be to tack detailed legislative riders 
onto appropriations bills, a practice which itself diminishes legislative 
accountability and fosters a governmental imbalance of power. The potential 
for such a response, along with the ad hoc nature of a nondelegation test 
based on a "judicial fetish for legislative language,"13 set the stage for the 
alternative proffered in the final two sections of the article. 
Section V introduces the contextual Chevron-based alternative, and 
examines it in light of two recent Supreme Court opinions, FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp.14 and AT& T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board.'' 
Both of these cases involved regulatory statutes that grant broad discretionary 
powers to administrative agencies. Although the agency actions at issue 
were invalidated, the Court's decisions rested on the bedrock tenets of 
administrative law formulated in Chevron and Overton Park, indicating that 
the Court has little interest in reviving the nondelegation doctrine as a ground 
-- 
13. Warren v.  Marion County, 353 P.2d 257,261 (Or. 1960). 
14. 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1297 (2000). 
15. 119 S. Ct. 721, 738 (1999). 
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for striking down congressional enactments. l6 These opinions support the 
article's central thrust: judicial review of an agency's statutory 
interpretations and its ultimate decision can do more towards holding the 
three branches of government to their constitutional duties and requiring 
agencies to make fair, well-reasoned decisions based on intelligible 
legislative objectives than does the nondelegation doctrine as resurrected by 
the D.C. Circuit. l7 
The fml section of the article tests the proposal by examining executive 
implementation of statutes enacted through constitutional powers other than 
the Commerce Clause. Specifically, Section VI applies the alternative 
approach to President Clinton's exercise of Property Clause powers in 
designating the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument and the Grand 
Canyon-Parashant National Monument. Several lawsuits have been filed to 
challenge the designations and, according to the state representatives, county 
officials, and ranchers who are acting as plaintiffs, the President's decisions 
are but an egregious display of executive discretion run rarnpant.18 Their 
overarching legal theory is that the executive branch, in issuing these 
decisions under the Antiquities Act of 1906,19 has usurped legislative 
prerogatives in violation of the nondelegation doctrine. 
Section VI concludes that, even if the dubious trend toward strict 
nondelegation review continues in the Commerce Clause context, it should 
not become a significant restraint on the exercise of Property Clause powers. 
16. In Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 120 S .  Ct. at 1297, the Court found that Congress had 
imposed unambiguous limitations on the Food and Drug Administration ('FDA"), such that no 
deference need be given the agency's decision to regulate cigarettes under Chevron step one. See 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. In Iowa Utilities, 1 19 S. Ct. at 738, the Court held that the regulations 
at issue were an unreasonable interpretation of statutory mandates governing local telephone 
services, thereby failing Chevron step two. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. The step two 
analysis in Iowa Utilities appeared to be a version of "hard look" review, although it was not 
explicitly characterized as such by the Court. 
17. A few days after the Court granted certiorari in Americun Trucking on the nondelegation 
issue, it issued a second order granting certiorari on an issue raised by the industry-that the EPA 
had incorrectly constmed the Clean Air Act as prohibiting a consideration of costs in setting the 
NAAQS. See Browner v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.) (regarding the 
nondelegation issue); Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Browner, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (mem.) (regarding 
the cost issue). This second order gives the Court a vehicle to sidestep the constitutional issue 
while still addressing concerns about the economic implications of regulatory statutes, using 
administrative law principles and, more specifically, the interpretive standards of Chevron. 
18. E.g., Compl. for Declaratory J. and Injunctive Relief and Deprivations of Federal 
Constitutional Rights 11 112-29. Esplin v. Clinton @. Ariz. filed Jan. 26, 2000) (No. CIV 00 0148 
PCT PGR); Compl. for Injuctive and Declarato~y Relief 11 88-94, Utah Ass'n of Counties v. 
Clinton @. Utah filed June 23, 1997) (No. 2:97CV-0479B); First Am. Compl. 17 38-44, Mountain 
States Legal Fnd. v. Clinton. (D. Utah filed Dec. 15, 1997) (No. 2:97CV-0863G). 
19. See 16 U.S.C. 88 4 3 1 4 3 3  (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
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Decisions issued under the Property Clause are less likely to have pervasive 
economic effects than Commerce Clause programs such as the Clean Air 
Act. Moreover, the Property Clause is broader in nature with respect to the 
discrete category of activities it governs than is the Commerce Clause, in that 
it provides dual proprietary and sovereign powers over federal public lands 
and resources. At the same time, this broad-sweeping power is 
counterbalanced and perhaps even canalized by trust-like duties to protect 
public resources. Congress presumptively delegated extensive powers to the 
executive branch to accomplish preservation-oriented objectives through the 
Antiquities Act, satisfying the first step of the proposed Chevron-based 
alternative. 
However, while the Antiquities Act is an extremely important 
preservation tool, national monument designations are distinct from other 
public lands decisions in that no procedural safeguards are required prior to 
designation. The Act gives the President unilateral power to designate 
national monuments without public input or consideration of environmental 
effects or alternatives. In addition, presidential decisions are insulated from 
the Administrative Procedure Act's provisions for judicial review. As a 
result, courts have no means of testing designations for arbitrariness. 
Although the Clinton Administration has reached out to the affected public 
prior to many of its designations, those efforts were voluntary and largely ad 
hoc. Because neither the public nor the courts is allowed a meaningful and 
regular role in the decision-making process, the second prong of the 
proposed alternative cannot be satisfied. Without formalized procedural 
safeguards to ensure against biased and arbitrary action, Antiquities Act 
withdrawals, unlike most other public lands management decisions, may 
raise concerns rooted in due process and fundamental fairness, but not 
separation of powers. 
11. THE EVILs OF DELEGATING THOSE DEVILISH DETAILS 
Thanks to Schoolhouse Rock, an entire generation of Americans grew up 
secure in the knowledge that the United States government is divided into 
three branches, each of which plays a role in a democratic s o ~ i e t y . ~  Article 
20. See Schoohuse Rock: nree Ring Government (ABC television broadcast, 1979); 
America Rock-nree Ring Government, Schoolhouse Rock, ABC Television, 
http://www.genxtviand.simplenet.com/SchoolHouseRk/song.hts?lo+threering (visited Oct. 24, 
1999). Schfhouse Rock first aired in 1973. and lasted for thirteen years. Although the 
SchooUlouse Rock phenomenon faded away in the mid-1980's. it has been revived recently, see 
Sean Powell. Schoolhouse Rock Creators, at http: Ilgenxtvland . simplenet.com/ 
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I of the Constitution specifically provides that "[all1 legislative powers . . . 
shall be vested in a Congress of the United  state^."^' In other words, elected 
representatives in Congress have the power to make laws of general 
applicability," Meanwhile, executive power-the power to implement the 
law-is held by the President,: and the power to review the activities of the 
other branches, in the context of cases or controversies, is vested in the 
judiciary." 
A primary reason for the constitutional separation of powers between the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches is to provide checks and balances 
against the capture of any one branch by an~ther. '~ Separation of powers 
deters government excesses through arbitrary or tyrannical rule and promotes 
accountability. It also minimizes the potential for manipulation of 
governmental processes by special interest groups and protects individual 
citizens from the effects of facti~nalism.~~ 
Although the doctrine forbids any branch from interfering with the central 
constitutional "prerogatives of anothern b r a n ~ h , ~  it does not require that 
legislative, executive and judicial functions "be entirely separate and 
di~tinct."'~ For a tripartite government to be workable, Congress cannot be 
the only entity allowed to "make a rule of prospective force. . . . Congress 
must be permitted to delegate to others at least some authority it could 
SchoolHouseRock/creators.hts?lo (last modified Nov. 16. 1997), and has played a role in the early 
education of several generations of Americans. 
21. U.S. CONST.art. I, 8 1. 
22. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 694 (1892). 
23. U.S. CONST. art. 11, # 1; U.S. CONST. art. 11. 8 3 (directing the executive branch to 
'take care that the Laws be faithfully executed "). 
24. U.S. CONST. art. 111, QB 1-2; Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 120 S. Ct. 693, 708 n.6 
(2000) (finding that environmental plaintiffs had Article 111 standing to bring a citizens' suit to 
redress Clean Water Act violations which had been ongoing at the time suit was filed). 
25. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380-82 (1989) ('[Tlhe Framers 'built into the 
tripartite Federal Government . . . a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or 
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of another . . . .'" (discussing THE FEDERALIST 47 
(Madison) and quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1975))). The Framers provided checks 
and balances so that each branch remains free from the undue control or coercive influence of the 
others. Id.; see also Sandra B. Zellmer, Samificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar of 
Appropriations Riders: A Cbnstitutionul Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 521-22 (1997). 
26. CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 15-17 (1990) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN. 
RIGHTS REVOLUTION]. 
27. Lovingv. UnitedStates,517U.S.748,757(19%). 
28. Misrretta, 488 U.S. at 380. In Misfrenu, the Court lauded Madison's flexible approach 
to the separation of powers: 'the greatest security against tyranny-the accumulation of excessive 
authority in a single Branch-lies not in a heretic division among the Branches, but in a carefully 
crafted system of checked and balanced power within each Branch." Id. at 381 (citing THE 
FEDERALIST 51 (Madison)). 
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exercise itself. "29 In practice, Congress frequently legislates its policies and 
objectives in broad-brush terms, leaving the details of execution to the 
executive branch, with judicial review as a safeguard against abusive or 
arbitrary action. 
A. The Role of Administrasive Agencies Within the Constitutional Framework 
Administrative agencies are sometimes characterized, usually in 
derogatory fashion, as constituting an unauthorized, unconstrained "fourth 
branch of As the federal government is one of enumerated 
powers, limited to those powers constitutionally granted to it along with 
those "necessary and proper" to the execution of specified powers,31 a logical 
starting point for this section is to shed light on the source of the authority to 
create administrative agencies and delegate power to them. 
The United States Constitution contains no explicit authority to create and 
delegate powers to agencies.32 However, in the Necessary and Proper 
Clause the Framers evidenced their clear intent that the federal government 
possess the authority to exercise its enumerated powers effe~tively.~~ The 
29. Loving. 517 U.S. at 758 (citing Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 
(1 825)). 
30. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 33 (3d ed. 1999) 
(citing Report of the Committee with Studies of Administrative Management in the Federal 
Government 3943 (1937)); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 160-61 
(1962). The term was likely coined by Justice Jackson. in his dissenting opinion in I;TC v. 
Ruberoid Co.: "Administrative bodies . . . have become a veritable fourth branch of the 
Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal theories much as the concept of a fourth 
dimension unsettles our three-dimensional thinking." Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent 
and the Rise of the Administrative Stare: Toward a Comtimional Theory of Second Best, 80 
CORNELL . REV. 1, 1 (1994) (citing Ruberoid, 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952)). 
31. U.S. CON=. art. I, 8 8, cl. 18 ('The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing [enumerated] Powers 
. . . ."); McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 324-25 (1819) (construing Necessary 
and Proper clause to uphold constitutionality of national bank); see ako U.S. CONS. amend. X 
("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the People. "). 
32. See Harold H .  Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. 
U .  L. REV. 491, 491 (1987) ('Ambiguity surrounds the constitutional relationships among the three 
branches of govenunent, and between the branches and the agencies."); Peter L. Strauss. The Place 
of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 
573, 596-605, 609-16 (1984) (noting that the Constitution says little about unelected officials who 
"necessarily perform the bulk of the government's work," and describing provisions that do touch 
upon the responsibilities of various government officials). 
33. See U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 8, cl. 18; see also Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., 
Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial 
Regulation but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 29 n. 116, 51-55 
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scope and breadth of the implied powers can be measured in terms of 
necessity: if the power is "essential to prevent the defeat of the venture at 
hand," it can be interpolated into the text of the constitution as necessary and 
proper to effectuate the  enumerated p ~ w e r s . ~  Agencies evolved out of 
necessity-the constitutionally created branches needed agents to perform the 
vast amount of detail work required to govern a modem society. Each 
branch has created agencies to oversee federal programs, conduct 
investigations, and fdl in gaps lefi by broad-brush legislation with detailed 
regulations and  guideline^.^' The ability to delegate gap-fdling power to 
non-legislative branch entities allows Congress to concentrate on its primary 
lawmaking duties and attend to the "venture at handn-enacting laws "to . . . 
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common 
defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of 
Liberty.n36 Thus, delegation of power to administrative agencies should be 
viewed as a "necessary and propern condition upon the successful operation 
of a constitutional, tripartite g~vernment.~' 
Because agencies are simply agents, their powers flow from, and are 
subsidiary to, the branch that created them. Accordingly, agency action 
must be consistent with the Constitution and the authorities granted by 
n.207-29 (1999) (discussing early practices and judicial response as indicia of the Framers' intent 
that Congress use all power conducive to constitutionally specified ends). 
34. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 14 (4th pxtg. 1962) (discussing judicial power to 
review congressional decisions; see also Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 33. at 56 (discussing Chief 
Justice Marshall's generous interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause in McCufloch, 17 
U.S. at 406-15). 
35. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL.. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, 
AND SOCIETY 378 (2d ed. 1998). 
36. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (19%); J.W. 
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406-07 (1928); United States v. Romard, 89 
F. 156. 156-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1898) (holding that Congress had lawfully exercised its power to 
prohibit discharges of refuse into navigable waters unless a permit be obtained from the harbor 
master, who could specify limits and placement of discharges; 'such a power cannot be denied . . . 
as it would defeat the only practicable and available means of protecting from nuisances the waters 
under [Congress's] jurisdiction, unless maybe, by a sweeping enactment prohibiting all deposits in 
the harbor"). 
37. See U.S. CONST. art. I, 8 8, cl. 18; Romard, 89 F. 156 at 158-59. Nonetheless, some 
jurists and academics have argued that the modem administrative state, with its extensive reliance 
on executive agencies, is unconstitutional, though they have not gone so far as to advocate 
revolution or abolition of the current order. E.g . ,  ROBERT BORK. THE TEMFTING OF AMERICA: 
THE POLlnCAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 158-69 (1990) (arguing that even though the modem 
administrative state is unconstitutional. dismantling it would plunge our government into chaos); 
Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 V A .  L. REV. 1387. 1443-54 
(1987) (arguing that New Deal legislation is unconstitutional, but accepting it as the result of 
'political fotcesn); McCutchen, supra note 30, at 2 (advocating that, although '[tlhere is no room 
for a founh branch within this tripartite scheme of governance," the Court should adopt a 'second 
bestn approach, and tolerate unconstitutional practices that have become institutionalized). 
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relevant statutes. The "organic act" that creates an executive agency and 
delegates power to it, along with subsequent enactments providing more 
detailed direction in specified contexts, set the parameters of the agency's 
power by providing legislative goals, policies and standards. 
A perusal of statutes related to environmental protection and natural 
resource management will help illustrate this point. In the public lands 
arena, the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service is instructed by its 
organic acts to manage forest reserves using multiple-use-sustained-yield 
 principle^.^' Within the Department of Interior, the National Park Service 
Organic Act directs the Park Service to preserve and protect parks "and the 
wildlife therein . . . by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the 
enjoyment of future  generation^."^' The Bureau of h d  Management 
operates under a variety of  statute^,^' but its general marching orders are 
found in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA"), which, 
like the Forest Service organic acts, embraces multiple-use  principle^.^' 
The EPA, generally charged with pollution control, has no true organic 
act. Unlike agencies found in cabinet-level departments, the EPA was 
created not by legislation but by executive order.42 It conducts its affairs 
according to a variety of statutes scattered throughout the United States 
Code, including the Clean Water A C ~ , ~ ~  Clean Air Toxic Substances 
Control and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA," or "S~perfund").~ 
38. The Organic Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. #$ 4 7 3 4 8 2 ,  551 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
directed a sustained yield of timber and protection of water flow. It was amended by the Multiple 
Use-Sustained Yield Act ('MUSYA") of 1960. 16 U.S.C. $5 528-531 (1994). which added a 
multiple-use component to the Forest Service management mandate; and the National Forest 
Management Act ("NFMAn) of 1976, 16 U.S.C. $5 1600-1604 (1994 & Supp. 1V 1998), which 
retained the multiple-use sustained-yield concept and added detailed requirements for forest 
planning. 
39. 16 U.S.C. 95 1, la-1 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see also National Park Service, 27ze 
Nbtioml Park Service-Our Mission, at hnp:llwww.nps.govllegacy/organic-act.hm (last modified 
Oct. 26, 1999). 
40. E.g.,43U.S.C. # $ 2 , 6 ,  11-18(1994). 
41. Id. $8 1701-1785 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Similarly, the Fish and Wildlife Service 
derives its authorities from several different statutes, most importantly, the Endangered Species Act 
of 1973,. 16 U.S.C. $8 1531-1544 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), and the National Wildlife Refuge 
System Act, 16 U.S.C. f$  668dd--668jj (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
42. Reorg. PlanNo. 3 o f  1970,3C.F.R. $8 199-202(1971),reprinfedin42U.S.C. $4321 
(1994 & Supp. I11 1997). cited in Lawrence E. Susskind & Joshua Secunda, B e  Risks and the 
Advantages of Agency Discretion: Evidence from EPA 's Project XL. 17 U.C.L.A. J. E N v n .  L. & 
POL'Y 67, 71 n.6 (1998-99). 
43. 33 U.S.C. 48 1251-1387 (1994 & SUPP. IV 1998). 
44. 42 U.S.C. $5 7401-7671 (1994 & Supp. 1V 1998). 
45. 15 U.S.C. $5 2601-2692 (1994 & SUPP. IV 1998). 
46. 42 U.S.C. 88 9601-9675 (1934 & SUPP. 111 1997). 
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The EPA's programs and initiatives are sometimes criticized as piecemeal 
and reactionary, with no unifying prin~iple.~' The lack of an organic act 
likely contributes to a perception of arbitrariness, and perhaps even heightens 
the suspicion with which courts review EPA activities. Intuitively, it seems 
that a cabinet-level agency with a congressionally enacted "mission 
statement" would be perceived as more credible and more accountable, and 
would therefore be given more deference by courts. It follows, then, that 
agencies like the National Park Service and the National Forest Service may 
be less susceptible to nondelegation challenges than the EPA and other 
agencies that operate under disjointed statutory directives. This article 
concludes that the activities of federal land management agencies are less 
likely to fall to nondelegation attack, not because of the cohesive nature of 
their legislative mission statements but because of the source of their 
power-the Property 
B. Separation of Powers, Laissez-faire Capitalism and Nondelegation 
The primary criticism of congressional delegations of power to 
administrative agencies is that such delegations erode the separation of 
powers among the branches. Agency officials are not elected by the public 
and are generally viewed as less accountable than the legislative branch, yet 
they frequently wield policy-setting and rule-making authority.49 Prior to the 
47. Susskind & Secunda, supra note 42, at 69-73 (describing EPA's history, and noting the 
lack of a clear legislative mission or mechanism for setting long-term priorities). 
48. See infra Section VI. Professor Cass Sunstein, having surveyed various agencies and 
their organic acts, concluded that "there seems to be no link between clear statutory terms and 
agency competence or agency contribution to social well-being." CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IS THE 
CLEAN AIR ACT UNCONSTITU~ONAL?, 22-23 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Reg. Studies, 
Working Paper 99-7, 1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, AIR I]; Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act 
Unconstitutional?, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 303, 339 (1999) [hereinafter Sunstein, Air 14 (a revised 
version of SUNmIN, AIR I). According to Sunstein, the perception of agencies operating under 
open-ended mandates ranges from great respect for the Securities and Exchange Commission to 
near-contempt for the Interstate Commerce Commission ('ICC"). Id. at 22-23; see also Enc~rra 
Enclyclopedia, Interstate Commerce Commission, at http://encarta.msn.com/index/ 
conciseindex/00/00082000.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2000) (noting that the ICC was abolished in 
1995, and its duties transferred to the Surface Transportation Board). Meanwhile. "[tlhe 
Department of Agriculture is one of the least well-regarded agencies, and the statutes it administers 
are frequently all too clear." SUNSTEIN, AIR I ,  supra, at 22. The Depamnent of Agriculture 
houses a number of agencies serving myrizd functions, from land management (the Forest Service), 
to inspection and customs (the Animal and Plant Health and Inspection Service), to agricultural 
services (the Natural Resources Conservation Service). It is not clear which agency among these is 
the subject of Sunstein's assessment. 
49. See William Funk. Rationaliry Review of State Administrative Rulemaking, 43 ADMM. L. 
REV. 147. 161-62 (1991) ('[Algencies are not created to be representative bodies. politically 
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enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946," unelected agency 
officials made important decisions largely free from public scrutiny and 
judicial review, giving rise to separation of powers and due process 
concerns 
It is therefore not surprising that the courts treated regulatory statutes as 
something akin to noxious, "foreign s~bstances"~~ when they first appeared 
on the legislative scene around the turn of the century. In keeping with the 
tremendous expansion of American industry and commerce, laissez-faire 
principles, undergirding the common law's bias for private rights and private 
markets, served as the "norm" or baseline for judicial review." Viewed in 
this light, regulations that protected workers and consumers were nothing 
more than "unprincipled interest group transfers. "s4 Because such transfers 
were "in derogation of the common law," regulatory statutes were 
interpreted very narrowly, often defeating the protections offered to the 
statutory benefi~iaries.~' The judiciary's reaction was consistent with the 
responsive to an electorate. . . . [Their] decisions are the product of institutional, rather than 
personal, process. ") . 
50. 5 U.S.C. 98 551-559 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
5 1. McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J .L.  ECON. & 
ORG. 180, 184 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 
U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 655 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Agency Inaction]; see also Sidney A. 
Shapiro & Richard E. Levy. Heightmed Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and 
the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 428 (noting that 
heightened scrutiny of administrative action is "integrally related" to separation of powers concerns 
implicated by the delegation of legislative and judicial power to agencies); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Factions, Self Interest and rhe APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 287 (1986) 
[hereinafter Sunstein, Four Lessons] (stating that judicial scrutiny under the Administrative 
Procedure Act can "flush out' impermissible motivations . . . [and) guard against the dangers of 
self-interested representation and of factional tyranny in the regulatory process"). 
52. SUNSTEIN, RIGHTS REVOLUTION. supra note 26. at 5. 
53. Laissez-faire economic theory is premised on the belief that govenunent should not 
interfere in the marketplace because individual freedom in bargaining will ultimately serve societal 
needs by allocating resources in a way that promotes the greatest overall satisfaction. William H. 
Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modem Antitrust, 44 EMORY L.J. 1, 7-8 (1995) (citing 
ADAM SMUIITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 49 
(Edward Canaan ed., 1976); and HERBERT SPENCER. THE GREAT POLITICAL SUPERSTITION, in 
MAN VERSUS THE STATE 153-156 (1981)). Justice Holmes. in his famous dissent in Lochner v. 
United States. 198 U . S .  45, 75 (1905). accused the majority of embracing this "economic theory 
which a large part of the country does not entertain. . . . The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. 
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." For further discussion of the influences of laissez faire and 
Social Darwinism on Lochner era courts, see Herbert Hovenkarnp, 171e Political Ecommy of 
Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379 (1988). 
54. SUNSTEIN, RIGHTS REVOLUTION. supra note 26, as 5. 
55. Id. at 6 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 298 U.S. 492 
(1936); FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619, 623-25 (1927); FTC v. American Tobacco 
Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1924); FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920); and Johnson v. 
Southern Pac. Co., 117 F. 462, 466 (8th Cir. 1902)); cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 
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broader sentiments at work during the Lochner Era, when redistributive 
legislation was routinely invalidated as interfering with the freedom to 
contract and substantive due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
~mendment . 56 
Despite judicial resistance, regulatory programs did not fade quietly into 
the sunset. Quite to the contrary, governmental involvement in the daily 
affairs of the citizenry became more prevalent in the Depression years of the 
1930's, in light of increasing evidence that the marketplace had failed to 
address important social needs. In the absence of regulation, unemployment 
reigned; farmers had no markets for meager crops coaxed from parched and 
eroded soils; factories exploited child labor and emitted pollution at will.'' 
The Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration set out to tip the scales in favor of 
the public interest with a variety of New Deal  program^.^' Newly enacted 
economic and social legislation gave regulatory agencies vast powers to 
vindicate collective rights held by the citizenry at large.59 
New entities were created to regulate and restore the securities markets, 
to bolster agriculture, and to safeguard the workplace and the banking 
system. New Deal agencies included key employment agencies, such as the 
Works Progress Administration, along with a panoply of regulatory and 
redistributive agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission, 
the Federal Power Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Social Security 
-- - -- -- 
U . S .  1, 58-60 (narrowly construing the Sherman Antitrust Act as prohibiting ody unreasonable 
restraints on trade, so as not to destroy the individual right to contract). 
56. See Lochner v. United States, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (striking a New York law limiting 
employment in bakeries to sixty hours a week and ten hours a day as an arbitmy interference with 
the freedom to contract guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment). Lochner was followed by 
Hammer v. Dugenhart, 247 U . S .  251, 268-77 (1918), invalidating a federal law designed to put an 
end to child labor as beyond the Commerce Clause power; and Duplex Printing Press v. Deering, 
254 U.S. 443, 464-78 (1921), holding that federal antitrust laws could be used to suppress labor 
union activities. The Lochner Era lasted until the mid-1930's. spanning a period of about thirty 
years; its demise went hand in hand with the eventual acceptance of New Deal programs. TRIBE, 
supra note 2, at 66-68, 132. 
57. See SUNSTEIN, RIGHTS REVOLUTION, srrpra note 26, at 21-22. 
58. For detailed analysis of New Deal programs and their economic and social origins and 
social and legal ramifications. see generally 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN 
RECESSION AND WAR (1995); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO 
F D R  (1955); PETER H .  IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL (1963); 1 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, J .. THE 
AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER (1957); 3 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., 
THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLJTIcs OF UPHEAVAL (1960). For insights into New Deal 
ideology during the waning years of the Roosevelt administration and World War 11, see generally 
DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, N O  ORDINARY TIME (1994). 
59. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 78-83. 
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~dministration.~' Meanwhile, the power of existing agencies, such as the 
Food and Drug Administration and Federal Trade Commission, was greatly 
e~panded.~' 
In many instances, agencies were given broad policy-making authority, 
which essentially combined all three governmental powers: legislative, 
executive and adj~dicative.~' Along with extensive power, early New Deal 
legislation typically provided little direction to agencies, authorizing them to 
prevent "unreasonable" behavior or to act "in the public interest."63 From 
the executive and legislative perspectives, strict judicial vigilance over the 
"system of checks and balances no longer appeared to be a necessary 
safeguard of private property and liberty from factionalism, but instead-and 
this was the crucial point-a faction-driven obstacle to social change in the 
public intere~t."~" Nonetheless, the judiciary, undaunted during the early 
years of the New Deal, continued to voice concerns that open-ended 
delegations and loosely phrased standards had a dangerous tendency to 
promote self-interest and factionalism, some of the very problems supposedly 
redressed by New Deal agen~ies.~' 
Enter the nondelegation doctrine. Although its basis is Article I, there is 
no explicit barrier to the delegation of legislative power in the constitutional 
text.66 Its touchstone is John Locke's oft-repeated statement, that given the 
principles of a limited federal government, "[tlhe power of the legislative, 
being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant . . . , can be no 
other than what the positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, 
and not to make  legislator^."^^ The limitation on delegation of legislative 
60. SUNSTEIN, RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 26, at 23-24. 
61. Id.at25,tbl.l. 
62. Id. at 23. 
63. See, e.g., NBC v. United States. 319 U.S.  190. 233 (1943) (upholding the Federal 
Communication Commission's ('FCC's") regulation of chain broadcasting under the authority 
granted by the Communication Act of 1934). This provision was examined most recently in AT&T 
Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board. 525 U.S. 366. 378-79 (1999). but the nondelegation doctrine was not 
raised in that case. See ako infra notes 393-405. and accompanying text. 
64. SUNSTEIN, RIGHTS REVOLU'I1ON. supra note 26, at 23. "The complicated character of 
modem problems vastly increased the need for technical expertise and specialization in making 
regulatory decisions. " Id. 
65. Id. at 29. 
66. Likewise, there is no concrete evidence that the Framers intended a nondelegation 
doctrine, and early practices demonstrated a willingness to delegate extensive discretionary powers 
to the President in both military affairs and American Indian relations. Sunstein, Air 11, supra note 
48. at 331-332. 
67. JOHN b X K E .  SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 58 141 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 
1980) (1690) (emphasis omitted). Professor Theodore Lowi describes the congressional rendering 
of legislative powers to the President and executive agencies as "legiscide." Theodore J. Lowi, 
T h  Rwdr to Serfhbm: Liberalism. Consenwism and Administrative Power, 36 AM.  U. L. REV. 
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power is meant to promote the balance of powers by ensuring that "important 
choices of social policy are made by Congress, the branch of our 
Government most responsive to the popular will. In addition, the doctrine 
is intended to protect against arbitrary action and abuses of governmental 
power by enhancing political accountability and assuring substantive and 
procedural safeguards to those who are affected by administrative action.69 
111. WAXING AND WANING JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF PRE- AND POST-NEW 
DEAL DELEGATIONS: FROM "LOOSE" TO U S ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ n  REVIEW 
Congressional delegations to executive agencies will be invalidated as 
violating separation of powers if the statute improperly grants authority that 
is purely legislative or judicial in nature.70 Chief Justice John Marshall 
recognized early on that the line between the enactment of the laws, a 
congressional power, and the execution of those laws, an executive power, is 
a fine one: "The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those 
important subjects which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, 
from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and 
power given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up 
the details. "" 
A nondelegation problem arises when Congress fails to give adequate 
standards to guide the Executive's discretion in implementing a statute, 
thereby allowing the agency itself to engage in legislative policy-making 
functions." Because the inquiry turns on whether Congress itself has made 
the difficult policy choices, the statute has been the focal point. However, 
the D.C. Circuit has recently taken the doctrine in a new direction, shifting 
the focus from Congress's statutory directive to the agency's construction of 
it, holding that an agency's interpretation may be so broad as to offend 
295, 299 (1987). 'Because the people cede inherent legislative power to their representatives 
through a democratic process of elections, it is not appropriate for the legislators to cede that power 
to nonelected officials who will not necessarily reflect the popular will." Robert W. Adler. 
American Trucking and the Revival (?) of the Nondelegarion Doctrine, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10.233, 
10,235-36 (2000). 
68. Indus. Union Dep't. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring). 
69. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing 
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 758-59 0.D.C.  1971)), modified on 
petition for reh'g, 195 F.3d 4 @.C. Cir. 1999). cert. granted, 120 S .  Ct .  2003 (2000) (mem.); 120 
S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (rnem.). 
70. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1952) (holding 
that a seizure order issued by the President violated separation of powers). 
71. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825). 
72. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
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separation of powers by presuming the power to act beyond its authorized 
executive role .73 
The Supreme Court's judicial litmus test for reviewing legislative 
delegations to executive agencies has long been whether the statutory 
language provides an "intelligible principle" to guide agency action.74 This 
test, which turns on legislative semantics, has changed very little over time, 
but the stringency of its application has waxed and waned significantly, 
depending on the political and social forces at work. It also appears that 
heightened scrutiny has been applied to executive action authorized by a 
certain type of enactment. Statutes issued pursuant to Commerce Clause 
authority, having a tendency to affect the entire economy, appear to be more 
closely scrutinized than those that have other constitutional powers as their 
so~rce . '~  
A. Nondelegati-on Review Through the New Deal Years 
Nondelegation was considered a "principle universally recognized" by the 
late 1800's,'~ even though at that time the Supreme Court had never actually 
struck down a statute on nondelegation grounds. When the nondelegation 
doctrine was first announced, the Court was quite tolerant of congressional 
grants of authority to executive bodies, upholding legislation so long as there 
were some standards to define the scope of the agency's power to r e g ~ l a t e . ~  
-- 
73. See Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034-40 (Williams, J.); discussion infra Part III.B.3. 
This approach was foreshadowed in an early D.C. Circuit opinion, Internazional Union, UAW v. 
OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1991), also issued by Judge Stephen Williams and a few 
lower court decisions, see Sunstein, Air 11, supra note 48, at 310 n.22 (citing cases). 
74. See J .  W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409 (upholding delegation based on "intelligible" 
statutory principle). Prior to J .  W. Hampton, the Court considered whether the legislature had 
provided an adequate standard for the delegatee to fill in the gaps left by general statutory 
provisions. See W u y m ,  23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43. 
75. See PIERCE, supra note 30, at 50-51; see also David Schoenbrod. The Delegation 
Doctrine: Could the Court Give it Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1224-25 (1 985). For a 
discussion of challenges outside of the Commerce Clause context, see infra Part V. 
76. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892). 
77. For the earliest cases to address the nondelegation concept, see Corgo of Brig Aurora v. 
United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382. 387-388 (1813) (recognizing a nondelegation issue. but 
upholding the enactment in question), and Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43 (sustaining a 
legislative grant of power to federal courts to adopt their own rules of process). In Field. the Court 
upheld a provision of the Tariff Act of 1890 which directed the President to suspend an exemption 
of impon duties "whenever, and so oftenn as he should be satisfied that the duties imposed on U.S. 
products by any country producing and exporting certain enumerated commodities were 
"reciprocally unequal and unreasonable." 143 U.S. at 680. The Court found that the President's 
power was simply: 
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For example, in United States v. Grimaud,18 the Court rejected a challenge to 
the Organic Act of 1897, which directed the Department of Agriculture to 
protect timber and watersheds within national forest reserves from 
destruction by regulating "their occupancy and use."" The Organic Act, 
according to the Court, set forth the legislative purposes along with sufficient 
guidance on how to effectuate those purposes. As such, the Act, in spite of 
its rather obscure directive, simply provided the agency with the power not 
to legislate but "to fill up the details. 
By the early New Deal years of the 19303, the political and judicial 
atmosphere had changed dramatically, and the search for intelligible 
principles became far more intensive. By then, the judiciary could be 
counted on as the bastion of the most powerful and resourceful 
industrialists-those very same entities who had benefited greatly from 
laissez-faire government and the common law's protections for contract and 
property rights. 8' The nondelegation doctrine, along with substantive due 
process and Commerce Clause constraints, emerged as the vehicles of choice 
for striking down progressive New Deal legislation.= 
In 1935, for the first time, the Supreme Court struck down two statutory 
provisions for unlawfully delegating legislative powers. In A.L.A. Schechfer 
Poultry Corp. v. United  state^,'^ the provision in question, the Live Poultry 
Code, a section of the National Industrial Recovery Act ("NIRA"), allowed 
firms to agree to codes of fair competition and authorized the President to 
enforce the codes if, inter alia, they did not promote rnonop~lies.~~ The 
Court found that the provision provided no standards, other than "the general 
[Vhe enforcement of the policy established by Congress. As the suspension 
was absolutely required when the President ascertained the existence of a 
particular fact, it cannot be said that in ascertaining that fact, and in issuing his 
proclamation, in obedience to the legislative will, he exercised the function of 
making laws. 
Id. at 693. Other early cases upholding broad delegations include Bunfield v. StrMohan, 192 U.S. 
470. 497-98 (1904) (sustaining delegation of authority to "establish uniform standards" for 
importing tea), and J .  W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 403-04 (upholding delegation of power to President 
to adjust tariffs when rates failed to "equalize . . . differences in costs of production"). 
78. 220 U.S. 506 (191 1) 
79. Id. at 509 (citing provisions now codified at 16 U.S.C. 88 475, 478, 551 (1994 & Supp. 
IV 1998). 
80. Id. at 517 (quoting W a y m ,  23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43). For further discussion of the 
nature of the hoperty Clause as a source for statutes such as the Organic Act, see discussion infra 
Part V1.A. 
81. Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 33, at 78 nn.353-55. 
82. See SUNSTEIN, RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 26, at 19-20; see also supra notes 52- 
56 and accompanying text. 
83. 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935). 
84. See id at 521-23. 
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aims of rehabilitation, correction and expan~ion."'~ As a result, it allowed 
the President vast and unfettered authority to determine what to do "for the 
betterment of business," constrained only by the extent of the federal 
commerce power.86 In turn, the provisions at issue were also found to be 
beyond the Commerce Clause authority, as the sale of chickens wholly 
within one state did not directly affect interstate commer~e .~  
That same year, in Panama Rejining Co. v. ~yan,*' the Court struck 
another provision of NIRA that allowed the President to prohibit the 
transportation of petroleum in interstate commerce in excess of amounts 
allowed by state law.'' The petroleum provision was faulted for giving the 
President "unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay down the 
prohibition . . . as he may see fit."" One year later, in Carter v. Carter 
Coal Co.," the Coal Conservation Act, which established local boards to set 
coal prices and authorized collective bargaining over wages and hours, was 
invalidated on due process grounds as an improper grant of legislative power 
to private parties.92 In addition, the Court concluded that coal production did 
not directly affect interstate commerce, but instead merely preceded 
commerce, and was therefore local in nature.93 
In response, FDR proposed a bill that would, in effect, allow him to pack 
the Court by expanding the bench from nine to fifteen members, presumably 
so that he could appoint justices more favorable to his policies." Roosevelt 
dropped his "Court-packing " plan, however, when one Justice "switched" 
and cast his vote in favor of Washington State's minimum wage law in West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. ~ a r r i s h ~  in 1937. Supreme Court review of a key New 
85. Id. at 541. Congress's stated policies included removing obstructions to the flow of 
commerce, encouraging the organization of industry and cooperative action among trade groups, 
advancing united action of labor and management, eradicating unfair competitive practices, and 
conserving natural resources. See id. at 521-36 (citing National Industrial Recovery Act 5 3, 48 
Stat. 196 (1933)). 
86. Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring). 
87. Id. at 524-550. 
88. 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
89. Id.at411.417-21. 
90. Id. at 415. 
91. 298 U.S. 238 (1936) 
92. Id. at 31 1; see &o United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64-68 (1935) (striking the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act as an invalid exercise of the general welfare clause). 
93. Cmer, 298 U.S. at 301-03; Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 33, at 70-71 (discussing 
Caner). For a discussion on the history and trends in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. see id. at 
56-93; i e a  Part III.B.2. 
94. TRIBE. supra note 2. at 66-68. 
95. 300 U.S. 379.400 (1937). Justice Owen Roberts. a Hoover appointee, has been dubbed 
"the switch in time that saved the nine." TRIBE, supra note 2, at 66 (quoting future Justice Abe 
Fortas); see also WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG. THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE 
BEYOND THE NEW DEAL 
Deal program followed closely on the heels of Parish, and in NLRB v. Jones 
& Luughlin Steel Corp. ,% the National Labor Relations Act was found a 
valid exercise of Commerce Clause a~ thor i ty .~  By the early 19403, 
legislation providing for unemployment compensation and agricultural 
support programs, along with the second Coal Conservation Act, had been 
upheld with minimal judicial re~istance.~' 
Professor Bruce Ackerman explains the events of 1935-37, including the 
Supreme Court's decisions and the re-election of Roosevelt in 1936, as 
nothing short of a pivotal "constitutional moment" in American legal 
history,99 It is by no means universally accepted, however, that Roosevelt's 
Court-packing plan had the direct effect of eviscerating judicial resistance to 
New Deal programs, thereby paving the way for a progressive new 
governmental approach to societal problems. loo Some commentators believe 
that individual pieces of early New Deal legislation would have survived had 
they been as ably drafted and defended as later "Second New Dealn 
enactment., like the National Labor Relations Act provisions at issue in 
Jones & Luughlin Steel.'" Although the exact reason may be unclear, 
without question, 1937 "marked a sharp change in the Supreme Court's habit 
of striking down New Deal legislation as exceeding the federal commerce 
power, or violating the due process or equal protection clauses. "IM 
In the ensuing years, broad delegations were routinely and universally 
upheld. Delegations that provided only vague standards have passed muster 
so long as the scope or degree of the agency's power could be construed as 
relatively narrow, or adequate procedural protections were given to the 
C O N ~ ~ O N A L  REVOLUTION I  THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 160-62 (1995) (asserting that the 
Court-packing plan directly affected the Court's response to New Deal legislation). 
96. 301 U.S. l(1937). 
97. Id. at 43. 
98. See Wickard v. Filburn. 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942); Superior Bath House Co. v. 
McCarroll, 312 U.S. 176, 179 (1941); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 31 F. Supp. 125, 
128 (E.D. Ark. 1940). 
99. Bruce Ackerman, The Srorrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L. J. 1013, 
1053-55 (1984) (explaining that the citizenry, responding to the signals sent by the Supreme Court's 
decisions, indicated its acceptance of significant new directions in legislative activity, not by 
attempting a formal constitutional amendment, but by way of the 1936 election); see ako  Daniel J .  
Hulsebosch, l71e New Deal Court: Emergence of a New Reason, 90 COLUM. L.  REV. 1973. 1979 
n.31 (1990). 
100. See DAVID P. CURRIE. THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND 
CENTURY 236-37 (1990); G. Edward White, Cabining the Constitutional History of the New Deal 
in Time, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1392, 1407-09 (1996). 
101. E-g.,  Barry Cushrnan, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 V A .  L. REV. 201, 249-55 
(1994). 
102. Daniel A. Crane, Faith, Reason, and Bare Animosity, 21 CAMPBELL . REV. 125, 136 
n.56 (1999). 
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persons subject to regulatory power.Io3 Courts have found that even the most 
ambiguous provisions may gain "meaningful contentn from the statute's 
overall purpose and general philosophy, as well as its legislative history, 
factual background or historical or social context.'" For example, statutes 
authorizing the Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcast 
licensing "as the public interest, convenience, or necessityn requires,IM the 
Price Administrator to fur "fair and equitable" commodities prices,Io6 and the 
War Department to recover "excessive profitsn ' earned from military 
c~ntracts,'~' have all withstood delegation challenges. 
By the 19703, the nondelegation doctrine was, for all intents and 
purposes, defunct. In Amlgamuted Meat Cutters v. C~nnally,'~* a 
remarkably broad provision of the Economic Stabilization Act was upheld, 
giving the President authority "to issue such orders and regulations [as 
deemed] appropriate to stabilize prices, rents, wages and salariesn at 1970 
levels, with 'adjustments as "necessary to prevent gross ineq~ities."'~~ 
According to the court, it was enough that the Act provided some limiting 
language, along with adequate procedural protections, including judicial 
review. 'lo 
The notion that procedural safeguards might allow a statute with few 
explicit guiding principles to dodge the nondelegation bullet finds support in 
the earlier Supreme Court cases, including Schechter ~oultry."' There, the 
Court drew a distinction between the offending provision of NIRA and other 
103. See PIERCE, supra note 30, at 53-55. 
104. E.g., Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Am. Power 
& Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946)). modifying on petition for reh'g, 175 F.3d 1027 
(D.C. Cir. 1999), cerr. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.); 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (mem.); 
see also Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947) (considering banking industry's 'well- 
defined practices" to uphold delegation to Federal Home Loan Bank Board to issue regulations for 
appointing conservators for savings and loan associations). 
105. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 214-16 (1943) (quoting 47 U.S.C. 8 303). 
106. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 , 422-26 (1944). 
107. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 747, 788-89 (1948). 
108. 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.C .C. 197 1) (Leventhal , J., for three-judge panel). 
109. Id. at 745. 764 (quoting Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 5 202. 84 Stat. 799 
(amended 197 1) (expired 1974)). 
110. Id. at 746-47. 
11 1. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935); see also 
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 583-85 (1963) (upholding delegation to Secretary of Interior 
where Secretary's power to apportion Colorado River water could be reined in by congressional 
oversight or judicial review); NBC. 319 U.S. at 214. 216 (rejecting a nondelegation challenge to the 
National Communications Act, which allowed regulation of radio broadcasting as the 'public 
convenience, interest, or necessity requires," because Congress had provided adequate guidance, in 
light of the Act's stated goals and procedures, when reviewed with the overall context of radio 
broadcasting in mind). 
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federal enactments like the Federal Trade Commission Act which, despite its 
seemingly unconstrained grant of discretion, required the agencydelegatee to 
utilize special procedures before making a determination of "unfair methods 
of ~ompetition.""~ In American Power & Light Co. v. SEC,'I3 the Court 
specifically noted that statutory rulemaking procedures and opportunities for 
judicial review provid.4 an adequate check against unconstrained delegation 
of power to executive agen~ies."~ Notably, that same year, the 
Administrative Procedure Act was enacted, requiring federal agencies to 
engage in specified rulemaking processes with increased opportunities for 
public invol~ement."~ The Act also opened the door for judicial review of 
agency action, which in many cases had been barred by sovereign 
immunity. ' I 6  
Thus, in the post-New Deal, post-Administrative Procedure Act era, 
courts have been far more interested in ensuring that procedural safeguards 
cabin the exercise of delegated power so that those affected by agency action 
are protected from arbitrary and abusive decisions. As the Oregon Supreme 
Court so adroitly observed: 
[Tjhe requirement of expressed standards has, in most instances, 
been little more than a judicial fetish for legislative language, the 
recitation of which provides no additional safeguards to persons 
affected by the exercise of the delegated authority . . . . [Ijt is of 
little or no significance . . . that the statute . . . stated the 
112. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 532-34. The opinion also distinguished the Interstate 
Commerce Act and the Federal Radio Act, both of which delegated power to executive agencies 
who were required to make findings, based upon evidence, before applying the relevant statutory 
standards. Id. at 539-41. 
113. 329 U.S. 90 (1946). 
114. Id. at 105-09; see nLro Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 170 (1991) (Marshall, J., 
concurring). 
115. See 5 U.S.C. Qg 551-559 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). For a discussion of the 
Administrative Procedure Act's background and legislative history, see McNollgast, supra note 5 1, 
at 180-84. 
116. See 5 U.S.C. 8 706 (1994 & Supp IV 1998). "It long has been established, of course, 
that the United States, as sovereign. 'is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . . 9 I) 
United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392. 399 (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 
(1941)); see afso Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 41 1-12 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) 
("The universally received opinion is. that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the 
United States"). However, the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 indicated that judicial review 
of administrative action should be available. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Claims Court at the 
Crossroads, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. 517, 522 (1991) (citing ch. 324, Pub.L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 
(1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 5 of the U.S. Code). To clarify the point, 
the 1976 amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act explicitly waived the federal 
government's sovereign immunity from injunctive relief. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 94 -574, 90 Stat. 
2721 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. 88 702-703)); see also United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206. 
227 n. 32 (1983). 
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permissible limits . . . in terms of such abstractions as "public 
convenience, interest or necessityn or . . . "for the public health, 
safety, and moralsn and similar phrases accepted as satisfying the 
standards requirement. 
Giving heightened attention to procedural safeguards over linguistics 
makes sense when viewed in light of the primary functions of the 
nondelegation doctrine. The noted administrative law scholar Kenneth Culp 
Davis proposed that the nondelegation doctrine be reformulated to better 
protect against arbitrary agency action: courts should "look to the totality of 
legislative and administrative standards and procedural safeguards to 
determine whether administrative discretion has been confined to the greatest 
degree practi~able.""~ So long as Congress has established the substantive 
policy choice, procedural requirements enhance judicial review by 
facilitating a complete administrative record, thereby providing a basis for 
more thorough inquiry into the agency's conclusions; as a result, regulatory 
decisions are less likely to be biased or arbitrary. Moreover, if the 
congressional objective is provided and some guidance is available, either 
explicitly or otherwise, so that agencies are not making law out of whole 
cloth and courts are afforded a meaningful oversight role, separation of 
powers is less likely to be impaired. 
B. Judicial Review in Recent Years: Another Swing of the Pendulum 
1. Supreme Court Review of Nondelegation Challenges 
Although no post-New Deal Supreme Court opinion has invalidated a 
statute on nondelegation grounds, since 1980 there have been a few signals 
that the pendulum may be swinging back, under the weight of the most 
- - - - - - 
117. Warren v. Marion County, 353 P.2d 257, 260-01 (Or. 1960) (en banc) (citing 1 DAVIS, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, 88 2.03--05; and FORKOSH, ADMINSTRATIVE LAW, 58 83- 
84). Oregon is one of a handful of states that seem to rely solely on procedural safeguards in 
rejecting nondelegation claims. See Gary J.  Greco. StMdards or S@eguards: A Survey of the 
Delegation Doctrine in the Stares, 8 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 567, 598-99 (1994). Many states have 
upheld delegations to administrative agencies if the legislature has provided some form of "loose" 
standards, particularly if the legislation includes procedural safeguards. Id. at 574, 588-97. 
118. 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE $8 3.3. .15 (26 ed. 1978); 
see also Kenneth C .  Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U .  CHI. L. REV. 713 (1969). 
Davis's proposal gained support in state courts. see Developments in the -7he Interpretarion of 
State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L .  REV. 1324, 1477 (1982). and likely influenced the three- 
judge panel in Amalgamated Meat Cutters, see supra notes 108- 10 and accompanying text. See also 
SUNSTEIN, RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 26, at 24-25. 
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conservative justices, toward the "strict" nondelegation review seen in the 
early New Deal cases. That year, in Inahstrial Union Department v. 
American Petroleum Institute,"9 the Court remanded an Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration ("OSHAn) standard limiting workplace exposure 
to benzene.'" The Occupational Safety and Health Act required OSHA to 
set exposure Iimits for toxic materials that would "most adequately assure, to 
the extent feasible . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment" of 
health.I2' According to the plurality opinion, had "feasibility" been the only 
limitation on agency discretion, OSHA could impose substantial costs on 
industry without any risk-based ju~tification.'~~ Citing Schechter Poultry, the 
Court surmised that such a "sweeping delegation of legislative power" might 
violate the nondelegation d0~tr ine. l~~ The Court, however, avoided the 
constitutional issue by finding that OSHA's discretion was adequately curbed 
by the Act's definition of safety standards as those standards "necessary or 
appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment."'" This provision was 
~ 0 n ~ t ~ e d  as requiring OSHA to make a threshold determination that a 
"significant risk of material health impairment" existed at the level of 
exposure prohibited by its regulation.'= 
Justice Rehnquist, concurring, believed that the statutory provision did in 
fact violate the nondelegation doctrine because it gave "absolutely no 
indication where on the continuum of relative safety [the Secretary of Labor] 
should draw his line."'26 Rehnquist added that, "in the light of the 
importance of the interests at stake, I have no doubt that the provision at 
issue, standing alone, would violate the doctrine against uncanalized 
delegations of legislative power. "I2' Justice Scalia, a law professor at the 
time, praised the possible revival of the nondelegation doctrine: "[Elven 
with all its Frankenstein-like warts, knobs, and (concededly) dangers, the 
unconstitutional delegation doctrine is worth hewing from the ice. The 
119. 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
120. Id. at 662. 
121. 29 U.S.C. # 655@)(5) (1994). 
122. Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 640. 
123. Id. at 646 (quoting A. L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v .  United States. 295 U .S. 495, 539 
(1935)). 
124. Id. at 639 (quoting Occupational Safety and Health Act, 8 3(8), 29 U.S.C. 8 652(8) 
(1994)). 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 675 (Rehnquist. J . ,  concurring). Justice Rehnquist opined that "the language 'to 
the extent feasible' . . . render[sJ what had been a clear, if somewhat unrealistic, standard largely, 
if not entirely, precatory. " Id. ar 681-82. 
127. Id. at 675. 
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alternative appears to be a continuation of the widely felt trend toward 
government by bureaucracy or (what is no better) government by courts. 
One year later, in American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. 
~ o n o v a n , ' ~ ~  the Court, reviewing the Occupational Safety and Health Act yet 
again, held that a cost-benefit analysis was not required to support "feasible" 
exposure ~ tandards . '~~  It found that the legislative history, though not 
"crystal clear," provided sufficient evidence that feasible meant "capable of 
economic and technological accomplishment. " 13' In dissent, Justice 
Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, stated that Congress itself was 
required to make the hard policy decision regarding the role of costs in 
workplace safety; by evading the issue, it had unlawfully delegated its duties 
to an executive agency.'32 
A delegation issue was raised again in Mistretta v. United but 
was flatly rejected by the Court, which held that Congress had provided 
sufficient guidance for the Sentencing Commission to develop federal 
sentencing guidelines.'" Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, noted 
that, although Congress had granted the Commission substantial discretion in 
formulating guidelines, the congressional directives at issue went beyond 
mere "intelligible  principle^."'^^ It was sufficient that Congress had 
legislated "a full hierarchy of punishment-from near maximum 
imprisonment, to substantial imprisonment, to some imprisonment, to 
alternatives-and stipulated the most important offense and offender 
characteristics to place defendants within these categories. Indeed, 
according to the Court, the development of sentencing guidelines "for 
hundreds of different crimes by a virtually limitless array of offenders is 
precisely the sort of intricate, labor-intensive task for which delegation to an 
128. Antonin Scalia, A Note on the Benzene Case, REG. Jul-Aug 1980, at 25, 28; see also 
Andres Snaider. Note. 7 7 ~  Politics and Tension in Deligating [sic] Plenary Power: The Need to 
Revive Nondelegation Principles in the Field of Immigration, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J . 107, 1 1 1 - 1 12 
(1 992). 
129. 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
130. Id. at 508-09, 530-36 (quoting 29 U.S.C. 5 655(b)(5)). 
131. Id. at 514. 
132. Id. at 547-48 (Rehnquist, J . ,  dissenting). The two dissenters stressed the importance of 
leaving questions of fundamental policy in the hands of 'the elected representatives of the people," 
but conceded that if the delegation had involved a complex technical issue incapable of legislative 
resolution due to a lack of congressional expertise, rather than a matter of public policy avoided 
because of a lack of political will, it may have been permissible. Id. 
133. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
134. Id. at 371-80. 
135. Id. at 379. 
136. Id. at 377. 
32:941] BEYOND THE NEW DEAL 967 
expert body is especially appropriate. "I3' The Court made a point of 
explaining that, in a complex modem society, "Congress simply cannot do 
its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general  directive^,"'^^ 
and that Congress, in enacting regulatory statutes, need not select the method 
of policy implementation that would result in the most minimal delegation of 
discretion to administrative officers possible.'39 
After Mistretta, all had been relatively quiet on the nondelegation front in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence until the Court accepted the petitions for 
certiorari in American Trucking.14 However, during the intervening years, 
the Court had reined in congressional and executive powers under a variety 
of other theories, indicating that there may also be renewed interest in 
nondelegation as a limitation on federal power. In particular, federalism 
concerns have experienced a resurrection, with a majority of the Court 
imposing limitations based on states' rights and a restrictive view of the 
Commerce Clause powers. 
2. Supreme Court Review of Commerce Clause and Federalism 
Challenges 
Throughout the post-New Deal era, the scope of the Commerce Clause 
was viewed as so exceedingly broad that it appeared to be almost limitless. 
In fact, between 1937 and 1995, the Supreme Court upheld every federal 
- - - -- - - - - -- - - - 
137. Id. at379. 
138. Id. at 372; see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996) ('To burden 
Congress with all federal rulemaking would divert that branch from more pressing issues, and 
defeat the Framers' design of a workable National Government."). 
139. Id. at 379 (citing Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425-26 (1994)). 
140. Browner v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.); Am. Trucking Ass'ns 
v. Browner, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (mem.). There were only a few cases in the late 1980's and 
early 1990's that dealt with nondelegation arguments head on. In 1991, the Supreme Court upheld 
a statute allowing the Attorney General to schedule controlled substances on a temporary basis if 
they posed an "imminent hazard to the public safety." Touby v.  United States, 500 U.S. 160, 166- 
67 (1991) (quoting 21 U.S.C. 8 811(h)(1)) (noting that the statute imposed additional restrictions on 
the discretion to list sllbstances: such substances must have a 'high potential for abuse," with 'no 
currently accepted medical use treatment" and 'a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug . . . 
under medical supervision"). The Court also upheld provisions of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice allowing the President to define aggravating factors for imposition of the death penalty in 
military capital cases, Loving, 517 U.S. at 771-774, and to exercise the taxing power, Skinner v. 
Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 220-21 (1989). Most recently, in reviewing a broad- 
sweeping grant of authority to the Food and Drug Administration ('FDAn) to regulate drugs and 
drug devices, the Court did not even hint at nondelegation, instead applying routine standards of 
judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1297-1315 (2000); discussion infra Part V.B. 
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statute challenged on Commerce Clause grounds.I4' But Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence experienced a sea-change in 1995, and the Court has since 
struck down two high profile federal regulatory programs as beyond 
interstate commerce, raising themes not seen since the Lochner years. In 
1995, the Court issued United States v. Lopez,'42 invalidating the Gun-Free 
School Zones which made knowing possession of a firearm in school 
zones a federal offense. 14' The Lopez decision held that the Act "by its terms 
haEd] nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise"; 
thus, possession of a gun in a school zone could not be considered an 
economic activity that "substantially affect[edIn interstate commerce. 
Subsequently, in United States v. Morrison,146 the Court struck down the 
civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women AC~, '~ '  finding that 
gender-motivated crimes of violence did not constitute economic activity 
within the reach of the federal Commerce Clause power.I4' Most recently, 
several environmental statutes have come under fire, and the Court has 
accepted certiorari in a Clean Water Act case challenging the regulation of 
wetlands as beyond the purview of the Commerce C 1 a ~ e . l ~ ~  
141. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 33, at 1, 4, 13-107 (providing an indepth assessment 
of the historic underpinnings of the Commerce Clause and the evolution of Commerce Clause 
jurispmdence). 
142. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
143. 18 U.S.C. 8 922(q) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
144. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62 (1995). Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 
stressed that federal legislative authority under the Commerce Clause "is subject to outer limits." 
Id. at 557. He remarked that the scope of the interstate commerce power: 
[Must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may 
not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect 
and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would 
effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local 
and create a completely centralized government. 
Id. (quoting dicta in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)). 
145. Id. at 562. The Court noted that: 
Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial 
burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce . . . . But to the extent that 
congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that 
the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though 
no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here. 
Id. at 562-63 (citations omitted). 
146. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000). 
147. 42 U.S.C. 8 13,981 (1994). 
148. Id. at 1749-52. 
149. See Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs. 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 
1999). cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000). Commerce Clause challenges to another far-reaching 
environmental statute, the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. $5 1531-1543 (1994). have also 
been raised in the circuit courts, so far unsuccessfully. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 492-94 
(4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Endangered Species Act's prohibition on activities on private 
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The remarkable nature of the h p e z  and Morrison decisions can best be 
illustrated with a brief historical overview. During the Lochner Era, a 
restrictive view of Commerce Clause powers prevailed when, for example, 
federal laws designed to put an end to child labor were struck down as 
unconstitutional in Hammer v. ~ a g e n h a r t . ' ~  Under Hammer, Congress 
could regulate only those activities with direct effects on interstate 
co~nrnerce.'~~ Two of the cases that brought that era to a close were United 
States v. D~rby, '~*  which overruled Hammer, and Jones & Laughlira Steel, 
which held that activities that individually are intrastate in nature may be 
regulated if together they have a "substantial relation to interstate 
Subsequently, the Court upheld one of the most sweeping 
assertions of power over commerce ever to come before it in Wckard v .  
Filburn,'" finding that Congress had a rational basis for believing that the 
aggregate effects of domestic, noncommercial wheat farming, used largely 
for home consumption, substantially affected commerce and therefore 
justified federal regulation.'" There, the Court noted that a more expansive 
view of Commerce Clause powers was consistent with the earliest Supreme 
Court precedent: "At the beginning Chief Justice Marshall described the 
Federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded. n's6 
After Wickard, a relaxed view of the Commerce Clause powers prevailed 
until the 1995 Lopez case. The "substantial relationn test is still the present 
day formulation of federal Commerce Clause p~wers, '~' but in application 
property that would "take" a red wolf and reintroduce it into its historic range as an experimental 
population of endangered species, was valid under the Commerce Clause); Nat'l Ass'n of Home 
Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1041-57 @.C. Cir. 1997) (finding the Endangered Species 
Act's "take" provision, as applied to endangered species of fly found only in California, was a 
constitutional exercise of the Commerce Clause power), cen. denied. 524 U.S. 937 (1998). In 
Gibbs, the court expressly distinguished Morrison and Lopez, and found that the provision at issue 
involved economic and commercial activities (tourism, scientific research and commercial trade in 
animals and pelts). and that takings of red wolves in the aggregate would have a substantial impact 
on interstate commerce. 214 F.3d at 490-510. 
150. 247 U.S. 251, 273-TI (1918). 
151. Id. 
152. 312 U.S. 100, 115-25 (1941). Darby also limited Caner Coal and, by implication, 
Lochner. For a discussion of the erosion of judicial intolerance for New Deal programs, see supra 
notes 94-102 and accompanying text. 
153. 301 U.S. 1. 36-37 (1937). 
154. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
155. Id. at 120, 128 ("It can hardly !w denied that a factor of such volume and variability as 
home-consumed wheat would have a substantial influence on price and market conditions."). 
156. Id. at 120 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1. 194-195 (1824)). 
157. The "substantial relation" test is one of three categories within the regulatory scope of the 
Commerce Clause. Congress may also cuntrol "the channels of interstate commerce" to keep them 
"'free from immoral and injurious uses,'* such as racial discrimination, and "the instrumentalities 
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the test is becoming far more restrictive, as seen in both Lopez and 
Morrison. In Morrison, Justice Souter, in dissent, lamented: 
Since adherence to these formalistically contrived confines of 
commerce power in large measure provoked the judicial crisis of 
1937, one might reasonably have doubted that Members of this 
Court would ever again toy with a return to the days before NLRB 
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Cow. . . . , which brought the earlier 
and nearly disastrous experiment to an end. And yet today's 
decision can only be seen as a step toward recapturing the prior 
mistakes. '" 
The Court's efforts to distinguish post-1937 Commerce Clause cases like 
Wickard from Lochner Era cases like Hammer were not the result of a 
principled application of constitutional theory or precedent, explained Justice 
Souter, but "laissez-faire economics, the point of which was to keep 
government interference to a minimum. "Is9 
Even beyond the Commerce Clause context, the Court has expressed 
renewed interest in federalism and states' rights.16" Up until the early 
199O9s, federalism challenges to congressional enactments had almost as 
dismal a track record as did Commerce Clause arguments, with the Court 
rejecting all but one.I6' Then, in 1992, the Court struck a provision of the 
of interstate commerce," such as navigational channels and railroads, including vehicles traveling 
wholly within a state. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (citations omitted). 
158. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1767 (2000). A precursor to this remark 
can be found in the concurring and dissenting opinions in Lopez. There, Souter, in dissent, queried 
whether the Court's decision "does anything but portend a return to the untenable jurisprudence 
from which the Court extricated itself almost 60 years ago. " 514 U.S. at 608. He replied to his 
own rhetorical question: "[tlhe answer is not reassuring." Id. Justice Kennedy, concurring, stated 
that "[tlhis case requires us to consider our place in the design of the Government and to appreciate 
the significance of federalism in the whole structure of the Constitution." Id. at 575. 
159. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1768 (citing toper, 514 U.S. at 605-06). 
160. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, m e  Three Faces of Federalism: An Empirical 
Assessment of Supreme Courr Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 741, 741 (2000) 
(noting that "[tlhe most recent Supreme Court term devoted considerable attention to federalism, 
especially under the Eleventh Amendment, and was perceived to have aggressively advanced the 
interests of states' rights vis-8- vis federal legislation."). 
161. Until 1992, only one federal statute was declared unconstitutional on federalism grounds. 
That case, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), was subsequently 
overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Tramit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 530-31 (1985). 
See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 F L A .  L.  REV. 499, 502 (1995); Laurence 
H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Anrmative Rights to 
Essential Government Services, 90 H A R V .  L.  REV. 1065, 1067 (1977). Professor Chemerinsky's 
article provides an illuminating exposition of Supreme Court federalism jurisprudence and its 
relationship to the underlying values of federalism, defined, for the purposes of the article, as the 
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Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act which required states to accept 
ownership of waste or regulate it according to congressional instructions, 
reasoning that such requirements lie outside Congress's enumerated powers 
and were inconsistent with the Tenth A few years later, in 
Printz v. United States,'* the Court found that a provision of the Brady 
Act16" requiring states to conduct background checks on prospective handgun 
purchasers, imposed an unconstitutional obligation on state officers to 
execute federal laws.16' The Court's opinion emphasized the vitality of the 
system of "dual sovereignty" established by the Framers, as well as the 
express limitation on national power found in the Tenth Amendment's 
reservation of state power. 166 
State sovereign immunity has likewise been invoked more frequently in 
recent years to restrict the scope of a variety of federal regulatory statutes, 
including the Age Discrimination in Employment the Fair Labor 
Standards Act,16' and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.'@ Even the recent 
Morrison decision, striking the Violence Against Women Act, can be 
characterized as a blow for federalism. Although the holding is based on 
Commerce Clause analysis, according to dissenting Justice Souter, it was a 
extent to which state governmental autonomy limits the exercise of federal power. See generally 
Chemerinsky , supra. 
162. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-88 (1992). Similarly, in Cipollone v. 
Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992), the Court held that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act generally did not preempt actions for damages under state law tort theories. Justice 
Blackmun attributed the Court's reluctance to find preemption to 'the principles of federalism and 
respect for state sovereignty. " Id. at 533 (Blackmun, J.,  concurring in part). 
163. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
164. 18 U.S.C. 8 922(s) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996). 
165. Prim, 521 U.S. at 933-35. 
166. 521 U .S. at 918-22; see also U. S. CONW. amend. X ('The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people."). 
167. See Kimel v. Fia. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 640-50 (2000) (concluding that 
Congress had gone beyond its authority by attempting to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity from suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). 
168. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that Congress could not subject 
state to Fair Labor Standards Act suit in state court without its consent). 
169. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida. 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) ( f d i n g  that Congress lacked 
authority. in the face of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, to subject states to Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act claims in federal court). Another recent Supreme Coun case that could be 
placed in the shadow cast by federalism is City of Boeme v. Flores, 1 17 S. Ct. 2157, 2 172 (1997), 
striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, in part because it undermined the 
federal-state balance. Id. at 2172-74. 
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product of the majority's interest in the states' long tradition of exercising 
police powers over violent ~rirnes."~ 
Both the increasing use of states' rights and the judicial curtailment of 
Commerce Clause powers have closely tracked the renewal of the 
nondelegation doctrine, with each theory once again becoming viable means 
of limiting federal regulatory powers in the twenty-first century 
administrative state. Most susceptible to limitation are those statutes and 
regulations that have the potential for pervasive economic effects. 
3. The D .C. Circuit's Decision in American Trucking 
Echoing the Commerce Clause and federalism themes of Printz, Morrison 
and Lopez, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit invalidated the 
EPA's interpretation of the Clean Air Act in American Trucking."' The 
court held that the EPA's regulation of ground-level ozone ("03") and 
particulate matter resulted in an "unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
power,"In reviving a doctrine "dormant since the mushrooming of the 
regulatory state under the New Deal."'" Instead of finding the statute 
unconstitutional and vacating the national ambient air quality standards 
("NAAQS") in their entirety, however, the court remanded the regulations to 
the EPA for an articulation of intelligible principles to constrain the agency's 
di~cretion."~ The EPA's petition for rehearing en banc on the nondelegation 
170. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1768 (1999) (Souter, I., dissenting). 
However. the Court rejected both Commerce Clause and federalism challenges in one notable case. 
Reno v. Condon, 120 S .  Ct. 666, 672 (2000), where it held that Congress could restrict the sale or 
release of a driver's personal information in the Driver's Privacy Protection Act pursuant to its 
authority to regulate interstate commerce. Distinguishing Lopez, the Court noted that this 
information was widely 'used by insurers. manufacturers, and direct marketers." and that the sale 
and release of such information as an interstate article of commerce was 'sufficient to support 
congressional regulation. " Id. at 671. Distinguishing Prim and New York, the Court held that the 
Driver's Privacy Protection Act did not offend the Tenth Amendment, as it did "not require the 
states in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens." but rather 'regulate[d] the states 
as the owners of databases." Id. at 672. 
171. 175 F.3d 1027, 1033-40 @.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) 
(mem.); 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (rnem.). 
172. Id. at 1034. 1057 (remanding the ozone final rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,863 (1997). and the 
final particulate matter rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,637 (1996)). 
173. George F. Will, See You in Congress . . . , WASH. POST, May 20, 1999, at A29; see 
also Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1057 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
174. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1057 (resewing the question of whether the fine particulate 
NAAQS should be vacated), modified on petition for reh 'g, 195 F.3d 4 @.C. Cir. 1999), cert. 
granred. 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) (rnem.); 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (rnem.). 
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issue was narrowly denied,"' but the Supreme Court has granted its petition 
for certiorari. "6 
Pursuant to the Clean Air Act, the EPA must set primary air pollution 
standards, or NAAQS, for certain criteria pollutants as "requisite to protect 
the public health* with an "adequate margin of safety."'" It must review the 
NAAQS at least every five years and revise them when "appropriate," using 
the same criteria and processes as it used to set them in the first ~1ace. l '~  
Further, the Act generally requires standards to "accurately reflect the latest 
scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable 
effects on public health or welfare which may be expected from the presence 
of such pollutant in the ambient air, in varying q~antities.""~ A key goal of 
the Act is "to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so 
as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its 
populati~n." '~~ Largely as a result of the NAAQS, the Act can be credited 
with tremendous irnprovemenl in air quality for all of the criteria pollutants, 
and is considered a great success story among regulatory  program^.'^' 
The court engaged in a detailed consideration of the agency's revised 
ozone and particulate matter NAAQS. In revising its ozone NAAQS, the 
court noted, the EPA had performed an extensive review of studies on the 
risks of lung diseases associated with automobile and industrial emissions of 
ozone precursors and had considered findings by the Clean Air Scientific 
Advisory Committee ("CASAC"), a scientific body established pursuant to 
the A C ~ . " ~  The EPA focused on the nature and severity of adverse health 
175. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S .  Ct. 
2003 (2000) (mern.); 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (mem.). Only four judges voted to deny the petition, 
while five would have granted a rehearing en banc. Because Judges Wald and Henderson did not 
participate, the EPA failed to get the vote of a majority of the judges in regular active service. See 
195 F.3d at 13. 
176. Am. Trucking, 120 S .  Ct. at 2003 (mem.). A few days later, the Court also granted the 
industry's petition for certiorari to review the EPA's interpretation of the statute as prohibiting a 
consideration of costs in setting the NAAQS. Am. Trucking, 120 S. Ct. at 2 193 (mern.). 
177. Clean Air Act g 109(b)(l). (d). 42 U .S.C. 8 7409@), (d) (1994). The Act also requires 
secondary NAAQS to protect the "public welfare," id. 5 7409 (b)(2) (1994), which generally 
includes effects on the environment as well as "economic values," 42 U.S.C. (1 760201) (1994). 
Criteria pollutants are those air pollutants caused by 'numerous or diverse" sources that have an 
adverse effect on public health or welfare, as listed by the EPA pursuant to section 108, 42 U.S.C. 
1 7408(a) (1994). 
178. Clean Air Act 4 109(d)(l), 42 U.S.C. 8 7409(d)(1) (1994). 
179. Clean Air Act 98 108, 109, 42 U.S.C. 08 7408(a)(2), 7409(b)(l) (1994). 
180. Clean Air Act 8 101(b)(l), 42 U.S.C. (1 7401(b)(l) (1994). 
181. Sunstein, Air 11, supra note 48, at 323 n.84, tbl. 1. 
182. See Clean Air Act 8 109(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. 8 7409(d)(2) (1994). CASAC also peer- 
reviewed the EPA's staff reports regarding the health effects of ozone and particulate matter. See 
Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027. 1035 @.C. Cir. 1999), modified on petition for 
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effects, the size of the at-risk population, and the degree of scientific 
uncertainty at various levels of exposure.lg3 However, the agency could not 
pinpoint with precision an ambient concentration level for either ozone or 
particulate matter "requisite to protect the public health" with an "adequate 
margin of safety. " 
Focusing on ozone as representative of the rulemaking at issue, the EPA 
faced a difficult task because ozone is regarded as a non-threshold pollutant- 
one which likely causes adverse health affects at any exposure level above 
zero . IB  EPA Administrator Carol Browner explained that the agency's risk 
assessment of exposures at levels above zero "indicated differences in risk to 
the public among various levels . . . but they did not by themselves provide a 
clear break point for a decision. "Ia6 In the face of scientific uncertainties, the 
EPA decided to replace the existing 0.12 parts per million ("ppm") standard, 
based on one-hour average concentration levels, with a new 0.08 ppm eight- 
hour standard, a level that had been recommended by CASAC."~ It 
determined that more people are exposed to more serious and long-term 
effects at levels above 0.08 ~ p r n . " ~  In rejecting a more stringent standard, 
the EPA explained that 0.07 ppm was closer to peak background levels from 
non-anthropogenic sources of ozone,'89 and that "[tlhe most certain 0 3 -  
reh'g. 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted. 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.); 120 S. Ct. 
2193 (2000) (mem.). Oxides of nitrogen and other pollutants react with sunlight to form ozone, or 
smog; thus, the effects of these precursors were considered in the rulemaking. Id. 
183. See Am. Trucking. 175 F.3d at 1035 (citing National Ambient Air Quality Standard for 
Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,868, 38,883 (Jul. 18, 1997)). 
184. Alec C. Zacaroli, Court Rulings Imperil EPA's Efforts to Clamp Down on Ozone 
Pollution, 30 ENV'T REP. 325. 326 (1999). 
185. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone: Proposed Decision, 61 Fed. Reg. 
65,716, 65,727 (1996) (noting that 'it is not possible to select a level below which absolutely no 
effects are likely to occur"). " 0 3  may elicit a continuum of biological responses down to 
background concentrations." Id. (quoting G.T. Wolff. Letter from Chairman of Clean Air Scientific 
Advisory Committee to EPA Adminisvator (Nov. 30. 1995) (EPA-SAB-CASAC-LTR-96-002)). 
For a detailed assessment of the particulate matter NAAQS, see Sunstein, Air N, supra note 48, at 
325-330. See &o Joseph M .  Feller. Non-Threshold Pollutants and Air Qualiry Standards. 24 
Envtl. L. 821, 825 (1991) (concluding "attempts to deal rationally with the problems of air 
pollution are frustrated because the threshold assumption is built into the Act"). 
186. EPA Proposed Clean Air Reguiatiom: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Env't and Pub. 
Works, 105th Cong. (1997) (testimony of Carol M. Browner, Adm' r, EPA). 
187. National &Hour Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 40 
C.F.R. 5 50.10; National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (July 18, 
1997). The new standard is roughly equivalent to a one-hour standard set at 0.09 ppm. National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone. 62 Fed. Reg. at 38.868. 
188. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,868. 
189. Id. Thus, regulatory efforts in regions that fail to attain 0.08 pprn would more likely 
reach controllable human activity rather than natural levels of ozone. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. 
EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1060 @.C. Cir. 1999) (Tatel, J., dissenting), mod#ed on petition for reh'g, 
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related effects [at 0.07 ppm], while judged to be adverse, are transient and 
reversible. " lgO 
The court did not seriously question the science behind the 0.08 ppm 
standard, noting that the EPA's conclusions were within the range 
recommended by CASAC and based on hundreds of studies published in 
peer-reviewed journals on ozone's effects on human respiratory f~nctions.'~' 
Instead, the court found that the agency had failed to articulate an 
"intelligible principle" in setting its new  standard^,'^^ stating that "it is as 
though Congress commanded EPA to select 'big guys,' and EPA announced 
that it would evaluate candidates based on height and weight, but revealed no 
cutoff point."'93 While such an approach may seem sensible enough on its 
face, the court stated, a reasonable person would also ask, "'How tall?' 
'How heavy?' "' 
According to the court, the EPA had examined appropriate factors to 
focus the inquiry on ozone's effects on public health at various exposure 
levels-the severity and certainty of adverse health effects, and the size of 
population affected.lgs Even so, it found that the EPA lacked a "determinate 
criterion for drawing lines" to justify the selection of any exposure level 
above zero.'% The agency's rationale for its choice of revised NAAQS 
"leaves it free to pick any point between zero and a hair below the 
concentrations yielding London's Killer Fog. 
The EPA's interpretation of section 109 was equated with OSHA's efforts 
to enact standards "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or 
healthful employment, " 19* which were invalidated in International Union, 
195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999). CeR. grunted, 120 S .  Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.); 120 S. Ct. 2193 
(2000) (mem .) . 
190. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,868. 
191. Am. Trucking. 175 F.3d at 1035-37, 1059-60. 
192. Id. at 1034. The coun found the particulate matter standard deficient on similar grounds. 
Id. at 1036. 
193. Id. at 1034. 
194. Id. (citations omitted). 
195. Id. at 1034-35 (citing National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 
at 38,883). The three criteria used by the EPA to assess health effects were expressly approved by 
the court in Lead Industries Ass 'n v. EPA. 647 F. 2d 1 130, 1 161-62 @.C. Cir . 1980). There, the 
court explicitly rejected Lead Industries' argument that the EPA must consider costs and 
technological feasibility in setting lead NAAQS. Id. at 1153. 
196. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034. 
197. Id. at 1037. In 1952, extremely high particulate matter levels, up to 2,500 gJm3, 
contributed to 4,000 deaths in one week. Id. at 1036 (citing W.P.D. Logan, Mortality in the 
London Fog Inciden!, 1952, m e  Lancet. Feb. 4, 1953, at 336-38). 
198. Id. at 1037. 
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UAW v. OSHA ("Lockout/Tagout z " ) . ' ~ ~  In that case, a regulation requiring 
employers to lock or tag energy isolating devices, such as circuit breakers, 
when maintaining or servicing industrial equipment was remanded for a more 
precise d e f i n i t i ~ n . ~  The D.C. Circuit rejected OSHA's view that it could 
impose any feasible restriction it chose as. unreasonably broad in light of 
nondelegation  principle^.^^' 
Similarly, in American Trucking, the court found that the EPA's 
interpretation was so broad that it violated the nondelegation doctrine. 
"EPA's freedom of movement between the poles" is as unconstrained as that 
asserted by OSHA in Lockout/Tagout I, "but the poles are even farther 
apart-the maximum stringency would send industry not just to the brink of 
ruin but hurtling over it, while the minimum stringency may be close to 
doing nothing at all. "''' 
Judge Tatel, in dissent, had no difficulty distinguishing Lockout/Tagout I. 
Unlike the Occupational Safey and Health Act: 
The Clean Air Act does not delegate to EPA authority to do 
whatever is 'reasonably necessary or appropriate' to protect public 
health. Instead the statute directs the Agency to fashion standards 
that are 'requisite' to protect the public health. In other words, 
EPA must set pollution standards at levels necessary to protect the 
public health, whether 'reasonable' or not, whether 'appropriate' 
or not.z03 
In other words, Congress did not allow the EPA to prioritize economic 
considerations over health in setting the NAAQS pursuant to the Clean Air 
Act; Congress itself chose health as its priority by precluding a consideration 
of  cost^.^ As such, the Act's requirement that standards be set as 
"requisite" for public health, according to Judge Tatel, was far more 
analogous to the regulation upheld in International Union, UAW v. OSHA 
("Lockout/Tagout N"),m where OSHA identified a "'significant' safety risk, 
to enact a safety standard that provides a 'high degree of worker 
199. 938 F.2d 1310 @.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting language on standards from the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act #3(8). 29 U.S.C. 8 652(8) (1994)). 
200. Id. at 1312-13. 
201. Id. at 1313. This decision was written by Judge Steven Williams, who also penned the 
nondelegation part of the American Trucking opinion. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1027. 
202. Am. Tnrcking. 175 F.3d at 1037. 
203. Id. at 1058 (Tatel. J., dissenting) (second emphasis added). 
204. See Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148-55 (1980) (finding that Congress 
had prohibited the EPA from considering the economic or technological feasibility of attaining 
NAAQS); Adler, supra note 67, at 10,243 (citing language of # 108(a)(2) and legislative history to 
support conclusion that Congress made the basic policy choice: health). 
205. 37 F.3d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
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protection. '"206 Either way, the agencies are directed to "ensure a high 
degree of protection. 
Judge Tatel also took issue with his colleagues' critique of the EPA's 
rationale for differentiating between 0.08 ppm and some more stringent 
regulatory level. "[The] EPA did not find simply that public health risks 
decrease at lower levels. Instead, it found that public health effects dzjJer 
below 0.08 ppm, i.e., that they are 'transient and reversible,'" and that 0.08 
ppm, unlike 0.07 ppm, was distinguishable from background ozone levels. m8 
Moreover, the EPA's extensive review of relevant studies, and of CASAC's 
recommendations, was in line with the Act's requirements that the NAAQS 
"accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge" about effects of air 
pollution on human health.209 In any event, Judge Tatel pointed out that 
"[wlhether EPA arbitrarily selected the studies it relied upon or drew 
mistaken conclusions from those studies . . . has nothing to do with our 
inquiry under the nondelegation doctrine. Those issues relate to whether the 
NAAQS are arbitrary and ~apricious."~ lo 
Judge Tatel hit the nail on the head. The starting point for analysis of a 
nondelegation claim should be the congressional directive as set forth in the 
language of the statute, in view of the statute's purpose, history and 
conte~t .~" After all, the focus of the inquiry is whether Congress has 
unlawfully delegated legislative powers and unconstitutionally blurred the 
lines of power between the branches of government. A central purpose of 
the nondelegation doctrine is to insure that Congress, a legislative body 
comprised of diverse representatives from all different geographical areas of 
the United States, makes the basic policy choices, rather than unelected 
agency How, then, can the EPA fm the problem of 
206. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1059 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (citing Lmkout/Tagout 11, 37 F.3d 
at 669). OSHA's second regulatory attempt, after the remand in Lmkout/Tagour I, was found to 
satisfy nondelegation concerns because its new interpretation, requiring "a high degree of worker 
protection" once a "significant" safety risk was identified, would only allow deviation from 
maximum feasible stringency by a "modest" amount. Lockout~Tagout 11, 37 F.3d at 669; see aLro 
Industrial Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (the Benzene case). 
207. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1059 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
208. Id. at 1059-60 (emphasis added). The majority opinion stated that the EPA's rationale 
for choosing 0.08 ppm amounted to nothing more than unremarkable assertions "that a less 
stringent standard would allow the relevant pollutant to inflict a greater quantum of harm on public 
health, and that a more stringent standard would result in less harm." Id. at 1035. 
209. Id. at 1058 (quoting Clean Air Act 8 108, 42 U.S.C. 8 7408(a)(2) (1994)). 
210. Id. at 1061 (emphasis added). See generally infra Part IV (discussing judicial review 
under administrative law principles as a viable alternative to nondelegation analysis). 
21 1. See Am. Power & Light, Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946). 
212. Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, I., 
concurring); Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038. 
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congressional abdication if, in fact, abdication is evident in the Act? If the 
Act is so obscure as to provide no intelligible directives to the agency, surely 
that would be evidence that Congress intentionally chose to punt on basic 
policy choices-a course of action forbidden by the nondelegation doctrine 
and therefore impossible for an agent of the executive branch to fix. 
Despite judicial protestations to the contrary, the majority opinion in 
American Trucking seems more in line with the Rehnquistian predilection to 
subject certain delegations to "strictn review than with any precedent 
provided by post-New Deal Supreme Court decisions.213 In support of its 
decision to invalidate the NAAQS on nondelegation grounds, the court cited 
only two Supreme Court majority opinions, Schechter ~oul t$I~  and a 1928 
case, J.  W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United Ironically, in J.  W. 
Hampton the Court found that a law authorizing the President to regulate 
customs duties was not an invalid delegation of legislative power.'16 The 
Court stated that it was simply a matter of "common sense" that a 
commission would be endowed with the power to investigate, take evidence 
from interested parties, and fix rates in accord with general objectives laid 
down by ~ongress.'" 
The statute at issue in Schechter Poultry, NIRA, delegated legislative 
power, not to an executive agency like the EPA, but to private In 
fact, of the few Supreme Court cases to strike down congressional 
delegations, both Schechter Poultry and Carter Coal involved delegations to 
private unions and trade associations.219 In Carter Coal, a statute that 
allowed a majority of miners to set a minimum wage and limit hours worked 
during the week was invalidated as "delegation in its most obnoxious 
213. The court protested that it was not reading "current Supreme C o w  cases as applying the 
strong form of the nondelegation doctrinen advanced by Chief Justice Rehnquist in, for example, 
Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 685-86 (Rehnquist, I . ,  concurring), and ~merican Textile 
Manufmturers Institute, Znc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 546-47 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038. 
214. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
215. 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
216. Id. at 409. 
217. Id. at 407-08. 
21 8. National Industrial Recovery Act, 15 U.S .C. 68 702-702f (1964) (repealed 1966); 
Schechrer Poultry, 295 U.S. at 536-37. 
219. Id. at 521-23, 551 ; see also Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 3 11  (1936). Although 
the Court's decision in Carter Coal rested on Fifth Amendment due process concerns, the Court 
critiqued the Cod Conservation Act in terms of a delegation problem, citing Schechtpr Poultry as 
precedent. See id. Only one Supreme Court case, Panama Refning Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 
417-19 (1935). actually invalidated a congressional delegation because it lacked standards to 
adequately inform the exercise of executive bmnch authority. Jeffrey A. Needelman. Attacking 
Federal R e s t r i a w ~  on Noncitizens' Access to Public Benefits on Constilutionul Groundr: A Survey 
of Relevrmt Doctrines, 11  GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 349, 374-75 (1997). 
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form. "2x1 The broad-sweeping delegation to private interests, who could then 
exercise power to promote themselves at the expense of other members of 
the same trade or industry, was rife with improper factional influences, and 
therefore highly offensive to separation of powers  principle^.'^' But a 
delegation of legislative power to the regulated industry is a far. cry from the 
directive to the EPA to issue NAAQS "requisite to protect public health. "222 
Moreover, both Carter Coal and Schechter Poultry rested on alternative 
grounds not explicitly raised in American Trucking. The Supreme Court 
viewed the legislative provisions at issue in those two cases through the lens 
of Lochner and found them to be beyond the Commerce Clause power, 
which, for a brief period of time, was thought to extend only to activities 
with "direct effects" on interstate The subsequent overruling 
of ~ a c h n e p  cast doubt on the enduring precedential value of related cases 
like Carter Coal, Schechter Poultry, and even Panama Refining, the only 
Supreme Court case to invalidate a congressional delegation to the executive 
branch for lack of intelligible standardsSm 
Jurists and scholars alike, with few dissenters, have noted the justifiable 
demise of the nondelegation doctrine in the modem era.m In post-New Deal 
cases, the Supreme Court has found that broad delegations to executive 
agencies have not presented separation of powers concerns; to the contrary, 
such delegations could even be viewed as a proper expression of 
220. 298 U.S. at 311. 
221. See Sunstein, Agency Inaction. supra note 51, at 655 n.16. Some state courts have 
stated. or at least implied, that any delegation to private parties is intolerable. E.g . .  Rogers v. 
Med. Ass'n, 259 So.2d 85, 87 (Ga. 1979); Gurnbhir v. Kan. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 618 P.2d 837, 
84-42 (Kan. 1980); Hetherington v. McHale. 329 A.2d 250, 253-54 (Pa. 1974). 
222. 42 U.S.C. $7409(b) (1994). 
223. See Caner Coal, 298 U .  S. at 307-09; Schectuer Poultry. 295 U .S. at 546-5 1 ; Hammer v. 
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); see also Needelman, supra note 219, at 375-76. 
224. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116, 123 (1941) (overruling the 'direct 
effectsn test of Hammer, limiting Carter Coal, and, by implication, limiting Lochner); NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (holding that, activities which, taken 
singularly, are intrastate in nature, may be regulated if together they have a "substantial relation to 
interstate commerce"). 
225. Needelman, supra note 219, at 376 (concluding that Schechter Poultry and Carter Coal, 
along with Panama Refining, "by association," could be considered bad law after Darby (citing 
JOHN HART ELY. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 132-33 (1980))); see d o  United States v. Frank, 
864 F.2d 992, 1010 (3rd Cir. 1988) (referring to Schechter Poultry as "aberrational"). Professor 
Sunstein, in contrast, believes that Schechter Poultry was correctly decided because "it did not 
discipline executive authority, and indeed it operated as a grant of lawmaking power to private 
groups." Sunstein. Air II, supra note 48. at 356. 
226. See Needelman, supra note 219, at 374-76; Sunstein, Agency Inaction, supra note 51, at 
655 & n.17; see also Federal Power Comrn'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352-53 
(1974) (Marshall. J., concurring) (stating that the doctrine 'has been virtually abandoned by this 
Court for all practical purposes"). 
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congressional will consistent with Article I, which ought not be disturbed by 
the courts:" 
Only if we could say that there is an absence of s t ~ r d s  for the 
guidance of the Administrator's action, so that it would be 
impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of 
Congress has been obeyed, would we be justified in overriding its 
choice of means for effecting its declared purpose . . . .228 
It is doubtful that the Clean Air Act could be construed as a complete 
absence of standards, particularly in light of other delegations which have 
survived constitutional challenge, e.g., allowing the Federal Communications 
Commission ("FCC") to regulate broadcasting "in the public interest."P9 If 
the Supreme Court does adopt the D.C. Circuit's approach to the 
nondelegation issue in American Trucking, it would be a dramatic departure 
from more than half a century of Supreme Court jurisprudence. In the 
aftermath of such a decision, establishing a more precise standard could well 
be an insurmountable task, given the efforts that the EPA has already made 
in reaching its revised ozone and particulate matter NAAQS. 
The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that a more "determinate" approach 
would be to set the NAAQS at zero and eradicate any hint of direct health 
risk.230 It quickly backed away from this option, however, noting that no 
party advocated such a drastic ~olut ion.~ '  At the opposite extreme, the court 
took note of the industry's argument that a consideration of economic costs 
could curb the EPA's ability to set excessively stringent NAAQS, but the 
court disposed of this issue in short order, agreeing that the agency cannot 
consider costs under section 109 of the Clean Air The D.C. Circuit 
has been steadfast in holding that costs play no role in setting the NAAQS: 
Congress made a "'deliberate decision . . . to subordinate such concerns to 
the achievement of health goals.' . . . [Tlhe ' technology-forcing ' 
requirements of the Act were expressly designed to force regulated sources 
to develop pollution control devices that might at the time appear to be 
227. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996); Mistretta v. United States, 488 
U.S. 361, 379 (1989). 
228. Mttrena, 488 U.S. at 378-79 (citing Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425-26 
(1944)) (emphasis added). 
229. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943). 
230. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027. 1038 @.C. Cir. 1999). modrped on 
petition for reh 'g, 195 F.M 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S .  Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.); 
120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (mem.). 
231. Id. 
232. See id. (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 973 @.C. 
Cir. 1990). modrped on other grounds, 921 F.2d 326 (1991)). 
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economically or technologically infea~ib le ."~~ Nonetheless, the court's 
resolution of the nondelegation issue in American Trucking could be 
characterized as industry's successful end-run at finally getting costs into the 
NAAQS-setting process.234 In any event, the Supreme Court granted the 
Association's petition for certiorari on the cost issue, providing it with an 
opportunity to invalidate the NAAQS without reaching the constitutional 
issue. 23S 
The D.C. Circuit did offer some concrete suggestions to guide the EPA 
on remand. The agency might avoid the nondelegation problem, according 
to the court, by assigning "weights" to a "range of ailments short of death," 
using clinical criteria to decide whether an effect counts as an "adverse 
health effect."u6 This suggestion sounds quite a bit like a remand of 
arbitrary agency action, rather than a solution for a constitutional problem. 
Yet, if the statute does in fact improperly delegate legislative power to the 
EPA, it defies logic to contend that the agency itself can somehow fix the 
constitutional impairment simply by articulating and applying additional 
criteria.237 
233. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting Lead 
Indus. Ass'n, v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). 
234. As Justice Brennan once noted, "candor compels recognition that our cases regarding the 
delegation by Congress of lawmaking power do not always say what they seem to mean." 
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 273 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
235. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Browner, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (mem.). Interestingly, the 
Coun denied industry's petitions for certiorari on the same issue in NRDC v. EPA, Lead Indusmmes, 
and fbnerican Petrokm v. Castle. 
236. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038-39. In its per curiam order denying rehearing on the 
nondelegation issue, the D.C. Circuit rejected the EPA's arguments that non-transient effects or a 
ninety-five percent confidence level would serve as an intelligible limiting principle, stating that the 
court could only decide if the nondelegation doctrine was satisfied 'after the EPA itself has applied 
[these parameters] in setting a NAAQS." Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA. 195 F.3d 4, 6-7 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S .  Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.); 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (rnem.). 
237. See Am. Trucking, 195 F.3d at 14-15 (Silbennan. J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing); SUNSTEIN, AIR I. supra note 48. at 29. Professor Lisa Bressman disagrees, arguing 
that the D.C. Circuit's 'new delegation doctrine," where courts remand suspect provisions to 
administrative agencies instead of invalidating the statute itself, offers courts a meaningful tool to 
curtail abuses of discretion while acting in a manner more respectful of administrative expertise. 
See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Milleniwn: A Delegation Doctrine 
for the Adhhktrative Stare. 109 YALE L. J. 1399, 1406-42 (2000). This option possesses notable 
virtues, in that it avoids legislative inability to reenact statutes set aside as unconstitutional, 
particularly when contentious detail-laden provisions are required; and it accentuafes the advantages 
of administrative rulemaking. But it has a serious downside in that it fails to satisfy the fundamental 
basis for having a nondelegation doctrine in the first place-ensuring that Congress makes the basic 
policy choices, and keeping core legislative, executive and jdicial powers separate. See id. at 
1416-1417 (conceding that the 'new delegation doctrine" cannot remedy the separation of powers 
problem). See also LQCKE, supra note 67. Qg 135-137, 220-222 ("The power of the legislative 
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In the end, although the court seemed to use the nondelegation doctrine as 
a rule of statutory construction to curtail the agency's discretion, rather than 
a constitutional test,238 it at least recognized that Congress, in enacting the 
Clean Air Act, may have left the EPA constitutionally vulnerable by failing 
to articulate an "intelligible principlen on which to base the NAAQS.~~' If 
the agency is unable to craft "a determinate standard on its own," the court 
noted, it could ask Congress to fuc the problem by legislatively "ratifying its 
choice" of ozone standards.240 But this gives small solace to an agency 
charged with administering the Act and other complex statutes, many of 
which require extensive fact-finding, technical expertise, and politically 
charged policy judgments regarding risks and benefits to human health and 
the environment. The decision arguably provides even less solace for 
members of the public, who have more reason to trust the EPA's 
conclusions, resulting from lengthy rulemaking procedures with opportunity 
for input at various points along the way, than the last minute trade-offs that 
can result from legislative processes. 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF "STRICT" NONDELEGATION REVIEW: THE 
DEVIL IN THE DETAILS 
Strict nondelegation review, as exhibited in American Trucking, could 
actually exacerbate separation of powers concerns. By calling upon the 
judiciary to distinguish "intelligiblen from unintelligible principles based on 
nuances in legislative nomenclature, the doctrine denies the courts a 
predictable reviewing role, ultimately undermining the rule of law. Further, 
a resurrected nondelegation doctrine would inhibit the government's ability 
to enact and implement even-handed, effective laws and regulations, 
ultimately making both Congress and executive agencies less responsive to 
the public will. 
A. A Spectrum of Legislative Principles, Dubiously Intelligible 
If strict nondelegation review were to become the law of the land, with a 
"fetish" for legislative semantics as the predominant criterion for testing 
delegations, a variety of regulatory provisions-many of which are far less 
. . . can be no other than what the positive grant [from the people] conveyed, which being only to 
make laws, and not to make legislators . . . . "). 
238. See Adler, supra note 67, at 10,239. 
239. Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1036-37. 
240. Id. at 1038. 1040. 
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detailed than the Clean Air Act-would be vulnerable to attack. Indeed, by 
some accounts, ninety-nine percent of the regulatory statutes currently found 
in the United States Code could be struck down.241 Under the American 
Trucking approach, the greater the discretion granted to an agency via 
legislative generality or ambiguity, the more likely the statute itself, or the 
agency's exercise of statutory power, will fall to a nondelegation challenge. 
Statutory delegations governing agency action can be loosely categorized 
into a spectrum, ranging from mandatory duties to wholly discretionary 
activities. Environmental statutes are used to represent the regulatory array, 
not only because American Trucking focused on the Clean Air Act but, more 
importantly, because environmental issues tend to be highly visible and often 
serve as proving grounds for controversial legal theories. While the function 
of this section is, in part, descriptive, the depiction of a range of 
representative statutes based on the type of language employed by Congress 
illustrates that a search for "intelligiblen guiding principles, particularly in 
the vast mid-range of the scale, is at best an elusive undertaking. 
At one end of the statutory spectrum are a handful of mandatory or 
ministerial requirements that are virtually immune to nondelegation claims. 
Statutory deadlines, for example, are fairly common in environmental law, 
dictating timeframes for listing endangered species and certain types of 
pollutants, along with technology-based standards for regulating those 
pollutants.242 The timing issue does not present a nondelegation issue; 
Congress has done the heavy lifting itself by making the decision in the 
statute. The agency has no wherewithal to avoid meeting the established 
deadlines, even if it has good reason for delay."3 Instead, it must simply 
- - - -- p~ ~ - 
24 1 . E. g. , George I. Lovel I, mat Sick Chicken Won't Hunt: l7ze Limits of a Judicially 
Enforced Non-Delegation Doctrine, 17 CONST. COMM. 79, 86 (2000) (citing Richard J.  Pierce, Jr., 
Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A Responre to Professor Lowi. 36 AM. U. L. REV. 
391, 401 (1987)). 
242. See Endangered Species Act 5 4(b)(3), 16 U.S.C. 5 1533@)(3) (1994) (specifying 
deadlines for responding to petitions to list species as endangered or threatened); Clean Water Act 5 
303(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. 8 1313(d)(2) (1994) (specifying deadlines for total maximum daily loads); 
Clean Air Act 8 109(b)(l), 42 U.S.C. 8 7409(b)(1) (1994) (directing that, for those criteria 
pollutants listed after 1970. the EPA simultaneously propose NAAQS). 
243. See Train v.  Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975) (holding that, 
under Clean Air Act 8 110(a)(2), the EPA must approve a state implementation plan "so long as the 
ultimate effect of a State's choice of emission limitations is compliance with the national standards 
for ambient air"); Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1192-93 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that "the Secretary violated nondiscretionary duty by failing to designate as critical the habitat for 
the Rio Grande silvery minnow by the statutory deadlinen); Oregon Natural Resources Council, 
Inc. v. Kantor. 99 F.3d 334, 338-39 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that the Endangered Species Act 
clearly required the Secretary to publish final regulations listing threatened species of salmon within 
twelve months of date on which proposed regulation had been published). 
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"take care" to implement the legislative decision, clearly an executive 
function under Article 
Moving along on the spectrum, a few statutory directives can be 
described as "mixed," making them at least partially subject to nondelegation 
challenges. These are only discretionary to a point, at which time mandatory 
duties kick in. For example, in listing criteria air pollutants under section 
108 of the Clean Air Act, the EPA Administrator must include those air 
pollutants caused by "numerous or diversen sources, that, "in his judgment," 
have an adverse effect on public health or   elf are.^' Although the statute 
provides for a fair amount of leeway in making the determination that a 
pollutant has an adverse effect on health or welfare, once that determination 
is made, the agency "shall" list the pollutant, and may not consider 
alternative control strategies.246 
Similarly, the Secretary of Interior is required to issue patents for mineral 
deposits on federal public lands under the 1872 Mining Act.''" Courts have 
described the issuance of a patent as a nondiscretionary, even ministerial, 
act.''@ However, before a patent will issue, the Secretary must determine 
whether the application covers a "valuable mineral deposit. n249 Although the 
Mining Act does not define "valuablen or provide any standards to guide the 
inquiry, the Secretary has been allowed great discretion in developing and 
applying a marketability test for determining which deposits are ~a luable .~ '  
The Secretary's factual findings in applying the test are generally upheld if 
supported by substantial evidence.=' It is quite possible that this type of 
- ~ 
244. U.S. CONST. art. 11. 8 3. In contrast, a fair amount of discretion is involved in the 
substantive component of the decision (e.g., whether a particular pollutant or species meets the 
criteria for listing; how stringent a pollutant standard should be), which would fall in the mid-range 
of the spectrum. 
245. Clean Air Act 108(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. 8 7408(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV  1998). The 
provision has since been amended to require the listing of pollutants From numerous and diverse 
sources "which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." Clean Air 
Act 5 108(a)(l)(A), 42 U.S.C. 8 7408(a)(l)(A). 
246. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 324-25 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(requiring the EPA to list lead as a criteria air pollutant). 
247. 30 U.S.C. 9 29 (1994). 
248. E.g . ,  Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 459-60 (1920); Roberts v. United States, 
176 U.S. 221, 231 (1900); South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190, 1193 (citing Wilbur v. United 
States er ref. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306. 318-19 (1930)). 
249. 30 U.S.C. 5 29. 
250. E.g . ,  United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 601 -03 (1968); Converse v. Udall, 399 
F.2d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1968); In re Pac. Coast MolyWenum Co., 90 Interior Dec. 352, 361-63 
(1983); Castle v. Womble, 19 Pub. Lands Dec. 455 (1894). 
251. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Dombeck, 168 F.3d 367, 375 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that 
substantial evidence supported the determination that a valuable mineral deposit existed based on 
"geologic inference," i.e., "the reasonable likelihood of the persistence of similar mineralization 
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threshold determination could fall under the "strict" delegation review 
exhibited in American Trucking. 
Most regulatory statutes are mid-range on the discretionary scale, 
providing overall policy objectives plus some substantive standards to guide 
the agency. The requirement that the EPA establish national ambient air 
quality standards ("NAAQS") "requisite to protect public health" with "an 
adequate margin of safetymu2 would be included in this category, as would 
the Clean Water Act's requirement for setting technology-based standards for 
certain pollutants using the "best available technology economically 
achievable"  BAT").^^^ The Clean Water Act is arguably closer to the 
"safe" end of the spectrum, as it specifies a number of factors for the EPA to 
consider in setting BAT, including the costs of achieving effluent reduction, 
given the processes and "age of equipment and facilities involved."2s4 This 
distinction is merely a matter of degree, more quantitative than qualitative in 
nature; the Clean Water Act still leaves a fair amount of discretion to the 
agency, in that it does not direct a specific outcome based on costs, nor does 
it require cost-benefit analysis. These mid-range provisions are likely to fail 
strict nondelegation review because they lack precise parameters to confine 
the agency's discretion, even though they typically include fairly extensive 
procedural safeguards to protect against arbitrary o u t c ~ r n e s . ~ ~  
The Antiquities Act of 1906,~~~ an example of a public Iands statute mid- 
range on the "intelligible principles" scale, has been challenged on 
nondelegation grounds in several recent laws~its.~' This statute has fewer 
substantive standards to constrain agency discretion than does the Clean 
beyond the areas actually sampled or exposed"); Hallenbeck v. Kleppe, 590 F.2d 852, 856-60 (10th 
Cir. 1979) (upholding the Secretary's decision that no prudent person would develop mining claims 
without a further showing of marketable discovery; decision was supported by substantial 
evidence). But see Baker v. United States, 613 F.2d 224. 226-30 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that the 
Department of the Interior's adoption of a 'too much" test, which would deny patents on 
marketable deposits for those additional claims in excess of the market need for the mineral, was an 
abuse of discretion). 
252. Clean Air Act 8 109(b)(l). 42 U.S.C. 8 7409(b)(l) (1994) (requiring NAAQS). 
253. Clean Water Act 98 301@)(2)(A). 304(b)(2); 33 U.S.C. $8 1311(b)(2)(A), 1314@)(2) 
(1 994). 
254. 33 U.S.C. 9 1314@)(2)(B). 
255. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. 88 1314(b), (m), 1361(a), 1365, 1369 (1994) (Clean Water Act 
provisions directing publication of regulations in the Federal Register, and procedures for 
administrative action, citizens suits and judicial review); 42 U.S.C. 89 7409(a), (d), 7601(a), 7604, 
7607 (1994) (Clean Air Act provision.: directing publication and review of regulations, and 
procedures for administrative action. citizens suits and judicial review); see also Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 8 553 (1994) (requiring informal rulemakiig. with publication in Federal 
Register and opportunities for public participation). 
256. 16 U.S.C. 98 431--433 (1994). 
257. For a discussion of these lawsuits, see infra notes 43940 and accompanying text. 
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Water Act or the Clean Air Act, and, if linguistics were the only 
consideration, it would probably fail strict nondelegation review. The 
Antiquities Act gives the President discretion to preserve public lands by 
declaring "historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other 
objects of historic or scientific interest . . . to be national monuments.n258 
The reservations are to encompass "parcels of land, the limits of which in all 
cases shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care 
and management of the objects to be protected. "259 Presidents of both parties 
have exercised this power extensively throughout the twentieth century, 
withdrawing millions of acres from extractive activities, like mining and 
logging, to create the Grand Canyon National Mon~rnent,'~" Jackson Hole 
National Mon~ment , '~~ and, most recently, the Grand Staircase-Escalante 
National Monument and the Grand Canyon-Parashant National 
~onurnent.'~' Designation decisions have been challenged on a variety of 
grounds over the years, including nondelegation, but none have been set 
aside as yet,263 quite possibly because, as explained in Section VI, the 
exercise of power over federal public lands does not raise the same concerns 
as do other types of executive power. 
At the far end of the spectrum, most susceptible to a reinvigorated 
nondelegation doctrine, are a handful of statutes that provide no substantive 
standards, much less intelligible principles, to guide the Executive's 
discretion. Although the Administrative Procedure Act provides that f m l  
agency action is subject to judicial review, $701(a)(2) exempts decisions 
258. 16 U.S.C. 8 431. 
259. Id. 
260. See Proclamation, 35 Stat. 2175 (1908). The Grand Canyon subsequently became a 
National Park by act of Congress. See 16 U.S.C. 8 221 (1994). See generally Cameron v. United 
States, 252 U.S. 450, 454-64 (1920) (discussing history of withdrawal and designation). 
261. See Proclamation No. 2578, 57 Stat. 731 (1943); see also 16 U.S.C. 8 406d-1 (including 
portions of the Jackson Hole National Monument within the Grand Teton National Park); Id. 8 
482m (including portions of the Jackson Hole National Monument within the Teton National 
Forest); Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890, 895-97 (D. Wyo. 1945). 
262. See Proclamation No. 7265, 65 Fed. Reg. 2825 (2000) (designating the Grand Canyon- 
Parashant National Monument); Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (1996) (designating 
the Escalante National Monument). Two additional monuments were designated at the same time as 
the Parashant National Monument. See Proclamation No. 7263, 65 Fed. Reg. 2817 (establishing 
the Agua Fria National Monument); Proclamation No. 7264. 65 Fed. Reg. 2821 (establishing the 
California Coastal National Monument). 
263. E.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 131-32 (1976) (Death Valley); Cameron, 
252 U.S. at 459-64 (Grand Canyon); Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155, 1164-65 (D. Alaska 
1W8) (seventeen monuments in Alaska, totaling fifty-six million acres); Franke. 58 F. Supp. at 
895-97 (Grand Tetons); Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, 14 E.R.C. (BNA) 1853, 1854 @. 
Alaska 1980) (three monuments in Alaska). For a detailed discussion of the nondelegation doctrine 
as applied to decisions affecting public lands and resources, see infra Part VI. 
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"committed to agency discretion by law.n2M The Act's exception to judicial 
review applies only "in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in 
such broad terms that in a given case there is no law, to apply.'"265 A prime 
example is the exercise of prosecutorial discretion or enforcement power. In 
Heckler v. ~ h a n e y , ~ ~ ~  the Supreme Court held that the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), which stated that "[tlhe Secretary is 
authorized to conduct examinations and investigations," provided no 
standards regarding the prosecution of  violation^.^^' An executive agency's 
"decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a number 
of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. "'" AS a result, the Court 
determined that the Secretary's refusal to initiate FDCA enforcement action 
was committed to agency discretion by law.269 
Although prosecutorial discretion can be thought of as uniquely within the 
realm of the executive branch, there are a few other types of executive 
actions that have been exempted from judicial review under 5 701. 
Decisions related to budgetary matters, such as the allocation of general 
funds, as well as those related to national security, immigration, and 
deportation status have b&n found "committed to agency discretion by 
law.""' There are also several public lands statutes that arguably provide 
"no law to apply." The Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act ("MUSYA") of 
264. 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2) (1994) (insulating actions 'committed to agency discretion by law" 
from judicial review); Id. 8 704 (1994) ('Agency action made reviewable by statute and final 
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in court are subject to judicial review."). 
265. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe. 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting S. 
REP. NO. 79-752, at 26 (1945)). 
266. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
267. Id. at 835-38. 
268. Id. at 831. In Heckler, the Court observed that judicial review of enforcement decisions 
would raise separation of powers problems because they have the same characteristics as decisions 
to indict and such decisions are considered the "special province of the executive branch." Id. at 
832. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
independent counsel provisions violate separation of powers because all law enforcement power 
must be vested wholly within the Executive Branch). 
269. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 835-38. 
270. E . g . ,  Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192-93 (1993) (denying review of agency's 
allocation of funds from a lump-sum appropriation as committed to agency discretion to adapt to 
changing circumstances and meet its statutory responsibilities in the most effective way); Webster v. 
Doe. 486 U.S. 592. 599-601 (1988) (denying review of the merits of a decision by the Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency to terminate an employee in the interests of national security); 
Achacoso-Sanchez v. INS, 779 F.2d 1260. 1265 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that executive decision not 
to reopen deportation proceedings to adjust deportable alien's status was virtually unreviewable); 
see also ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. 482 U.S. 270, 276. 278-82 (1987) (holding 
that, where unions petitioned for review of an administrative order exempting participants in a rail 
consolidation from protection afforded railroad employees, the agency's refusal to grant 
reconsideration is committed to agency discretion). 
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196p7' is an example of a highly discretionary statute that provides virtually 
no direction to the agency. MUSYA quite simply and succinctly directs the 
Forest Service to ensure that forest resources are available for multiple uses 
and that they maintain sustained  yield^.^ Understandably, the statute has 
been described as "breath[ingJ discretion at every pore."273 MUSYA has 
since been supplemented with the National Forest Management Act:74 which 
constrains the agency's discretion by providing shape and form to the 
multiple-use sustained-yield concept through detailed planning 
requirements .27s 
Similarly, the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934276 provides little guidance to 
the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") with regard to grazing on public 
lands. It allows the Secretary of Interior to regulate the "occupancy and 
use" of grazing districts, "to preserve the land and its resources from 
destruction or unnecessary injury, [and] to provide for the orderly use, 
improvement, and development of the range."2n Grazing permits are to 
specify numbers of livestock as well as seasons of use.n8 These provisions, 
standing alone, have been found to lack "law to apply. "279 
271. 16 U.S.C. 88 528-531 (1994). 
272. Id. $8 528, 531. 
273. Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Strickland v. Morton, 5 19 
F.2d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1975)); see also Ness Inv. Corp. v. USDA, 512 F.2d 706, 715, 718 (9th 
Cir. 1975) (finding that the Secretary of Agriculture's power to grant or deny a special use permit 
for the construction of a recreational facility for use on national forest land is committed to agency 
discretion under 16 U.S.C. 8 497). 
274. 16 U.S.C. $8 1600-1614 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
275. See id. 8 1604; see d o  Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Reg'l Forester, 833 F.2d 
810. 813 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that Forest Service regulations provided standards for the 
consideration of special use permits so that permit decisions are reviewable), rev'd on other groundr 
sub nom. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council. 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989). As the 
Supreme Court recently noted, '[alt the time a statute is enacted, it may have a range of plausible 
meanings. Over time, however, subsequent acts can shape or focus those meanings." FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco, Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1306 (2000). 
276. 43 U.S.C. 88 315-31% (1994). 
277. Id. 9 315a. 
278. Id. 8 315b; see also id. 9 1752(e) (1994) (requiring that permits specify "the numbers of 
animals to be grazed"). 
279. See Mollohan v. Gray, 413 F.2d 349, 352-53 (9th Cir. 1969); Sellas v.  Kirk, 200 F.2d 
217. 220 (9th Cir. 1952). Courts have reached similar results regarding the Secretary's 
implementation of other public lands statutes. E.g . ,  Nelson v. Andms, 591 F.2d 1265, 1266 (9th 
Cir. 1978) (holding that the Secretary's decision to classify land as suitable for entry under Desert 
Land Act, 43 U.S.C. 8 321 (1994). was committed to agency discretion); cf. City of Santa Clara v. 
Andrus, 572 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding preference clauses of the Reclamation Act of 1939, 
43 U.S.C. 8 485h(c) (1994), and the Flood Control Act of 1944, 16 U.S.C. 9 825s (1994), 
provided "no law to apply" to Secretary's denial of allocation of hydroelectric power generated by 
federal reclamation project). 
32:941] BEYOND I X E  NEW DEAL 989 
However, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA"), 
enacted in 1976, adds that permits should include "such terms and conditions 
as [the Secretary] deems appropriate for management of the . . .  land^."^ 
Further, permits must retain authority to "reexamine the condition of the 
range at any time and, if . . . the condition of the range requires adjustment 
in the amount or other aspect of grazing use, that the permittee or lessee 
shall adjust his use to the extent the Secretary concerned deems 
neces~ary."~~' FLPMA also provides that the BLM "shall" take any action 
needed to prevent "unnecessary or undue degradation" of the lands under its 
management.281 These requirements, along with a provision directing that 
judicial review of public land decisions be provided,283 supply sufficient legal 
specifications to allow judicial review of grazing decisions, but the standard 
of review is highly deferential.% 
A statutory provision that commits authority entirely to an agency's 
discretion by providing "no law to apply" would seem a prime target for 
nondelegation challenges. While $ 701(a)(2) precludes judicial review on the 
merits so that decisions made pursuant to such provisions cannot be attacked 
as arbitrary under the Administrative Procedure Act, it does not insulate 
prosecutorial and other wholly discretionary activities from constitutional 
280. 43 U.S.C. 55 315b, 1752(e). 
281. Id. 5 1752(e). In addition. the Secretary has issued regulations under FLPMA to provide 
greater specificity for the management of public rangelands. See 43 C.F.R. Part 4100; Pub. Lands 
Council v. Babbitt, 120 S. Ct. 1815, 1821-29 (2000). 
282. 43 U.S.C. f 1732@). 
283. Id. 8 1701(6). 
284. See Sierra Club v. Clark, 756 F.2d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that the multiple-use 
goal vests great discretion in the Secretary to administer forest and range land; thus, the Secretary's 
determination regarding effects of off-road recreational use "was not arbitrary, capricious, or an 
abuse of the broad discretion committed to him by an obliging Congress" (citing Perkins)); Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045, 1058 & n.7 @. Nev. 1985). a r d ,  819 F.2d 
927 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that judicial review is available under FLPMA 'under a narrow 
standard" as the statutory language "breathes discretion at every pore" (citing P e w .  608 F.2d at 
806)); see ako Marla E. Mansfield, On the Cusp of Property Rights: Lessons from Public Land 
Law, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 43, 103-04 (1991) (concluding that f 1732(b) supplies "law to apply," 
although BLM's interpretation of the scope of its power to prevent degradation, and its conclusions 
regarding the actual effects of a potentially degrading activity, are generally given great deference 
by courts). A few courts in the Tenth Circuit, however, continue to find that certain decisions 
affecting public rangelands are wholly discretionary. E.g.,  Bischoff v. Glickman, 54 F.Supp.2d 
1226, 1230 (D. Wyo. 1999) (dismissing rancher's challenge to Forest Service decision to cancel 
grazing permits because there was 'no law to apply"). @inned. 216 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 2000); 
see also Baca v. King. 92 F.3d 1031 (10th Cir. 1996) (dismissing rancher's challenge to land 
exchange for lack of standing on grounds that whether to designate lands for grazing was 
"completely within the Secretary of Interior's discretion" and therefore was not redressable by the 
court). 
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challenge.285 A claim that separation of powers had been breached, or that 
rights secured by the Bill of Rights had been violated, such as the Fifth 
Amendment's guarantee of due process, may be reviewable regardless of the 
language of the statute in question.286 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has 
exhibited little if any interest in the nondelegation doctrine in this context, 
and the Court did not even mention it in the landmark Heckler case.**' 
If a nondelegation challenge were asserted, it is plausible that the specific 
statute in question and 5 701(a)(2) itself would be suspect. Congress's 
attempt to commit a decision entirely to the agency's discretion by failing to 
include any substantive or intelligible standards, such that agency action is 
effectively immunized from judicial review, would necessarily constitute an 
unlawful delegation under American Trucking. Of course, Congress can 
place certain executive actions beyond judicial review altogether by 
maintaining sovereign immunity or by otherwise explicitly limiting access to 
the federal courts, which are, after all, courts of limited juri~diction.'~~ But 
statutory preclusion of judicial review through vague, standardless provisions 
could render the delegation of power unconstitutional, both because Congress 
failed to make the appropriate policy choice, leaving the agency to engage in 
unfettered lawmaking; and because no satisfactory procedural safeguard is 
285. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599-603 (1985) (stating that "where Congress intends 
to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear;" a "heightened 
showing" is necessary "to avoid the 'serious constitutional question' that would arise if a federal 
statute were construed to deny any judicial fonun for a colorable constitutional claim"); see &o 
Sunstein. Agency Ination, supra note 51, at 658 (noting that there is always "law to applyn to 
claims that an agency's action is based on constitutionally impermissible factors). 
286. See Achacoso-Sanchez v. INS, 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Administrators 
with plenary discretion to do as they will on the merits must still abide by constitutional constraints 
. . . ."); Shaltry v. United States, 182 B.R. 836. 842 @. Ariz.) (allowing review of an allegation 
that the termination of membership in the pool of individuals eligible to be named trustees in 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases deprived plaintiff of property and liberty interests under the Fifth 
Amendment, although membership determination was otherwise committed to discretion), aff'd 
without opinion, 87 F .  3d 1322 (9th Cir . 19%). 
287. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). In one of the few cases to explore the 
relationship between nondelegation and 8 701, the D.C. Circuit, in a pre-American Trucking case, 
flatly rejected the constitutional argument but found that a decision to close or realign 145 domestic 
military bases was "committed to agency discretion by law." Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. 
United States, 905 F.2d 400, 404-06 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Judge Wald, writing for the court, 
concluded that the Base Closure and Realignment Act "easily clears the 'intelligible principle' 
hurdle; it contains a terse but understandable standard to constrain administrative discretion," 
centered largely on the military value of the base in question. Id. at 404-05. Nonetheless, there 
were no ujudicially manageable standards . . . against which to judge the agency's exercise of 
discretion" for the purpose of judicial review. Id. at 405 (citations omitted). Had Af?Iericm 
Trucking been the law of the land, the outcome of the nondelegation issue may well have been 
different. 
288. See U.S. CONST. art. 111. 
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available to confine the agency to its congressional mission (to the extent that 
a mission can be discerned).289 Not too surprisingly, calls for the repeal of 8 
701(a)(2) followed closely on the heels of the Heckler decision.290 
The Eighth Circuit had an opportunity to consider the relationship of 6 
701 and the nondelegation doctrine in South Dakota v. United States 
Department of ~nten 'or .~~ '  There, the Secretary of Interior asserted that he 
possessed complete and unreviewable discretion to acquire land in trust for 
the Lower Brule Tribe under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 
("IRA"), which allows the Secretary to "provid[e] land for Indians. "292 The 
court went along with the Secretary to a point, agreeing that the IRA failed 
to provide guiding standards: 
By its literal terms, the statute permits the Secretary to purchase a 
factory, an office building, a residential subdivision or a golf 
course in trust for an Indian tribe . . . . Indeed, it would permit 
the Secretary to purchase the Empire State Building in trust for a 
tribal chieftain as a wedding present . . . . It delegates unrestricted 
power to acquire land born private citizens for the private use and 
benefit of Indian tribes or individual ~ n d i a n s . ~ ~ ~  
Turning the Secretary's argument on its head, though, the court 
concluded that not only was review of constitutional infirmities possible, the 
nondelegation doctrine invalidated the relevant provision of the IRA and the 
Secretary's decision.294 Indeed, the court remarked that the delegation of 
"wholly discretionary" power requires "a particularly close look" because of 
-- -- - 
289. See Donald A. Dripps, Delegation and Due Process, 1988 DUKE L. J. 657, 682 n. 105 
(stating that the nondelegation doctrine may make it 'unconstitutional for Congress to commit the 
exercise of legislative power entirely to agency discretion" through 9 701(a)(2)). 
290. E.g.,  Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman. Congress, me Supreme Court, and i%e 
Quiet Rmlution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 874; see also Kenneth Culp Davis, 
No Law to Appfy, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 4-10 (1988) (arguing that Heckler was incorrect 
because even if Congress has not established clear statutory constraints, the Administrative 
Procedure Act requires a court to apply 'such everpresent standards as 'justice.' 'fairness.' and 
'reasonableness' that necessarily guide all judicial action" and that 'the question whether the agency 
has abused its discretion is a matter for judicial discretion") (emphasis omitted). Shapiro and 
Glicksman note that Davis's 'interpretation serves the purposes of checks and balances review by 
requiring that every agency action, unless Congress has expressly immunized it from review, be 
subject to a requirement of 'reasonableness.'" Shapiro & Glicksman, supra, at 874 n.256. 
291. 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995), cerr. granted, vacated und remanded, 519 U.S. 919 (1996). 
292. 25 U.S.C. 8 465 (1994); seealso 25 C.F.R. 8 151.1--15 (1999) (describing when land 
may be acquired for the benefit of American Indians). 
293. South Dakota, 69 F.3d at 882. 
294. Id. at 884-85. Ironically, the IRA was passed in 1934 by the same Congress that enacted 
the NIRA provisions invalidated in Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining. Id. at 881. There are 
signs that the court may have been influenced, at least to some extent, by the perception that this 
particular Congress was afflicted with poor drafting skills. See id, at 884. 
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the lack of meaningful opportunities for judicial review.295 In reaching its 
decision, the court noted that "delegation questions [should be] considered in 
light of [the] legislative history and context," as well as any narrowing 
agency interpretation, but that the Secretary's broad interpretation of the IRA 
provided no  constraint^.^^ As a result, "tlhere are many opportunities for 
abuse in a program of this nature;" the Secretary-as head of an "agency 
fiefdomB-could arbitrarily remove the lands in question from state and local 
taxation, as well as "zoning ordinances, building codes, health and safety 
regulations, and other exercises of the police power."297 The Secretary 
subsequently issued new regulations requiring notice before taking land into 
trust and acknowledging that judicial review would be available; 
consequently, the Eighth Circuit's decision was vacated by the Supreme 
C O U L - ~ . ~ ~ ~  
As indicated in the South Dakota case, the demise of the nondelegation 
doctrine in the post-New Deal years goes hand in hand with the increasing 
availability of judicial review through the Administrative Procedure ~ c t . ~ ~ ~  
- - -  -- - - -- - - 
295. Id. at 881-82, "[Jludicial review perfects a delegated-lawmaking scheme by assuring that 
the exercise of such power remains within statutory bounds." Id. at 881 (quoting Touby v. United 
States. 500 U.S. 160, 170 (1991)). If meaningful judicial review is available, then that would be "a 
factor weighing in favor of upholding a statute against a nondelegation challenge." Id. at 882 
(quoting United States v. Garfinkel, 29 F.3d 451, 459 (8th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted)); see also 
Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 219 (1989) (noting that when "Congress 
clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of 
this delegated authority[,] [plrivate rights are protected by access to the courts to test the application 
of policy in light of these legislative declarations") (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 
U.S. 90, 105 (1946)). 
2%. Sourh Dakota, 69 F.3d at 884 (citing Ca@nkel, 29 F.3d at 458; and Int'l Union, UAW 
v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1314-15 @.C. Cir. 1991)). The court acknowledged that delegation 
questions should be considered in light of the overall statutory context and recognized that 
Congress's intent, as shown in the legislative history, was probably for trust lands to be used for 
agrarian purposes. Id. at 883. However, because Congress had failed to say so in the statute, and 
the Secretary had interpreted the language as broadly as possible, the court believed it must 
"construe the statute literally for purposes of applying the nondelegation doctrine." Id. at 884. The 
court noted that it was bound to do so because it had upheld the Secretary's interpretation of this 
provision in the past. Id. 
297. Id. at 884. 
298. See Dep't of the Interior v. South Dakota, 519 U.S. 919 (1996) (citing regulations now 
codified at 25 C.F.R. 5 151.12 (1996)). Justice Scalia, joined in dissent by Justices O'Comor and 
Thomas, believed that vacating and remanding the decision was inappropriate. Id. at 920. He 
noted that the government had maintained its position that review was unavailable under the Quiet 
Title Act, 28 U.S.C. 8 2409a(a) (1994). once title had passed. Id. at 921. In any event, he failed to 
see how the availability of judicial review had anything to do with the nondelegation question. Id. 
at 922 ("It is inconceivable that this reviewability-at-the-pleasuce-of-the-- a u l d  affect the 
constitutionality of the IRA in anyone's view, including that of the Coun of Appeals."). 
299. See Sowh Dakota, 69 F.3d at 881-82; see also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Leventhal, J.  , concurring) ("Congress has been willing to delegate its 
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Although Congress must still make the fundamental policy choice in the fonn 
of legislative objectives, broad-brushed though they may be, the possibility 
of judicial involvement can alleviate the need for more detailed substantive 
d i r e c t i ~ e s . ~  Judicial review protects the integrity of the administrative 
process by preventing abuses of discretion, favoritism, and ad hoc, irrational 
decision-making. A statute that provides "no law to apply" lacks guiding 
principles for either the agency or the court's edification, and therefore 
would be most vulnerable to challenge as an improper delegation of 
legislative authority under the American Trucking approach. 
The spectrum outlined above illustrates that "there is no simple metric to 
tell how much [delegated] discretion is too m ~ c h , " ~ '  particularly in the 
middle of the spectnun, where most regulatory statutes lie. A resurrection of 
strict nondelegation review based on the fine distinction between intelligible 
and less-than-intelligible principles yields a judicial inquiry that can itself be 
described as unprincipled. A legal formula that gives "controlling force to 
nomenclat~re,"~ as opposed to the actual effects of a delegation in a given 
context, leaves the judiciary without any means of resolving separation of 
powers concerns in a predictable, coherent fashion, in effect allowing the 
judiciary to expand its own constitutional role by intervening in the policy- 
making process. 303 
B. Subversive Legislative Tactics 
Congress often finds itself unable to enact narrow and specific directives, 
particularly in controversial and complex areas such as environmental law. 
This is due, in no small measure, to the difficulty of reaching consensus on 
issues that affect public health and welfare at the same time as jobs and profit 
margins. Stalemate can also result due to turf wars between the myriad 
legislative powers broadly-and courts have upheld such delegation-because there is court review 
to assure that the agency exercises the delegated power within statutory limits . . . .") (footnote 
omitted). 
300. See Sunstein, Agency Inaction, supra note 5 1, at 655-56. 
301. Sunstein, Air 11, supra note 48, at 337. 
302. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 628 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted). 
303. Even Justice Scalia, who has expressed his suppon for a revi ta lk l  nondelegation 
doctrine, see South Dakota, 519 U.S. at 919-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Scalia, supra note 128, at 
28, believes that the judiciary is ill-equipped to enforce the intelligible principle formula. See 
Mistretta v. United States. 488 U.S. 361, 415-16 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that this 
formula lends itself to a debate 'not over a point of principle but over a question of degree;" as 
such, "[Congress is] better equipped to inform itself of the necessities of government," including 
'the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law"). 
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committees with overlapping jurisdiction over environmental issues.3w 
Perhaps most frequently of all, the legislature articulates general policy 
objectives and leaves the details to administrative processes because the very 
complexity of the technical questions accompanying a regulatory decision 
makes it more efficient and effective to do so.305 Even congressional 
members admit that "[fJrom a group of legislators that sometimes has trouble 
simply producing a budget, . . . micromanagement would be a recipe for 
disaster. w3M 
Congress's inability to enact specific and detailed regulatory directives 
does not necessarily evidence a defective system. The constitutional process 
for resolving conflict is designed to accommodate individuals and groups 
with disparate ideologies. When Congress issues relatively general 
legislative mandates in response to the range of interests presented to it, "it is 
operating in the politically rational manner for which it was created.w307 A 
probable consequence of strict delegation review is that "[u]nless Congress 
can engage in political compromise by using generalities, it will likely pass 
less regulatory legislation. Thus, reinvigoration of the nondelegation 
prohibition would represent a political choice in favor of less regulation. 
If the Supreme Court affirms the D.C. Circuit on the nondelegation issue 
in American Trucking, the EPA may be unable to craft more determinate 
standards for itself on remand, and Congress could be immobilized by the 
inability to articulate precise standards and inhibited from delegating the 
power to craft such measures to executive agencies. As a result, either the 
304. See Zellmer, supra note 25. at 501-03. 
305. See PIERCE, supra note 30, at 58; see also Jerry A. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why 
Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J .  L. ECON. & ORG. 8 1, 98 (1985) (concluding 
that broad delegation to agencies counters the "extraordinary delegitimizing effect of rules that are 
so specific that they cannot be made responsive across either space or time"); Peter Schuck, 
Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Shoenbrod. 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 781-83 
(1999) (concluding that delegation is consistent with democracy, largely because agency decision- 
making is more responsive to public input than is legislation). The Supreme Court has expressly 
recognized that "[tlo burden Congress with all federal rulemaking would divert that branch from 
more pressing issues, and defeat the Framer's design of a workable National Government." Loving 
v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996); see also Misrrerta, 488 U.S. at 381 (explaining that, 
without some degree of overlap among the branches, the Nation would be incapable of 'governing 
itself effectively ") (quoting Buckley v. Valeo. 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976)). 
306. Joseph I. Lieberman & Henry A. Waxman, A New  are^ for An& on Clean Air: Zke 
COWS, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 10, 1999, at A23; see also Loving, 5 17 U.S. at 758 ("Nothing 
is so embarrassing nor so mischievous in a great assembly as the details of execution.") (citing 5 
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 319 (P. Ford ed. 1904) (letter to E. Carrington, Aug. 4, 1787)). 
307. PIERCE. Supra note 30. 59. 
308. Id. at 58 (emphasis added). See also Schuck. supra note 305, at 792 (remarking that a 
robust nondelegation doctrine has the pernicious result of "forcing Congress to bear the burden of 
inertia, which is always a crucial and often determinative, factor in legislative politics"). 
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status quo--dirty air-will be maintained indefinitely, or frustrated 
congressional members will turn to alternative legislative processes to take 
care of business. Congress may attempt to avoid constraints imposed by the 
other two branches by tacking substantive legislative "riders" onto 
appropriations bills. Appropriations riders allow their sponsors to side step 
the difficult process of balancing diverse interests and reaching compromise 
otherwise necessary for enactment of statutory provisions through normal 
legislative procedures.309 The appropriations process could be employed to 
"fast track" detailed regulatory measures proposed by well-financed industry 
constituents. 'I0
Appropriations riders, far more than broad delegations included in regular 
substantive enactments, seriously undermine each of the justifications offered 
by the D.C. Circuit in American Trucking for invalidating the EPA's 
regulations."' Although Congress itself does make "important choices of 
social policy" through riders, riders are passed when Congress is acting in a 
manner least "responsive to the popular Riders appended to 
appropriations bills allow only minimal opportunity for review and 
assessment by congressional members outside of the appropriations 
committees, let alone by members of the interested The use of 
riders to legislate important substantive choices, a process often shielded 
from public review and critique, is especially vulnerable to manipulation by 
special  interest^.^'^ Meanwhile, congressional members can evade 
309. Zellmer, supra note 25, at 486-89 (1997); see afso Lovell, supra note 241, at 92 (noting 
that '[tlhe nondelegation doctrine cannot prevent Congress from burying divisive regulatory 
decisions in the technical details of omnibus budgetary] bills"). 
310. See Zellmer, supra note 25, at 491, 520-21; see a k o  Michael Axline, Forest Health and 
the Politics of Expediency. 26 ENVTL L. 613, 637 (1996). 
311. See Am. T ~ c k i n g  Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating that 
the doctrine's purposes are to ensure that Congress makes 'important choices of social policy" 
through the legislative process, to ensure that agencies do not exercise authority arbitrarily and to 
'enhance the likelihood [ofj meaningful judicial review"), modified on petition for reh'g, 195 F.3d 
4 @.C. Cir. 1999). cert. granted. 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.); 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (mem.). 
312. Id. (citing Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) 
(Rehnquist. J . , concurring)). 
313. Zellmer, supra note 25, at 510-11. 
314. See id. at 491. Forcing Congress to legislate with a high degree of specificity would 
likely exacerbate the concentration of power in committee and subcommittee chairs, providing ever 
greater opportunities for factional influence. See DAVID EPSIZlN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, 
DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER 
SEPARATE POWERS 237-238 (1999): Sunstein, Air 11, supra note 48, at 338 (citing BRUCE A. 
ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COALJDIRTY AIR 26-58 (1981)). Although 'special 
interests may receive protection through favorable agency regulations, is this more widespread or 
morally more opprobrious than having them protected through a tax loophole or a targeted 
provision in a bill?" EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra, at 10. 
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responsibility for unpopular regulatory decisions by highlighting other, more 
palatable provisions of omnibus budgetary bills, some of which are hundreds 
of pages long. 
In addition, appropriations riders often direct the agency to act in a 
particular way while insulating that action from complying with otherwise 
applicable legal standards.31s As a result, the judiciary's role is impaired, 
because reviewing courts have virtually no means to assess whether agency 
action taken pursuant to a rider's directive is arbitrary and capricious. For 
example, the 1995 Salvage Timber Rider, appended to a bill providing 
disaster relief for victims of the Oklahoma City bombing, provided that 
various types of national forest timber sales would proceed notwithstanding 
any other law.316 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that its 
provisions left it with virtually "no law to apply" with respect to 
environmental ~oncerns.~" 
Finally, the use of riders undermines executive prerogatives. Substantive 
riders, like the Salvage Timber Rider, are typically appended to emergency 
resolutions and omnibus spending bills that provide funding for essential 
programs, inhibiting the presidential veto a~thority.~" The Salvage Timber 
Rider and others like it also impede the Executive's authority to "take [clare 
that the [l]awsn enacted through regular legislative processes "be faithfully 
executed. "3'9 
In sum, not only would the revival of strict nondelegation review 
exacerbate the inefficiencies caused by congressional deadlock, it could also, 
in and of itself, upset the separation of powers, eroding both the judicial and 
executive functions and making Congress less accountable to the public it 
serves. In other words, congressional maneuvering to avoid strict 
nondelegation constraints could heighten the very concerns cited by the D.C. 
Circuit in involung the doctrine. 
-- -- 
315. See Zellmer, supra note 25, at 473-75, 523-25 (discussing various riders directing the 
sale of timber from National Forest and BLM lands). 
316. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Additional Disaster Assistance, for Anti- 
Terrorism Initiatives, for Assistance in the Recovery from the Tragedy that Occurred at Oklahoma 
City, and Rescissions Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-19, 1 2001, 109 Stat. 240 (codified at 16 
U.S.C. 8 1611 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
317. See Ore. Natural Res. Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 792, 7% (9th Cir. 1996); Inland 
Empire Pub. Lands Council v. Glickman, 88 F.3d 697. 701 (9th Cir. 1996); cf. Rokrtson v. 
Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992) (holding that a rider which directed the outcome 
of two pending cases did not violate separation of powers because it replaced existing law and 
provided some new requirements applicable to the underlying lawsuits). 
318. See U.S. CONST. art. I. 8 7, cl. 2 (providing for the presidential veto). 
319. U.S.Co~sr.art .  11, 1 3 .  
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V. JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN ALTERNATIVE: CAN THE DEVIL BE 
EXORCISED? 
It is a fundamental principle of judicial review that courts should refrain 
from ruling on the constitutionality of a statute unless "absolutely necessary 
to the [resolution] of [a] The D.C. Circuit could have resolved the 
American Trucking Association's challenges to the national ambient air 
quality standards ("NAAQS") on non-constitutional grounds by applying 
principles of administrative law. Instead of remanding the ozone and 
particulate matter NAAQS for violating nondelegation principles, the court 
could have taken a "hard lookn at the EPA's decision to determine if it was 
arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure A C ~ , ~ "  an 
approach commonly attributed to Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. 
V ~ l p e . ~ ~  Alternatively, the court, upon fmding the statute itself ambiguous, 
could have tested the agency's interpretation of the terms "requisite to 
protect public healthn and "adequate margin of safetyn for reasonableness 
under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. .323 
Either approach would have provided an appropriate means for resolving the 
case and avoiding the nondelegation doctrine alt~gether.~~" 
The two approaches are not necessarily separate and distinct avenues of 
judicial review, and the courts have not been entirely consistent in applying 
320. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(citing Burton v. United States, 1% U.S. 283, 295 (1905)). "Considerations of propriety, as well 
as long-established practice, demand that we refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of an 
act of Congress unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function, when the 
question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it." Blair v. United States, 250 
U.S. 273, 279 (1919); see also City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 
687, 707 (1999) (stating that courts "must 'first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is 
fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided.'") (citations omitted); Three 
Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984) 
(stating that this is "a fundamental rule of judicial restraint"). 
321. See 5 U.S.C. $j 706 (1994). 
322. 401 U.S. 402, 415, 420 (1971) (remanding the decision of the Secretary of 
Transportation to approve the use of parkland for a highway, and directing the district court to 
review the full administrative record before the Secretary at the time of his determination that no 
feasible alternative routes were available). 
323. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); see also UdaH v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1965) 
(deferring to agency's interpretation of its regulations and secretarial orders). 
324. In its petition for certiorari, the United States urged the Supreme Court to repudiate the 
D.C. Circuit's directive that the EPA restrain its interpretation on nondelegation grounds, and take 
one of these well-established paths of judicial review. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *27-30. 
43 Browner v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, No. 99-1257, 2000 WL 1010083 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2000) 
(arguing that both Chevron support the NAAQS, and that neither the Constitution, nor the Clean 
Air Act, require the EPA to supply the "determinate criterion for drawing lines,": instead, EPA 
must simply "consider the factors that the [Clean Air] Act prescribes and provide a reasoned 
explanation, based on scientific evidence, for its decision. "). 
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them.325 Generally speaking, Chevron comes into play as an interpretive tool 
when an issue of statutory construction is raised.326 Overton Park and its 
progeny are utilized to review informal rulemaking involving an agency's 
fact-based decision, for example, to issue a regulatory standard, like the 
NAAQS for ozone and particulate matter, or to grant or deny a permit or 
otherwise apply a legal requirement to a particular factual set~ing.~" The 
circuit courts occasionally apply both Chevron and Overton Park when 
reviewing administrative regulations, but rarely explain why they are 
invoking both doctrines, or how they fit together in any given case.328 
By synthesizing the two doctrines, it is possible to lend some clarity to the 
confusion in the context of broad delegations of authority to executive 
agencies. A reasoned alternative to strict nondelegation review can be 
conceptualized and articulated, at least in a tentative form, through a 
marriage of these bedrock principles of administrative law. The proposed 
approach involves a two-tier review of broad statutory delegations. First, it 
calls upon courts to account for contextual differences, particularly those 
rooted in the constitutional source of the authority in question, by giving 
heightened scrutiny only to those delegations posing the most danger of 
overreaching, factionalism or abuse of discretion. A statute would fail this 
inquiry only in those rare cases where the delegation results in the 
325. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 51. at 395-96 (noting that the Supreme Court itself has 
been "criticized for its failure to articulate a theory of judicial review that" justifies confidence in 
the administrative process). 
326. See, e.g.. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter. 515 U.S. 687, 703 (1995) (deferring to 
agency's interpretation of the term "harm" as used in the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 8 
1532 (1994)). 
327. See, e.g., Southwestern Penn. Growth Alliance v. Browner, 121 F.3d 106, 11 1 (3d Cir. 
1997) (upholding the EPA's disapproval of Pennsylvania's request to redesignate air nonattainrnent 
area to attainment status for ozone under arbitrary and capricious standard); BP Exploration & Oil, 
Inc. v. EPA, 66 F.3d 784. 792 (6th Cir. 1995) (reviewing EPA's effluent standards for offshore oil 
and gas operations under arbitrary and capricious standard). 
328. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Dep't. of the Interior, 134 F.3d 1095, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (applying both Chevron deference and the arbitrary and capricious standard to review 
Interior's procedures for natural resource damage assessments); Mausolf v. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 661, 
667 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding snowmobiling regulations for Voyageurs National Park while citing 
both Chevron and Overton Park); Gamboa v. Rubin, 80 F.3d 1338, 1343-44 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(stating that courts must give "significant deference" to regulations under Chevron, but also 
"searching and careful" review under Motor Vehicle Manufmturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U. S .  29 (1983), and Overton Park), vacated on other groundr , 101 
F.3d 90 (9th Cir. 1996); Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 76 F.3d 400. 407 
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (acknowledging that the tests sometimes overlap, but that "a permissible statutory 
construction under Chevron is not always reasonable. . . . '[Wle might determine that although [an 
interpretation is] not barred by statute, an agency's action is arbitrary and capricious because the 
agency has not considered certain relevant factors or articulated any rationale for its choice'") 
(citations omitted). 
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obstruction or abdication of a core prerogative of one of the three branches. 
If it does not, courts should proceed to the second tier of the proposed 
approach, and take a hard look at the agency's decision to assure against 
improper biases and unprincipled results. 
A. Hard Look Review: Testing Arbitrary Agency Action 
The "hard lookn doctrine harkens back to Overton Park, where the Court 
stated that, although an agency's decision is entitled to a "presumption of 
regularity," it must nevertheless be subjected to "probing, indepth 
review."329 The doctrine has been further refined by the D.C. Circuit, where 
it is frequently invoked to ensure that the agency has taken a hard look at all 
relevant factors pertaining to the issue.330 Over the years, hard look review 
has evolved into a double-layer of close scrutiny; it is now often described as 
requiring the court itself to take a hard look at the agency's decision to 
ensure that it is well-reasoned and supported by the administrative record.331 
Hard look review does not give reviewing courts carte blanche to second- 
guess an agency's reasoning, nor does it allow the judiciary to make the 
ultimate decision. Courts are typically and justifiably more deferential when 
an agency makes technical or scientific predictions "within its area of special 
expertise, at the frontiers of science.n332 However, the courts "can and do 
insist that the agency's reasons and policy choices do 'not deviate from or 
ignore the ascertainable legislative intent.' Beyond that, . . . [courts] can 
only require the agency's reasons and policy choices to conform to 'certain 
329. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971). 
330. See, e .g . ,  Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 @.C. Cir. 
1970); Pikes Peak Broad. Co. v. FCC, 422 F.2d 671, 682 0 . C .  Cir. 1969). The development of 
"hard look" review is described in detail in Nat'l Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n. 126 
@.C. Cir. 1980). 
331. See, e.g., Md. Wildlife Fed'n v. Dole, 747 F.2d 229, 237 (4th Cir. 1984) (upholding 
agency action, stating that the agency must "take a 'hard look' at all relevant factors," and stating 
that the court itself must observe "the rule of reason and practicality and taken a 'hard look' at the 
relevant factors") (citations omitted); see aLFo Nat'l Lime Ass'n, 627 F.2d at 451-52 n. 126 (defining 
and describing the evolution of doctrine). 
332. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) 
(upholding the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's determination that the permanent storage of 
certain nuclear wastes would have no significant environmental impact as within the bounds of 
reasoned decision making required by the Administrative Procedure Act). 
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minimal standards of rationality. ' n333 If SO, the rule passes the "arbitrary and 
capriciousn threshold and must be upheld.334 
Although the circuit courts have employed "hard look" review fairly 
rigorously,335 the Supreme Court signaled some disapproval of this approach 
in Vemtont Yankee Nuclear Power Cop. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, I ~ c . ~ ~  There, the Court found that the D.C. Circuit's probing 
review of rulemaking regarding nuclear waste disposal, which resulted in a 
remand for additional agency procedures, had gone too far.337 Indeed, the 
circuit court's activist approach, the Supreme Court remarked, "borders on 
the Kaflcaesque. "338 It continued, invoking separation of powers concerns: 
"[tlirne may prove [the agency's decision] wrong . . . , but it is Congress or 
the States within their appropriate agencies which must eventually make that 
judgment. In the meantime courts should perform their appointed 
function.*339 That function, according to the Court, does not include a 
reexamination of fundamental pol icy questions. 340 
333. Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506. 520-21 @.C. Cir. 
1983) (citations omitted). 
334. Id. at 521. The court held that the EPA's leadcontent limit for gasoline was reasonable, 
but remanded other provisions of the rule for lack of notice and, alternatively, for failure to explain 
the choice of phase-out dates and the belief that most small refmers could meet the standards at a 
reasonable cost. Id. 
335. E.g. ,  Am. Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 392-393 @.C. Cir. 1998) (remanding the 
EPA's decision not to issue short term NAAQS for sulfur dioxide when the record showed that even 
brief "bursts" had significant effects on asthmatics, noting that "[wlhere, as here, Congress has 
delegated to an administrative agency the critical task of assessing the public health and the power 
to make decisions of national import in which individuals' lives and welfare hang in the balance, 
that agency has the heaviest of obligations to explain and expose every step of its reasoning"); 
Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 248, 251 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that the Forest Service's 
"planning process was improperly predisposed toward clearcutting" and resulting land resource 
management plan was arbitrary), vacated on other growrdr, 523 U . S .  726 (1998); Kemecott 
Copper Corp. v. EPA. 462 F.2d 846. 849-50 @.C. Cir. 1972) (remanding secondary NAAQS to 
the EPA for additional rationale); see also Ross v. Fed. Highway Admin., 162 F.3d 1046, 1055 
(10th Cir. 1998) (finding that, by finishing construction of trafficway prior to completion of 
supplemental environmental impact statement, the agency failed to take a "hard look" at the effect 
of its actions, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")); Blue Mountain 
Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that the Forest 
Service arbitrarily failed to prepare a single impact statement that addressed cumulative effects of 
logging projects). cert. denied, 527 U.S.  1003 (1999). 
336. 435 U.S. 519 (1978); see also Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman. Judicial 
Activism and Restrain1 in the Sypreme Court's Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 
383 (1989); Stanley A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy. Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in 
Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L. J . 105 1 (1995). 
337. Vt. Y d e e ,  435 U.S. at 558. 
338. Id. at 557. 
339. Id. at 558. 
340. Id. at 558. 
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Subsequently, the Court has sent conflicting messages regarding the 
appropriate level of judicial scrutiny to be given agency decisions. In Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v .  State Fann Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co. ,"' the Court found that the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration's failure to consider passive restraint requirements for 
automobile manufacturing was arbitrary and c a p r i c i o ~ s . ~ ~  A multi-faceted 
test was articulated for reviewing the agency's regulatory decision: (1) the 
agency "relied on factors [that] Congress [did] not intend0 it to consider;" 
(2) the agency "entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem;" or (3) the agency "offered an explanation for its decision that runs 
counter to the evidence before [it], or is so implausible that it could not be 
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.""3 In 
applying this test, the Court expressly warned that "[tlhe scope of review 
. . . is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency.n344 In effect, however, the Court engaged in rather aggressive 
substantive review of the agency's decision.Ms 
Other than the Motor Vehicle decision, a basic pattern of judicial restraint 
seems to have emerged in the years since Overton Park, particularly when 
the agency action at issue is policy-ba~ed.~ A survey of the more recent 
opinions indicates that the Court has not promoted the Motor Vehicle criteria 
to define the scope of review of agency action.347 Without some sort of 
determinate judicial test, it is nearly impossible to predict with any degree of 
certainty whether a given administrative action will be found arbitrary and 
capricious. Ironically, as a result, judges are relatively free to engage in ad 
hoc "result-oriented behavior,*- i.e., to replace the agency's judgment with 
341. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
342. Id. at 46. 
343. Id. at 43. 
344. Id. 
345. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 336. at 106667. The Court has engaged in rigorous 
review in only a few cases since Vermont Yankee was issued. E.g.,  Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. 
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 658-59 (1980) (plurality) (rejecting the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration's ('OSHA") benzene standard after a derailed examination of the 
administrative record); cf. Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council. 490 U.S. 360, 377-78 (1989) 
(upholding agency's decision that new information did not require a supplemental environmental 
impact statement, but acknowledging that the review of agency action, though narrow, must "be 
searching and careful"). 
346. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 336, at 1066. 
347. See id. at 1067. 
348. td. at 106768. 
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their own-the very thing forbidden by Vermont Yankee as contrary to 
separation of powers principles.349 
Congress, on the other hand, explicitly approved of "hard look" review 
as applied to Clean Air Act issues during legislative debate on the 1977 
Clean Air Act amendments.350 Thus, a remand in American Trucking for 
articulation of principled reasons under the hard look doctrine, guided by the 
Motor Vehicle factors, would have been a viable judicial response, true to 
legislative objectives. In fact, the D.C. Circuit's overriding concern seem 
to center on the quality of the EPA's explanation for its choice of NAAQS; 
otherwise, the court would have vacated the NAAQS and found that the 
Clean Air Act itself was unconstitutional."' If rigorous review had been 
employed in the American Trucking case, the court could remand the 
decision as arbitrary if the EPA had failed to explain the criteria used to 
determine that 0.08 ppm was an appropriate ozone NAAQS, but 0.09 ppm 
inadequate and 0.07 ppm more stringent than necessary to protect public 
health with an adequate margin of safety. Remand would also be in order if 
the EPA failed to consider factors relevant to the protection of public health, 
including both the likelihood and magnitude of effects on human health. 
Finally, if the revised NAAQS were not supported by findings in the 
administrative record, the court could remand the decision. 
Along the same lines, Professor Sunstein has suggested that, on remand, 
the EPA could survive the D.C. Circuit's scrutiny if it were to perform a 
detailed analysis of anticipated benefits of its proposed NAAQS and at least 
two other alternatives, one more strict and one more lenient.352 He 
recommends that the agency determine the level of "residual risk" of all 
349. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 435 U.S. 519. 558 
(1978). 
350. See National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 452 n.127 (D.D.C. 1980) ('[Tlhe 
conferees intend that the courts continue their thorough, comprehensive review which has 
characterized judicial proceedings under the Clean Air Act thus far") (citing H.R.REP. No. 95-564 
(1977). reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1559). 
351. "Typically, the D.C. Circuit remands without vacating when the court believes that the 
agency action is consistent with the statute, but requires a more careful explanation." Craig N. 
Oren, Run Over by American Trucking, 29 ENV7L. L. REP. 10,653, 10,657 (citing Patricia M. 
Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 621. 638 n.72 (1994)). 
352. SUNSTEIN, AIR I, supra note 48, at 35. Professor Sunstein concludes that the EPA, in 
failing to explain how it reached its conclusions and selected the NAAQS, was arbitrary and 
capricious, particularly as to the ozone standard, where it failed to counter evidence that ground- 
level ozone could in some ways be beneficial to health. Sunstein, Air II, supra note 48, at 327-30, 
369-70. He would recommend a remand to the EPA for further explanation without invalidation of 
the NAAQS. Id. at 369. 
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three options before selecting a revised NAAQs.~'~ This approach likely 
goes above and beyond what is needed to survive "hard look" review- 
rational and balanced decision-making based on a complete administrative 
record.3M As such, it would provide "intelligible principlesn and then some, 
alleviating the D.C. Circuit's concerns of unbridled agency discretion run 
amuck. 
B. Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Ambiguous Statutes 
Arbitrary and capricious review generally arises in the context of 
challenges to an agency's decision to apply statutory criteria to a particular 
issue, based on facts developed in an administrative record. In contrast, 
facial challenges to an agency's interpretation of statutory directives trigger a 
two-step analysis under Step one requires the reviewing court to 
determine whether Congress directly and unambiguously expressed its intent 
on the question at hand. If so, the inquiry is over and a court must hold true 
to congressional intent.356 If the statute is silent or ambiguous on the issue, a 
court must proceed to step two and affirm an agency's "permissible" 
interpretation, even if the court itself would reach a different conclusion.3s7 
In Chevron, the Court, reviewing the language of the Clean Air Act and 
its legislative history, found that Congress had not clearly expressed an intent 
regarding the meaning of the term "stationary source."358 Although the 
353. SUNSTEIN, AIR I, supra note 48, at 35. 
354. Professor Sunstein's model approaches the level of analysis required by NEPA, 42 
U. S. C. 8 4332(2) (1 994). which mandates the assessment of environmental effects and alternatives 
for all major federal actions. However, as the court noted in American Trucking, Congress 
exempted the EPA from preparing NEPA documents when it establishes NAAQS or takes other 
action under the Clean Air Act. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1041 @.C. Cir. 
1999) (cidng 15 U.S.C. 8 793(c)(1) (1994)), mod@ed on petition for reh 'g, 195 F.3d 4 @.C. Cir. 
1999), cerr. granted. 120 S .  Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.); 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (mem.). Even absent 
a specific statutory exemption, it is relatively well-established that NEPA does not apply to most of 
EPA's actions under pollution control statutes, on the grounds that these statutes require the 
'functional equivalent" of environmental assessment or impact statement. See Portland Cement 
Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The merits of requiring NEPA or 
NEPA-like analysis of the EPA, while warranting additional attention, must be left for another day. 
355. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council. Inc., 467 U.S. 837. 842-43 (1984). 
356. Id. 
357. Id. Thus, "Chevron presumes the existence of at least one constitutionally permissible 
interpretation of the relevant statutory language . . . . Where only one constitutionally permissible 
interpretation of the statute is possible. i.e., where Congress has spoken directly to the precise 
question at issue, the court must effectuate that interpretation of the law." Adler, supra note 67, at 
10,244. "Where multiple permissible readings exist," the agency is allowed to choose any 
reasonable outcome. Id. 
358. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841, 845. 
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opinion did not provide explicit guidance as to when a statute should be 
found ambiguous, it did note that courts should employ "traditional tools of 
statutory constructionn to ascertain whether Congress had a specific intent on 
the particular provision at issue.35g The starting point for this inquiry is the 
plain language of the statute itself. Other tools may include the overall 
statutory framework, congressional policy and the legislative history.360 
Moving on to step two, the Chevron Court found that the EPA's 
definition was permissible. The agency allowed a facility to "bubble" 
multiple emission sources for the purposes of calculating emission rates, so 
that if the facility were to add a new emission source it could offset that 
source by reducing emissions elsewhere in its This interpretation 
allowed many facilities to avoid the stringent requirements imposed on new 
or modified major stationary sources.362 In finding the agency's decision 
permissible and reasonable, the Court cited the complex and technical nature 
of the regulatory scheme, the "detailed and reasoned" consideration that the 
EPA had given to the issue, and the nature of EPA's interpretation as one of 
policy The Court admonished the reviewing court that it need not 
find that the agency's interpretation is the most accurate one, or the one the 
court itself would have chosen, to conclude that the interpretation is 
permissible. 364 
As in V e m n t  Yankee, the Chevron Court invoked separation of powers 
principles to justify its deferential stance.36s It explained that the judiciary 
359. Id. at 843 n.9; see also Shapiro & Levy, supra note 336, at 1069 (describing the QIevron 
decision as giving rise to a presumption of ambiguity). There appears to be no precise formula for 
step one, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict when a court will fmd a statute ambiguous 
under step one. In application, 'disagreement reigns as to the clarity of particular statutes." 
Michael Hen,  Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking under Chevron, 
6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187. 205 (1992). Justice Scalia has remarked that it is not necessary for 
opposing interpretations to be in 'absolute equipoise" for ambiguity to exist. Antonin Scalia, 
Judicial Deference to Administrative Znrerprefananons of Law, 1989 DUKE L. J. 5 11, 520. 
360. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1301 (2000); see also 
Scalia, supra note 359. at 515. 
361. CYmron, 467 U.S. at 841 (reviewing the EPA's regulatory definition and the language 
and intent of the Clean Air Act). The new source review program requires the EPA to set uniform 
standards of performance for emissions from new or modified sources reflecting 'the degree of 
emission limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction . . . 
adequately demonstrated." Clean Air Act 8 1 1  l(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. 8 7411(a)(l) (1994). 
362. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841. 
363. Id. at 865. 
364. Id. at 843 n. 11; see also NLRB v .  United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 
23, 484 U.S. 112, 133 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
365. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 864-66; Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); see also Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory lnterpret~~on 
and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L .  REV. 452, 456 (1 989). 
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should not undermine the legislature's decision to entrust regulatory 
responsibility to executive agencies: 
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is 
an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a 
specific provision of the statute by regulation . . . . Sometimes the 
legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is 
implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not 
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a 
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an 
agency. 366 
The Court castigated the D.C. Circuit for "rnisconceiv[ing] the nature of 
its role" and imposing its own belief that bubbling would not advance the 
Act's overarching goal of improving air quality: "If [EPA's] choice 
represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were 
committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless 
it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is 
not one that Congress would have ~anctioned."~~' In essence, Chevron 
assumes that policy choices ought to be made by persons accountable to the 
political branches-if not by Congress itself, then at least by agency 
administrators appointed by the President and confirmed by Congress-but 
not by the federal judiciary. 
In its initial decision in American Trucking, the D.C. Circuit cited 
Chevron step one to support the relatively narrow finding that the EPA was 
correct in refusing to consider costs, given the plain language of section 
Curiously, the court did not even mention Chevron's deferential 
standard with respect to the overall integrity of the levels chosen for the 
NAAQS, instead invoking the nondelegation doctrine. The per curiam 
opinion on the petition for rehearing gave more consideration to Chevron: 
To choose among permissible interpretations of an ambiguous 
principle, of course, is to make a policy decision, and since 
Chevron it has been clear that "[tlhe responsibilities for assessing 
the wisdom of such policy choices . . . are not judicial ones." 
Accordingly, just as we must defer to an agency's reasonable 
366. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. 
367. Id. at 845 (citation omitted). 
368. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1999), modifled on 
petition for reh 'g, 195 F.3d 4 (D .C . Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S.  Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem. ) ; 120 
S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (mem.). The role of economic costs as a factor in setting NAAQS is the subject 
of the Association's petition for certiorari. which was granted by the Court a few days after it 
granted review on the nondelegation issue. See Am. Trucking. 120 S. Ct. at 2193 (mem.) (petition 
for writ of cen. granted). 
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interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term, we must defer to an 
agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute containing only an 
ambiguous principle by which to guide its exercise of delegated 
authority. In sum, the approach of the Benzene case, in which the 
Supreme Court itself identified an intelligible principle in an 
ambiguous statute, has given way to the approach of 
The court indicated that Chevron step two is applicable whether the 
inquiry is characterized as an interpretive matter or as a decision to fill a gap 
left by Congress to the agency; even so, it denied the petition.370 
Unlike the "stationary source" definitional issue before the Court in 
Chevron, the ozone "cutoff' at 0.08 ppm did not turn solely on the EPA's 
definition of an ambiguous term. Instead, it involved the EPA's choice of a 
specific standard, based on an administrative record, regarding the level of 
NAAQS necessary to protect health as directed by section 109. To execute 
the Act's requirements by choosing a standard, the EPA had to make a 
policy call, guided by scientific data compiled in its administrative record but 
also involving a fair amount of judgment of an interpretive nature, as to 
exactly what level would be "requisite" to protect public health with an 
"adequate" margin of safety. 
If in fact Chevron is applicable to the EPA's revised NAAQS, it cuts 
against the D.C. Circuit's decision to set aside the agency's choice of a 
standard.37' Under Chevron step one, the court would find a lack of clear 
intent on the stringency of standards necessary to protect public health. It 
appears that Congress did not express an opinion on the range of permissible 
standards, and, more likely than not, punted on the question of what to do 
when adverse health effects might occur at any level above zero. The Clean 
Air Act is ambiguous on this point, perhaps even intentionally so.3n 
Moving on to step two, the court would defer to the EPA's choice of the 
appropriate NAAQS, so long as that choice is "permissible." Courts rarely 
reverse once they reach step two, unless the agency's interpretation is 
patently unreasonable, unconstitutional, or frustrates discernible statutory 
goals.373 An agency's decision is not delegitimized just because it reflects the 
369. Am. Trucking, 195 F.3d at 8 (citing Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 
U.S. 607,642, 646 (1980)) (other citations omitted). 
370. Id. 
371. See id. at 11-12 (Tatel, J . ,  dissenting from denial of rehearing). 
372. Public choice theorists posit that Congress routinely passes ambiguous provisions to avoid 
the need to reach consensus or take responsibility for controversial issues. E.g . ,  David Shoenbrod, 
Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 731, 740 (1 999); JERRY 
L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 14-42 (1997). 
373. Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasiz.ing Reasoned Decisionmaking in 
Reviewing Agency lnte~pretariom of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, % (1994) (noting that some 
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political goals of the powers that be in the executive branch if other factors 
showing "permissibility" are met.374 
Chevron plainly refutes the position that a broad delegation of standard- 
setting authority to an executive agency offends separation of powers. The 
Chevron Court recognized that legislative ambiguities, i.e., standards that 
lack crystal-clear guiding principles, are not at all remarkable or unusual in 
complex areas like environmental law. As a result, it is perfectly 
appropriate-and not constitutionally suspect-for the agency to "fill in the 
blanks" with reasonable details if the statutory directive is broadly or loosely 
phrased such that several interpretations are possible. Yet, under American 
Trucking, it is hard to imagine a court ever proceeding to Chevron step two, 
because an ambiguous statute wouId trigger a constitutional delegation 
problem. The application of American Tmcking to future cases could 
effectively eviscerate the Chevron doctrine. 
There are those who might say "good-bye and good riddance" to Chevron 
deference, on the grounds that Chevron itself presents a separation of powers 
problem. The notion that judges should stand back and let executive 
agencies interpret statutory provisions may be "quite jarring to those who 
recall the suggestion, found in Marbury v.  adi is on,^'^ and repeated time and 
again in American public law, that it is for judges, and no one else, to 'say 
what the law is.'"'" But the interpretation of ambiguous language in a 
regulatory statute often boils down to a choice between competing policies, 
not merely the construction of words, phrases, statutory context and 
legislative history. This is especially true in those cases where nondelegation 
arguments are most likely to be raised-where Congress did not make a 
judges uphold the agency under step two unless the agency's decision outright "flunk[s] the laugh 
test") (quoting Judge Stephen Williams, author of the majority opinion in American Truckng). In 
fact, the Supreme Court had never invalidated an agency's interpretation of a statute within its 
jurisdiction once it reached step two, see Ronald M. Levin, Tke Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two 
Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1261 (1997). until it issued AT&T Cop. v. Iowa 
Utilities Board, 525 U. S . 366 (1 999). 
374. Seidenfeld, supra note 373, at 100, 103 (noting that the Court in both Chevron and later 
in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187 (1991). "explicitly accepted the agency's assertion that 
political attitudes had changed" under President Reagan as a legitimate factor and justification for 
the agency's decisions); see ako Scalia, supra note 359, at 517-18 (stating that step two should 
allow political flexibility). 
375. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). In Marbury. Chief Justice Marshall proclaimed that '[ilt 
is emphatically the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Id. at 177. 
376. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration Afier Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 
2074 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, After Chevron]. Professor Sunstein describes Chevron as "a 
kind of Marbury, or counter-Marbury, for the administrative state." Id. at 2075. Prior to Chevron, 
a line of cases had refused to give any deference to agency interpretations of 'pure questions of 
law," but Chevron plainly repudiated that approach. See Scalia. supra note 359, at 513 (citing 
cases). 
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choice on a particular issue but delegated that function to the agency. The 
choice of policy is clearly a function of the elected branches, not the 
C O U ~  .3n 
Two recent Supreme Court decisions clarify the constitutional role of 
courts, Congress and executive agencies when faced with ambiguous 
statutory directives. In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. ,378 the 
Court held that the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") lacks authority 
to regulate nicotine and tobacco products as drugs or devices under the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA").~'~ Instead of striking down a broadly 
phrased statute on nondelegation grounds, the Court simply recognized that 
its role, as a matter of judicial review, was to find the FDA's assertion of 
jurisdiction impermissible in view of Congress's apparent refusal to delegate 
the power to regulate tobacco under the FDCA.~~' Far from invoking the 
separation of powers doctrine or in any way calling into question the 
constitutional validity of the statute itself or the agency's construction of it, 
the Court stated that "we must be guided to a degree by common sense as to 
the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such 
economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency. n38' 
The FDA issued the regulations at issue in 1996, defining nicotine as a 
and cigarettes and smokeless tobacco as "drug delivery devices, "jg3 
and asserting jurisdiction to restrict the promotion, labeling and accessibility 
of tobacco products to adolescents." ~nder ' the Court's construction of the 
FDCA, given the FDA's express finding that cigarettes and other tobacco 
-- --- - 
377. Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 
295 (1986) (noting that the Supreme Court has equally 'emphatically stated that it [is] for the 
agency, not the reviewing court. 'to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests 
which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved'" 
(citing C3evron. 467 U.S. at 865)). 
378. 120s. Ct. 1291 (2000). 
379. 21 U.S.C. 84 301-397 (1994). 
380. Brown & Williamon Tobacco, 120 S. Ct. at 1301. 
381. Id. (citing MCI Telecomrn. Corp. v.  AT&T Corp., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994)). 
382. 21 U.S.C. 8 321(g)(l)(C) (1994) (providing that drugs include "articles (other than food) 
intended to affect the structure or any function of the body "). 
383. Id. 8 32101) (1994) (defining device as 'an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, 
contrivance, . . . or other similar or related article, including any component, part, or accessory, 
which is . . . intended to affect the structure or any function of the body "); see ulso id. 8 353(g)(l) 
(1994) (granting the FDA authority to regulate 'combination products" which 'constitute a 
combination of a drug, device, or biological product"). The FDA found that these provisions gave 
it discretion to regulate combination products as dmgs, devices or both. See Regulations 
Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and 
Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,400 (1996). 
384. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless 
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg.at 44.397, 44,402. 
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products were ~nsafe ,~"  the Act would require FDA to ban such products 
entirely-an outcome which Congress had foreclosed in subsequent 
statutes .386 Accordingly, the Court invalidated the FDA's regulations, 
specifically invoking Chevron step one: 
Deference . . . to an agency's construction of a statute that it 
administers is premised on the theory that a statute's ambiguity 
constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to 
fill in the statutory gaps . . . . In extrmrdiMry cases, however, 
there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress 
has intended such an implicit delegation. . . . This is hardly an 
ordinary case. Contrary to its representations to Congress since 
1914, the FDA has now asserted jurisdiction to regulate an 
industry constituting a significant portion of the American 
economy. '8-1 
The Court found that deference could not be given the agency's 
interpretation of the statute because Congress had "repeatedly acted to 
preclude any agency from exercising significant policymalung authority in 
the area [of tobacco]."388 In keeping with Chevron step one, the Court 
concluded: 
Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such 
economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a 
fashion. To find that the FDA has the authority to regulate tobacco 
products, one must not only adopt an extremely strained 
understanding of "safetyn as it is used throughout the Act-a 
concept central to the FDCA's regulatory scheme-but also ignore 
the plain implication of Congress' subsequent tobacco-specific 
legislation. It is therefore clear . . . Congress has directly spoken 
385. See id. at 44,398-99. 
386. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 120 S. Ct. at 1301-04. Various provisions of the 
FDCA require that regulated products be found 'safe" before they can be sold or allowed to remain 
on the market. Id. at 1301-05 (citing 21 U.S.C. 58 360c(a)(2), 352Q). 393(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. IV 
1998)). The Court went on to examine a panoply of subsequent enactments and proposed 
amendments in determining that Congress had forbidden such a ban. Id. at 1306-13. It concluded 
that, "[tlaken together, these actions by Congress over the past 35 years preclude an interpretation 
of the FDCA that grants the FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products." Id. at 1312. 
387. Id. at 1314-15 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that. up until 1995, the FDA had 
consistently denied that it possessed jurisdiction 'to regulate tobacco products as customarily 
marketed. " Id. at 1307. 
388. Id. at 1315. The Court added 'tobacco has its own unique political history" owing to its 
"unique place in American history and society. " Id. 
1010 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
to the question at issue and precluded the FDA from regulating 
tobacco products.389 
Thus, it stated, "we are obliged to defer not to the agency's expansive 
construction of the statute, but to Congress' consistent judgment to deny 
FDA this power."390 
The Court's only direct reference to the separation of powers concerns 
typically raised by nondelegation challenges was in response to a point raised 
by dissenting Justice Breyer. Justice Breyer refuted the majority's 
implication that courts "should assume in close cases that a decision with 
'enormous social consequences,' . . . should be made by democratically 
elected Members of Congress rather than by unelected agency 
adrninistrat~rs."~~' The majority remarked that, although the public may 
well hold the executive branch politically accountable for the FDA's 
decision, given the serious and high-profile nature of the tobacco issue, an 
"agency's power to regulate in the public interest must always be grounded 
in a valid grant of authority from Congress. "392 
389. Id. 
390. Id. The Court cited MCI Telecommunications, where it had held that the FCC did not 
have the authority, under a proviso allowing it to 'modify any requirement" of the Communications 
Act of 1934, to convert a mandatory requirement that long distance carriers file their rates into a 
voluntary activity. Id. (citing MCI Telecomrn. Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 512 U.S. 218. 225 (1994)). 
"[qinding 'not the slightest doubt' that Congress had directly spoken to the question, . . . we 
concluded that '[ilt is highly unlikely that Congress would leave the determination of whether an 
industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion-and even more 
unlikely that it would achieve that through such a subtle device as permission to 'modify' rate-filing 
requirements. ' " Id. (quoting MCI Telecomm., 512 U . S .  at 228, 231). 
391. Id. at 1330 (Breyer, J. .  dissenting). Justice Breyer noted that the public was quite likely 
to be aware of the FDA's decision to regulate tobacco products and to hold executive branch 
officials politically accountable: 
Presidents, just like Members of Congress, are elected by the public. Indeed, 
the President and Vice President are the on& public officials whom the entire 
Nation elects. I do not believe that an administrative agency decision of this 
magnitude--one that is important. conspicuous, and controversial--can escape 
the kind of public scrutiny that is essential in any democracy. And such a 
review will take place whether it is the Congress or the Executive Branch that 
makes the relevant decision. 
Id. at 1331; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 323 
(2000) [hereinafter Sunstein. CMOIU] (noting that, if the public is angry at Congress for "passing 
the buck" to the executive branch, voters will react accordingly in the next election; if they don't, it 
may be because they are content with the operation of government under broad delegations). 
392. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 120 S .  Ct. at 1315. The Court went on to state, "[iln our 
anxiety to effectuate the congressional purpose of protecting the public, we must take care not to 
extend the scope of the statute beyond the point where Congress indicated it would stop." Id. 
(citations omitted). 
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The Court took a different tack in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board,393 
and, for the first time since Chevron was handed down in 1984, invoked 
Chevron step two to invalidate regulations issued by the FCC pursuant to the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.394 The similarity between Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco and Iowa Utilities is more striking, though, than is this 
distinction-once again, principles of administrative law, not constitutional 
law, were invoked to resolve a difficult regulatory issue. 
The Telecommunications Act, designed to introduce competition among 
providers of local telephone service, allows new entrants to lease certain 
elements of the existing carriers' network.395 Section 251(d)(2) directs the 
FCC to determine which elements would be subject to this "unbundled 
access" by considering, "at a minimum, whether (A) access to such network 
elements . . . is necessary; and (B) the failure to provide access to such 
network elements would impair the [new entrant's] ability . . . to provide the 
services that it seeks to offer."396 The FCC's regulations allowed new 
entrants to meet the "necessary" standard regardless of whether they could 
obtain the network element from some other source; in other words, if 
service could be provided at the lowest cost using the incumbent's elements, 
the standard was met, even if services were otherwise available from other 
carriers.397 The FCC's interpretation of "impairment" likewise precluded 
consideration of opportunities for self-provision or purchase from other 
providers. New entrants could meet this standard if an incumbent's failure to 
provide access "would decrease the quality or increase the . . . cost of the 
service, " 398 
The Court found 8 25 1(d) "a model of ambiguity or indeed even self- 
c~ntradict ion,"~~~ but nonetheless concluded that the FCC had failed to 
interpret the statutory terms in a "reasonable fashion," because its rule "is 
393. 525 U.S. 366, 392-93 (1999). 
394. Id. at 392-93; see Bressman. supra note 237, at 1399. Justice Souter dissented from this 
part of the opinion on the grounds that, once ambiguity was detected, 'Chevron deference surely 
requires us to respect the Commission's conclusion." Ia. Utilities, 525 U.S .  at 401 (Souter, J., 
dissenting in part). 
395. 47 U.S.C. 5 251(c) (Supp 111. 1997). 
396. Id. 251(d)(2) (Supp. I11 1997). The FCC's general rulemaking authority to "prescribe 
such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest," provided in the 
Communications Act of 1934,47 U.S.C. 4 201@) (1994). extends to its implementation of the 1996 
Act. la.  Utilities, 525 U.S. at 377-78. 
397. See la. Urilities, 525 U.S. at 389 (citing In re lmplementation of the Local Competition 
Provisions, 11 F.C.C.R. 15.499 (1996) (First Report & Order 1 283)). 
398. Id. (citing First Report & Order ( 285). 
399. Id. at 397. Justice Scalia. writing for the majority, remarked that the lack of clarity 'is 
most unfortunate for a piece of legislation that profoundly affects a crucial segment of the economy 
worth tens of billions of dollars." Id. 
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simply not in accord with the ordinary and fair meanings" of the terms 
"necessary" and "impairment. "400 Moreover, the agency had failed to take 
the Act's objectives into a c c o ~ n t , ~ '  and had neglected to apply any "limiting 
standard, rationally related to the goals of the Act."4M In effect, the FCC 
had abdicated its regulatory role, delegating almost complete discretion to the 
aspiring carriers themselves to determine whether access to the network 
elements of an incumbent was necessary simply by choosing the most 
efficient service, while turning a blind eye to the availability of elements 
outside of the incumbent's network.403 This, the Court found, was surely 
contrary to congressional intent .404 
Although portions of the Court's opinion evidence its overarching 
concerns about regulatory responsibility for a program with tremendous 
implications for the national economy and federalism-the same concerns 
evident in the early New Deal nondelegation cases-nowhere does it cite 
those precedents, nor does it even mention the nondelegation doctrine. The 
Court's decisions in both Iowa Utilities and Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
indicate that it has no interest in reviving the nondelegation doctrine as a 
constitutional ground for invalidating congressional enactments. To the 
contrary, the opinions demonstrate a willingness to hold true to the very 
basis for the Chevron doctrine, i.e., effectuating the intent of C o n g r e ~ s . ~  If 
Congress spoke directly to the issue, delegation was not intended and there is 
no basis for giving deference to the agency's interpretation, or to even move 
400. Id. at 390. 
401. Id. at 392. 
402. Id. at 388. 
403. See id. at 389-90. Justice Scalia characterized the power delegated to the new entrants as 
"promiscuous," id. at 397 (quoting a statement made by GTE's counsel at oral argument), 
reminiscent of the imagery used by Justice Cardom in Schechter Poultry, see Bressman, supra note 
237, at 1401, 1435-36. The lack of limiting standards, along with the abdication of lawmaking 
authority to private parties, were the very same flaws which rendered the delegation at  issue in 
Schechter Poultry unconstitutional. Id. at 1435. Professor Bressman concludes that the Iowa 
Utilities decision can be explained in terns of a nondelegation problem just as easily as it could a 
Chevron step two problem, although the Court did not couch its opinion in constitutional terms. Id. 
at 1436. 
404. la. Utilities, 525 U.S. at 390. Economic and states' rights themes were evident 
throughout the opinion, and, in particular, the Court seemed acutely conscious of the economic 
implications of the FCC's interpretation. See id. at 395. However, the majority flatly rejected the 
state utility commissions' appeals to states' rights, id. at 378 n.6, although Justices Thomas, 
Rehnquist and Breyer believed that the case raised 'basic principles of federalism." citing 'the 100 
year tradition of state authority over intrastate telecommunications." id. at 411 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting in part. with Rehnquist and Breyer); id. at 427 (Breyer, dissenting in part). 
405. See Scalia, supra note 359, at 516-17. Scalia explains that whether or not ambiguity 
reveals a true congressional intent to confer discretion on an agency, a query which is 'probably a 
wild goose chase anyway," Congress now knows that, as a result of Chevron, intentional or 
unintentional ambiguities will be resolved by agencies, not courts. Id. at 517. 
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beyond step one of the Chevron analysis. On the other hand, if Congress left 
a gap in the statutory scheme, it has implicitly delegated the power to the 
agency to fill that gap with a permissible interpretation of the provision in 
question. Iowa Utilities demonstrates a renewed interest in step two, and a 
clarification of what is "permissible." Reviewing courts are to determine 
whether the interpretation is permissible and reasonable, giving due 
deference to the agency's policy choices, while probing the factual and legal 
bases for the ultimate decision. 
Of course, invoking Chevron is not a panacea for irregular or 
unpredictable decision-making. There is a danger that courts can find 
ambiguity where none exists if they wish to uphold the agency's decision, or, 
on the other hand, discern clarity where none exists, thereby stripping the 
agency of discretion when its interpretation is disagreeable to the ideology of 
the judges.'$06 Empirical studies of cases applying the Chevron doctrine have 
yielded contradictory results. Some find that courts do use Chevron for 
partisan purposes,407 while others conclude that judges actually behaved less 
ideologically after ~hevron."~* Whether judicial proclivities play a distinct 
role or not, it is apparent that the application of Chevron has not produced 
the predictable results one might expect. But Chevron has, at least, given a 
signal to Congress that legislative ambiguities are more likely to be resolved 
by agencies, whose political biases are relatively easy to discern, than by 
individual  jurist^.^ And, in cases where Congress established legislative 
goals but otherwise avoided a particular issue by giving the broadest possible 
delegation to the agency, the use of Chevron as an interpretive norm should 
caution courts against striking down the delegation and supplying policy- 
based limitations intended for administrative resolution. 
406. See Bressman, supra note 237, at 141 1-12; Schuck, supra note 305, at 788. 
407. E.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H.  Tiller, Judicial Partismhip and Obedience to Legal 
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeah, 107 YALE L. J. 2155, 2175 (1998); see 
aLso Scalia, supra note 359, at 521 (stating that, under a textualist approach, a judge can generally 
find that the plain meaning is apparent from a provision's text and its relationship to other laws; as 
a result, deference under Chevron step two will be less often triggered, making it 'relatively m e "  
that 'Chevron will require me to accept an interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not 
personally adopt "). 
408. E.g. ,  Aaron P. Avila, Application of the Chevron Doctrine in the D. C. Circuit, 8 N.Y .U.  
ENVTL. L.J. 398 (2000) (comparing challenges to EPA decisions before and after Chevron to see if 
judges tended to be more ideological after Chevron). 
409. See Scalia, supra note 359, at 517. As a result, Justice Scalia concludes, legislating 
"becomes less of a sporting event. " Id. 
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C. A Marriage of Chevron and Overton Park, with a Contextual Twist 
It is virtually impossible to square American Trucking's nondelegation 
approach with Chevron.410 A more reasoned response to separation of 
powers and due process concerns can be crafted by synthesizing Chevron 
principles with hard look review, as seen in Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
and Iowa Utilities. This approach would allow Congress to establish 
legislative goals and delegate the details to agencies so that the political 
branches are making policy-based judgments, while promoting meaningful 
judicial review, without raising constitutional concerns. 
The Brown & Williamson Tobacco decision provides a viable judicial 
response where the subject matter of the regulation and the relevant statutory 
scheme shows a congressional intent to place discernible limits on the 
agency's discretion. In those instances, courts must fulfill their constitutional 
duties by holding true to congressional intent and invalidating inconsistent 
executive action. Where the statute at issue does not specify precise 
parameters, however, the initial inquiry will still employ "traditional tools of 
statutory constructionn to see if Congress has spoken to the issue, as directed 
in Chevron step one. The nuance added by the proposed nondelegation 
alternative gives special attention to context-"step one-plus." 
Courts can presume that Congress is less likely to delegate open-ended 
powers to executive agencies in certain areas, and demand greater specificity 
in those cases. Professor Sunstein describes several categories of 
"nondelegation canons" to illustrate that courts generally do not defer to 
agencies when their decisions go against "background" legal  principle^.^" 
These canons justify more rigorous review when the subject of the agency's 
decision is contrary to widely held expectations or uniquely within 
Congress's realm. Examples include the retroactive application of a statute 
or rule, the intrusion on fundamental constitutional rights, the abrogation of 
American Indian treaties4I2 and, possibly, decisions requiring tremendous 
410. See Adler, supra note 67, at 10,242 (noting the tension between the nondelegation 
doctrine articulated in the American Trucking and Lockout/Tagout decisions, and the Chevron 
doctrine of judicial review). 
41 1. Sunstein, Canons, supra note 391, at 330. 
412. See id. at 331-35. Although federal taxation would also seem a likely candidate for 
inclusion in a set of nondelegation canons as a power uniquely within Congress's sovereign and 
legislative realm, especially subject to lobbying efforts and factional influence by private groups, 
see id.; United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 354 (1988); Sunstein, Canons, supra 
note 391, at 325, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected arguments that heightened scrutiny 
should be given to delegations of the taxing power, see Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 
U.S. 212, 222-23 (1989). 
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expenditures for marginal gainsS4l3 Courts may expect Congress to voice a 
clear intent to grant specific powers to the executive branch in these areas, 
and agencies will not enjoy the benefit of the doubt in the face of legislative 
ambib~i ty .~ '~  
By the same token, a "prodelegation" presumption might be recognized 
in other areas where plenary powers have been routinely granted in the past 
or where separation of powers concerns are minimal. Regardless of the level 
of statutory detail, certain types of statutes are less likely to trigger 
nondelegation and separation of powers concerns. As noted in  menc can 
Trucking, and as Justice Rehnquist explained in Industrial Union Depament  
v. American Petroleum Ins t i t~ te ,~ '~  some enactments warrant less scrutiny 
than others.*16 His examples include cases where the delegatee possessed 
413. Sunstein cites, inter aka, Corrosion hoof  Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1222-23 (5th 
Cir. 1991). for this proposition, a case that invalidated EPA's decision to ban the manufacture of 
asbestos under the Toxic Substances Control Act ('TSCA")). Sunstein, Canom, supra note 391, at 
334 n.93. As TSCA explicitly requires a consideration of economic effects, see 15 U.S.C. 8 
2618(a)(3) (1994), a straightforward application of Chevron step one dictates against any contrary 
interpretation. TSCA is also distinctive in that it imposes the more exacting 'substantial evidence" 
standard of judicial review. Id. 8 2618(c)(l)(B)(i) (1994). Compared to arbitrary and capricious 
review, this standard "imposes a considerable burden on the agency and limits its discretion in 
arriving at a factual predicate." Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1214. In two other cases 
cited in support of his point, agencies were allowed to grant de minimis exceptions to statutory 
prohibitions where costs of regulation in the particular case yielded minimal gains, see Alabama 
Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360-61 @.C. Cir. 1979); Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy, 613 
F.2d 947, 955-56 (D.C. Cir. 1979), but there are probably as many cases where the agency was 
denied the power to imply regulatory exemptions, see, e .g . ,  Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. 
Costle. 568 F.2d 1369, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (invalidating EPA decision to exempt irrigation 
return flows from the Clean Water Act's definition of 'point source"). Sunstein also cites the 
Benzene case, Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 644 (1980). which may be 
a better example of an implicit 'nondelegation canon" against the imposition of excessive costs, see 
supra notes 119-28 and accompanying text. 
414. See Sunstein, Canons, supra note 391, at 335-36. Another category that could be 
included as a 'nondelegation canon" involves agency interpretations of their own jurisdictional 
reach. Although Justice Scalia has argued that it is "settled law" that Chevron deference applies to 
jurisdictional issues, other justices have disagreed. Hen. supra note 359, at 216-18 (discussing 
divergent views evidenced in several Supreme Court cases). Arguably, Congress is less likely to 
have intended to leave a determination as to the scope of administrative authority to the agency 
itself, so implied delegation of a jurisdictional issue may be inappropriate. Id at 219; see also Lars 
Noah. Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in Administrative Low, 41 Wm.  & 
Mary L. Rev. 1463, 1484-1485, 1528-1529 (2000). 
415. 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
416. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027. 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that no 
"special theories," such as 'war powers . . . or the sovereign attributes of the delegatee [had been] 
asserted" to justify the "vague delegation" given in the Clean Air Act), modified on petition for 
reh'g, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.); 120 S. Ct. 
2193 (2000) (mem.); Am. Petrolewn Inst., 448 U.S. at 684 (Rehnquist, I . ,  concurring in 
judgment). A test that embraces differentiated levels of review finds support in United States v. 
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), which gave rise to strict scrutiny for laws 
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residual authority over particular subjects of regulation, as does the President 
with respect to foreign affairs,417 and cases where the statutory delegation 
takes place against the backdrop of an administrative practice that predated 
the legi~lation.~" Rehnquist also referred to situations where the delegatee 
itself possesses independent authority over the subject matter, citing a statute 
that authorized American Indian tribes to regulate the import of liquor into 
Indian 'Finally, he would include "a rule of necessity," where 
broad delegations of authority are upheld simply because "it would be 
'unreasonable and impracticable to compel Congress to prescribe detailed 
rules' regarding a particular policy or situation. "420 
These contextual and practical presumptions become tools of construction 
to be utilized at step one-plus of the proposed nondelegation approach. 
Using these tools, if the court is convinced that delegation was not intended 
by Congress, or that it does result in separation of powers problems, it must 
remand the decision, as it did in Brown and Williamson Tobacco, or 
that discriminate against a "discrete and insular minority" or impair the political processes 
othewise expected to result in the repeal of unfavorable legislation. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond 
Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. R E V .  713, 714 (1985) (explaining that Guolene Products 
provided a unifying principle for judicial review in the New Deal era, based on "an entirely new 
constitutional rhetoric-one that self-consciously recognized that the era of laissez-faire capitalism 
had ended"); Erwin Chemerinsky, 7 7 ~  Constirution in AIrthorit~vi~ I n ~ t i ~ o ~ ,  32 SUFFOLK U .  L. 
REV. 441, 459 (1999) (noting that Carolene Products provides "a framework of general judicial 
deference to the legislature, but with particular areas of more intensive judicial reviewn). 
417. Am. Petroleum Imt., 448 U.S. at 664 ("[Tjhe Court upheld a statute authorizing the 
President to prohibit the sale of arms to certain countries if he found that such a prohibition would 
'contribute to the reestablishment of peace'" (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 307 (1936))). The Court stated that, 'in the area of foreign affairs, Congress 
'must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction 
which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.'" Id. (quoting Curtiss- 
Wrighr, 229 U.S. at 320). Along the same lines, a prodelegation presumption might also be 
warranted for decisions governing international trade relationships. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters 
v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 754 0.D.C. 1971) (citing Curriss-Wright; & Zemel v. Rusk, 381 
U.S. 1, 17 (1965)). 
418. See Am. Petroleum Imt., 448 U.S. at 683 (giving President authority to recapture 
'excessive profits" (citing Lichter v.  United States, 334 U.S. 742. 783 (1948))). 
419. Id. at 684 (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 55657 (1975)). Notably, 
Justice Rehnquist would review this type of delegation less strictly, even though the authority was 
given to a non-federal entity. 
420. Id. at 684-85 (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC. 329 U.S. 90. 105 (1946)). 
According to Justice Rehnquist, there was no necessity which would justify an "evasive" standard 
like "feasibility" in the Occupational Safety and Health Act: "Congress was faced with a clear. if 
difficult, choice between balancing statistical lives and industrial resources or authorizing the 
Secretary to elevate human life above all concerns save massive dislocation in an affected industry." 
Id. at 685. In contrast, both a "rule of necessityn and an extensive backdrop of administrative 
practice justify a pro-delegation presumption in Property Clause cases. See infra Part V1.A-B. 
Rather than atkmpt to imagine every subject to be included, my intent is to introduce the pro- 
delegation concept here and try it out in the context of the Property Clause. 
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invalidate the statute. On the other hand, if the court is satisfied that the 
agency has been given the power to "fill in the details," then it moves to step 
two to determine permissibility, as a matter of administrative law. 
If heightened emphasis were placed on step two of Chevron, as it was in 
Iowa Utilities, courts would take a hard look at the reasonableness of the 
agency's decision in light of legislative goals, as shown by the overall 
statutory framework and legislative history."' Under this "step two-plus" 
inquiry, if the question is one of pure interpretation, for example, defining an 
ambiguous statutory term like "stationary source," the court must follow 
Chevron and defer to the agency's policy-based selection of any permissible 
d e f ~ t i o n .  If the issue involves a mixed question of interpretation and 
application of the law to a set of facts, as did EPA's decision that 0.08 ppm 
ozone is an appropriate level "requisite" to protect public health with an 
"adequate margin of safety," the court's review of the interpretative 
component should still be deferential. Review of the "as-applied" 
component, though, would employ the Motor Vehicle factors. The court 
should look closely at the record and the ultimate decision to ensure that the 
agency explained itself clearly, considered all relevant factors and made a 
decision that is well-supported by the record. As a result, the agency's 
political choices are not second-guessed (unless they were precluded by 
Congress as revealed in step one-plus), but its factual fmdings and ultimate 
conclusions must be the product of regular and well-informed processes, as 
opposed to factional influence or arbitrary whim, to withstand review. 
Meanwhile, courts can fulfill their constitutional role and promote 
deliberative tripartite democratic processes by providing careful judicial 
review, without displacing the agency's judgment on policy or factual 
matters, formulated through rulemaking and public input. In turn, agencies 
are less likely to issue arbitrary or ill-formed decisions if they know that, 
given a concrete case or controversy, courts will be probing those decisions 
with a hard look.4" 
421. See Seidenfeld, supra note 373, at 128-30; see ako Adler, supra note 67, at 10,243 ('In 
a 'step two' context, the nondelegation doctrine is satisfied where Congress has included adequate 
standards in the statute, augmented by its legislative history, to guide an agency in its choices 
among competing, permissible readings of the statute."); Shapiro & Levy, supra note 336, at 1075 
n.%, 1076 n. 100 (noting that the Administrative Conference recommended the merger of Chevron 
and Motor Vehicle, and recommending th?: step two of Chevron include the first two Motor Vehicle 
factors). 
422. See ~ic&rd B. Stewart, The Development of AdministrMMw and Quai-ConstiMioml 
Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act. 62 
IOWA L. REV. 713, 731-32 (1977); Cass R. Sunstein. Conn'turiomlism After the New Deal, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 421, 471 (1987) [hereinafter Sunstein, Constiturionalism]. 
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Vigorous judicial scrutiny at step two-plus acts as a significant 
impediment to improperly motivated decisions.423 Administrative processes 
generally provide greater opportunities for public involvement than 
congressional processes, allowing more informed decision-making but, at the 
same time, increasing the potential for undue influence by more vigilant or  
well-heeled interest groups. Heightened scrutiny minimizes the potential for 
abuse of agency discretion by revealing the influences of interest group 
pressure on administrative processes. By requiring the agency to explain 
why a rule or interpretation favoring any particular faction is a reasonable 
balance of statutory goals in a way that furthers the public interest and takes 
account of all relevant facts, courts play an important role in preventing 
factionalism-one of the primary concerns of the separation of powers 
doctrine .424 
The marriage of Chevron principles and Overton Park "hard look" 
review, guided by the Motor Vehicle factors, would not deprive the 
nondelegation doctrine of its force or effect. This approach is actually more 
likely to result in each branch performing its primary functions. Meaningful 
judicial review goes a long way toward ensuring that, when Congress 
performs its law-making duties by crafting policy-based objectives while 
delegating the details of regulatory implementation to administrative 
agencies, judges-not "foxesn-are "guarding the h e n h o ~ s e s . " ~ ~  
Legislatures and agencies are both made more accountable through judicial 
review, and agency decisions are more likely to be based on intelligible and 
well-supported principles because of the procedural protections afforded 
through the administrative process and access to the courts.426 
Admittedly, rigorous judicial review is not without its own dangers. The 
knowledge that each decision may be subjected to heightened scrutiny can 
ossify the agency's decision-making process and result in less regulation, 
tending to cause in the administrative arena the same adverse consequence 
423. Sunstein. Constitutionalism, supra note 422, at 471; see also Seidenfeld. supra note 373, 
at 133 ('According to deliberative democracy. agencies, rather than courts, should have primary 
interpretive authority. not only because of their superior expertise and greater political 
accountability, but also because agency decision-making processes are geared toward more 
meaningful interest group discourse. ") . 
424. Seidenfeld, supra note 373, at 135-36. 
425. Farina, supra note 365, at 498 (citing Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a 
Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 353. 368 (1987) (remarks of Cass R. Sunstein at panel 
discussion, Oct. 10. 1986)); see also Sunstein. Constirutonalism, supra note 422, at 467 (criticizing 
Chevron's deferential stance, in that "[tlhe case for judicial review depends in part on the 
proposition that foxes should not guard henhouses"). 
426. See discussion supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (discussing Warren and Davis' 
proposal). 
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feared of strong nondelegation review in the legislative In other 
words, because stringent judicial review encourages more detailed and 
cautious rulemaking, it may result in less frequent rulemaking, and standards 
like the NAAQS, once set, will rarely be revised.428 While this provides 
stability to states and regulated entities, it also causes standards to lag behind 
scientific advancements. Yet some delay, or ossification, may well be an 
unavoidable cost of the business of governance in a democracy. Delay 
occurs both at the legislative and administrative levels when opportunities for 
public involvement and judicial scrutiny are afforded as a result of 
constitutional checks and balances. The increased accountability and public 
confidence resulting from full and open processes, safeguarded by judicial 
review, will likely outweigh the costs of delay in most cases. 
As for the NAAQS at issue in American Trucking, instead of focusing on 
whether intelligible principles exist to curb the agency's discretion, the Court 
should consider the actual effects of the action at issue, as well as the overall 
context of the statutory directives, to resolve the nondelegation issue at step 
one-plus. Even though Congress may have stated its Clean Air Act 
objectives in relatively broad terms, by no stretch of the imagination does the 
Act pose a danger of "aggrandizement or encroachment" into core 
prerogatives of other branches.429 If Congress had given the power to the 
EPA to implement whatever environmental standards it deemed appropriate, 
with no guidance as to the relevant legislative goals or priorities, perhaps that 
could be viewed as abdication of its Article I duties, in light of the Act's 
effects on the "whole economy" and state interests. But Congress did not do 
that-it specified its objectives and prioritized health over other 
considerations. As the D.C. Circuit itself recently observed, if "Congress 
can lawfully delegate the power to define crimes-a power which is arguably 
at the height of that which might be defined as legislative-then surely it can 
lawfully delegatew other powers, like the regulation of public health and 
welfare, to executive agencies .430 
Step two-plus of the proposed approach requires an indepth look at the 
administrative record and the EPA's explanation and factual basis for 
selecting the final NAAQS.~~' If this inquiry reveals that EPA arbitrarily 
427. See generally Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Zbughts on "DeOssifying' the Rulemaking 
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992). 
428. SeeOren, supra note 351, at 10,664. 
429. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989). 
430. Milk Indus. Found. v. Glickman, 132 F.3d 1467, 1474 @.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing 
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996); Mistrena, 488 U.S. at 385). 
431. For an assessment of the possible deficiencies in EPA's conclusions regarding the final 
ozone standard. see Sunstein, Air II, supra note 48. at 324-30. 
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selected the studies relied upon, ignored relevant data, failed to explain its 
conclusions or drew a conclusion that is not supported by the evidence in the 
record, its decision would fail "hard look" review, and would be 
remanded. 432 
In the end, reviewing courts should heed the advice given in Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco, and be guided "by common sense" as to the likelihood 
and effects of implied delegation in a particular ~ontext."~ Courts will still 
invalidate congressional attempts to abdicate its law-making function. 
Separation of powers precludes Congress from reassigning powers 
constitutionally vested in one branch to another branch or its agent, for 
example, by giving uniquely legislative powers to the Executive through a 
line item veto, as in Clinton v. City of New By the same token, 
Congress may not hoard executive or judicial powers unto itself, as in INS v. 
~ h u d h a ~ ~ '  and Bowsher v .  S y n ~ r . ~ ~ ~  In cases like American Truckmg, 
however, the issue is not one of reassignment or abdication of legislative 
432. See supra notes 34145 and accompanying text. 
433. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1301 (2000); see also 
Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946) (using common sense approach in 
upholding broad standards as "a reflection of the necessities of modem [securities] legislation 
dealing with complex economic and social problemsn); J.W. Hampton. Jr. v. United States, 276 
U.S. 394, 407-08 (1928) (upholding, as a matter of "common sense," legislation that gave a 
presidential commission the power to fix rates in accord with general objectives); cf. United States 
v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 472 (1915) (implying congressional acquiescence to the 
President's power to withdraw public lands, and remarking that "government is a practical affair 
intended for practical menn). 
434. 524 U.S. 417 (1998). In Clinton, the Line-Item Veto Act was held unconstitutional 
because it violated the procedures of Article I, section 7, governing statutory enactment; the Court 
refused to reach the separation of powers issue. Id, at 448. However. Justice Kemedy, in his 
concurrence, noted, "By increasing the power of the President beyond what the Framers 
envisioned, the statute compromises the political liberty of our citizens, liberty which the separation 
of powers seeks to secure. * Id. at 452. Notably, the majority did not invoke nondelegation as a 
ground for invalidation, and dissenting Justice Breyer expressly concluded that there was no 
nondelegation problem. Id. at 490; see aLro Steven F .  Huefner, me Supreme Court's Avoidance of 
the Nondelegation Doctrine in Clinton v. City of New York: More Than "A Dime's Wonh Of 
Diflerence." 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 337, 341 (2000) (noting that the Court's avoidance of the 
nondelegation doctrine is "telling, for if the Court does desire to reinvigorate the nondelegation 
doctrine. it will be hard pressed to find a better opportunity than the Line Item Veto Act 
presented"). 
435. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). In Chadlro, the Supreme Court struck a provision giving the 
House power to veto deportation decisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
explaining that Congress must abide by its decision to delegate authority to decide deportation 
matters until it legislatively altered or revoked the delegation. Id. at 954-55. Moreover, because 
the veto exercised by the House was essentially legislative in purpose and effect, it was subject to 
the procedural requirements of Article I, sections 1 and 7, i.e., passage by a majority of both 
houses and presentation to the President. Id. at 957-58. 
436. 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding that Congress may not exercise removal power over officer 
performing executive functions). 
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duties, but of a legitimate delegation of discretion as to the details of 
executing the stated objectives of the law. The only question, then, is 
whether the discretion has been effectuated in a non-arbitrary, non-biased 
way. 
VI. THE DELEGATION OF POWER OVER PUBLIC LANDS AND RESOURCES: 
"DEFY THE  DEVIL"^^' 
If the American Tnrcking approach receives a warm reception in the 
Supreme Court, aggressive executive action over public lands and resources 
may well be the flashpoint for the resultant wave of nondelegation review. 
The presidential withdrawal of public lands to create national monuments is 
particularly controversial, and is often raised as an example of unbounded, 
heavy-handed federal intrusion into states' rights. Recent challenges to 
President Clinton's designation of several new national monuments, 
including the Grand Canyon - Parashant National Monument and the Grand 
Staircase-Escalante National Monument,438 explicitly raise nondelegation and 
separation of powers claims. In Esplin v. Clinton, a group of ranchers and 
state legislators allege that the decision to withdraw public lands and reserve 
them as the Parashant National Monument is unconstitutional because, under 
the Property Clause, only Congress may designate federal lands "for 
disposition," and it may not "delegate power to dispose of federal land to the 
~xecutive. "439 Likewise, in Utah Association of Counties v. Clinton and 
437. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE. T W E L W  NIGHT act 3, sc. 4. 
438. See Proclamation No. 7265, 65 Fed. Reg. 2825 (2000) (designating the Grand Canyon- 
Parashant National Monument); Proclamation No. 6920. 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (1996) (designating 
the Grand Staircase Escalante National Monument). 
439. Compl. for Declaratory J. and Injunctive Relief and Deprivations of Federal 
Constitutional Rights 11 112-29, Esplin v. Clinton (D. Ariz. filed Jan. 26, 2000) (No. CIV 00 0148 
PCT PGR). Plaintiffs characterize the withdrawal for the specific purpose of creating a national 
monument as the equivalent of a disposition of the public lands, a matter plaintiffs claim is left 
solely to Congress. Id. 71 121, 127. Plaintiffs apparently believe that the designation should have 
been effectuated (if at all) pursuant to the Enclave Clause, most frequently used to create military 
posts and post offices. See id. 11 38, 114-1 17; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, 8 8, cl. 17 (allowing 
the creation of federal enclaves with the consent of the affected state). Plaintiffs also raise a variety 
of assertions founded on 'equal footing" and rather vague federalism themes. They argue that the 
designation of Parashant National Monument treats Arizona as if it were merely a territory, 
discriminating against its citizens by creating 'specific classifications of persons and different rights 
in similarly sihlated groups of people," thereby depriving them of privileges and immunities, equal 
protection and voting rights. Compl. for Declaratory J. and Injunctive Relief and Deprivations of 
Federal Constitutional Rights 11 73, 77, 86-87, 140-42, Esplin v. Clinton (D. Ariz. filed Jan. 26, 
2000) (No. CIV 00 0148 PCT PGR). In support of this theory, plaintiffs invoke Dred Scom v. 
Surdford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), see id. 1162, 136-38 ('It is no longer constitutional for Congress to 
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Mountain States Legal Foundation v .  Clinton, plaintiffs allege that the 
President's decision to designate the Grand Staircase Escalante National 
Monument violates the separation of powers doctrine and exceeds his 
delegated authorities under the Antiquities Act of 1906.~ 
The rather vaguely worded Antiquities Act would not fare well if strict 
nondelegation review were applicable, as noted above in Section IV of this 
article.441 However, executive decisions governing the management of public 
lands, including Antiquities Act withdrawals, should be less susceptible to 
nondelegation problems than the exercise of Commerce Clause powers. 
Under the contextual Chevron-based approach, property Clause authority 
would be included as another type of delegation justifying less intense 
scrutiny. Executive exercises of Property Clause power easily fit within two 
of Rehnquist's "prodelegation" categories, as they take place within an 
extensive backdrop of pre-existing administrative practices governing public 
lands, and they satisfy the "rule of necessity. "qq2 Moreover, the regulation 
of public lands and resources generally does not affect the whole economy, 
unlike the executive actions invalidated on nondelegation grounds in 
American Trucking and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.443 
Last but certainly not least, Congress's Property Clause power ,is plenary in 
nature, with both proprietary and sovereign attributes, and is therefore more 
sweeping, at least with respect to the resources it covers, than its Commerce 
Clause powers. Consequently, the delegation of Property Clause power to 
the executive branch may be correspondingly broad. 
create different rights to state citizenship."), a w e  which now has little or no precedential value, 
see notes 509-12, in@, and accompanying text. 
440. Compl. for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief 11 1, 100, Utah Ass'n of Counties v. 
Clinton @. Utah filed June 23, 1997) (No. 2:97CV-0479B) (citing Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 
U.S.C. $5 4 3 1 4 3 3  (1994)); First Am. Compl. 11 45-48, Mountain States Legal Found. v. 
Clinton, @. Utah filed Dec. 15, 1997) (No. 2:97CV-0863G) (alleging that the Escalante 
designation violates nondelegation doctrine). The Utah Counties and Mountain Stares plaintiffs also 
allege violations of the withdrawal and planning provisions of the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act ("FLPMA") and the National Environmentat Policy Act ("NEPAw). Compl. for 
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief 11 105-37, Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton (D. Utah filed June 
23, 1997) (No. 2:97CV-0479B); First Am. Compl. 11 58-65, 83-90, Mountain States Legal Found. 
v. Clinton, (D. Utah filed Dec. 15, 1997) (No. 2:97CV-O863G). 
441. See supra Part 1V.A. 
442. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506. 516-17 (1911). See supra nores 415-20 and 
accompanying text (discussing prodelegation categories). For discussion of the historic backdrop 
for executive withdrawals of public lands, see infra Part VI.B.1. 
443. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
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A. The Duality of Property Clause Powers and Responsibilities 
1. Proprietorship of Public Lands 
Congress's power to make all "needful" regulation respecting the public 
lands and integral resources444 has been described as "without limitations. "445 
Property Clause enactments concern only federal property and federal 
resources, and the regulatory power takes on both proprietary and sovereign 
 attribute^.^^ Because of the relatively narrow focus of the Property Clause 
power, the exercise of its authority has far less potential to invade state 
sovereignty in areas of traditional state regulation and is less likely to impact 
the "whole economy" than Commerce Clause legislation. Thus, even if the 
trend toward "strict" nondelegation review continues in the Commerce 
Clause context, it should not carry over to public lands decisions. 
As discussed above, the only Supreme Court cases to strike legislation on 
nondelegation grounds involved statutes enacted under the Commerce 
 lau use.^ The Court has become increasingly vigilant in reviewing the use 
of the federal Commerce Clause authority when it bumps up against areas 
perceived as being withii traditional state Although the Commerce 
Clause power has been described at times as plenary in nature,449 when it 
444. U.S. CONST. art. IV. 8 3, cl. 2 (providing that 'Congress shall have Power to dispose of 
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to 
the United States"). 
445. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16.29 (1940); see abo Kleppe v .  New Mexico, 
426 U.S. 529, 539-40 (1976) (describing Congress's broad powers under the Property Clause); 
Camfield v. United States, 167 U .S. 518, 525 (1897) (noting that the power over public property 
was at least as extensive as "the police power of the several States"). 
446. The exertion of Property Clause power over activities on private or state land adjacent to 
federal public lands has been upheld where the regulation involved subjects closely related to the 
protection of federal property or resources integral to federal property. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 
538; Cnmfield, 167 U.S. at 525; see also Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1250-51 (8th Cir. 
1981) (holding that the Property Clause power authorizes the regulation of motorboats and 
snowmobiles on non-federal lands and waters where such activities would threaten the designated 
purpose of the public lands). 
447. See Carter v .  Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 297 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 
(1935). 
448. E.g.,  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) (holding that an activity must 
"substantially affectw interstate commerce to be regulated under the Commerce Clause); supra notes 
141-70 (assessing trends in Commerce Clause jurisprudence). 
449. E.g. ,  Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 15 (1989). overruled by Seminole 
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840 (1976), 
overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-21 (1941); Gibbons v.  Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824). 
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impacts states' rights, the Court has found that the broader principles of the 
Constitution, reserving powers to the states unless specifically enumerated as 
federal powers, must impose some 
Further, as noted in Schechter Poultry and American Trucking, and more 
recently in RIA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco C ~ r p , ~ "  courts most 
closely scrutinize statutes that affect the entire American economy, such as 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's ("OSHA") authority to 
reach into "every workplace."452 The Clean Air Act, like the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act and other Commerce Clause a~thorities,~'~ 
undoubtedly has great potential to affect a wide array of state and private 
interests, and in turn the "whole economy." Public lands provide significant 
economic resources in the form of hard rock minerals, oil and other fuel 
minerals, timber and forage. However, in contrast to the Clean Air Act and 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the regulatory impacts of Property 
Clause delegations are generally felt, not across broad and diverse sectors of 
the economy, but instead by a handful of local communities and specialized 
industries, such as logging companies, sawmills and mining companies.4s4 
Executive actions governing public lands and resources are also readily 
distinguishable from public health and environmental regulations because the 
The theory that Commerce Clause power is "plenary" seems to have been repudiated by a majority 
of the Court, in application if not in express judicial holdings. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 61- 
62; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566-68. 
450. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; Printt v.  United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932-33 (1997); 
Lopez. 514 U.S. at 559; supra notes 160-70 (assessing trends in federalism jurisprudence). 
451. 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000). 
452. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027. 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that the 
nondelegation doctrine has special force if the exercise of the delegated power affects the whole 
economy (citing Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 553; and Int'l Union, UAW v. OSHA 
("Lockout/Tagout I"), 938 F.2d 1310, 1317-18 @.C. Cir. 1991))). mod~#ed on perition for reh 'g, 
195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. grarued, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000) (mem.); 120 S. Ct. 2193 
(2000) (mem.); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1315 
(2000) (observing that Chevron deference is less likely when agency action affects an industry 
constituting a 'significant portion of the American economy"). The dissent in American Trucking 
distinguished the Occupational Safety and Health Act from the Clean Air Act, noting that under the 
Clean Air Act the states are on the front-lines of implementing the NAAQS and allocating the 
burdens of pollution reduction to individual sources through their State Implementation Plans; thus, 
courts have less reason to second-guess the specificity of the delegation to the EPA. 175 F.3d at 
1061 (Tatel. J.. dissenting). 
453. Pollution control statutes like the Clean Air Act are generally enacted under the 
Commerce Clause. See generalty United States v .  Riverside Bayview Homes. Inc., 474 U.S. 121 
(1985); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
454. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND. WATER, AND 
THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 28-33, 149-50, 166-67 (1992) (describing economic effects of timber 
and mining enterprises); Michael Axline, Forest Health and the Politics of Expediency. 26 ENWL. 
L. 613, 614 (1996) (assessing economics of logging on public lands in the Pacific Northwest); 
Zellmer, supra note 25, at 467-71, 483 (discussing effects of Pacific Northwest "timber wars"). 
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Property Clause, unlike the Commerce Clause, evidences a duality of 
governmental power.4ss In executing delegated Property Clause powers, the , 
Executive acts both as a proprietor and as a ~overeign."~ Thus, property 
management is not necessarily analogous to other types of lawmaking, and 
more leeway might be afforded executive agencies, acting not only as 
instruments of a tripartite government but also as proprietors, when public 
property is implicated.4s7 
Courts have regularly cited the Executive's role as proprietor of the 
public lands and resources to ratify sweeping exercises of power. 
Proprietorship is viewed not as a limitation on power, but as a supplement to 
the government's sovereign powers. In Kleppe v. New the Court 
described Congress's dual powers under the Property Clause as "complete 
powern over the public property entrusted to it.4s9 The extent to which the 
federal government may exercise its Property Clause power is simply 
"measured by the exigencies of the particular case. 
At one time, the proprietary nature of the power over public Iands was 
routinely invoked to curtail both public participation and judicial review. 
Public involvement was considered inappropriate "because public land 
management was [merely] an internal affair."46' Judicial review of executive 
455. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529. 540-41 (1976); United States v. Midwest Oil 
Co., 236 U.S. 459, 459-60, 474 (1915); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1911); 
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525 (1897). 
456. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 540-41; Midwest Oil , 236 U.S. at 459-60, 474; Light, 220 U.S. 
at 536-37; Camfield. 167 U.S. at 525. 
457. See Schoenbrod, supra note 75. at 1265-69 (explaining that mere expectations to use 
public property, such as public lands and even government contracts and broadcast signals, have not 
been ueated as protected property interests by the takings and due process clauses under the Fifth 
and Fourteenth amendments; these expectations have 'special feature[sIm and should be subject to 
less stringent review); see also Louis L. Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power 11. 47 
CoLuM . L. REV. 561. 567-68 (1947) (noting that property management is not law-making) . 
458. 426 U.S. 529 (1976). 
459. Id. at 540. Kleppe upheld the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act as a valid 
exercise of the Property Clause power, in spite of alleged impacts on the traditional roles of state 
and local governments in regulating livestock. Id. at 546. 
460. Camfield, 167 U.S. at 525 (upholding Congress's power to prevent the enclosure of 
public lands). The sweeping nature of the executive's power to protect public lands was addressed 
in Midwest Oil, where the Court recognized the President's power to withdraw public lands from 
extractive activities 'as the exigencies of the public service required." Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 
471 (quoting Grisar v. McDowell, 73 U.S. 363, 381 (1867)). See urfra Part V1.B. for a more 
detailed discussion of the Midwest Oil decision. 
461. Charles F. Wilkinson, ZRe Public Tmr Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 269, 303 (1980). This approach was consistent with a provision of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, which provides that rulemaking is not required for matters 'relating to . . . public 
property. 5 U.S.C. 4 553(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. 111 1997). At one point, the Attorney General 
defined public property to include "real or personal property owned by the United Statesw or its 
agencies, and stated that 'the making of rules relating to the public domain, i.e., the sale or lease of 
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activities was sometimes denied as "committed to agency discretion by 
law. "462 When courts did review public lands decisions, the scope of review 
was sharply circumscribed on the grounds that agencies had wide latitude in 
their roles as proprietors.463 As a result, the agencies' own decision-making 
processes took place, for the most part, behind closed doors. This changed 
significantly in the 1960's and 1970's, with the enactment of the National 
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),464 and the extensive overhaul of 
statutes governing national forest and rangeland management.- Yet the 
concept of proprietorship as a basis for authority over public lands and 
resources remains a viable analytical tool for distinguishing Property Clause 
power from other governmental powers. 
In the nondelegation context, the breadth of the Executive's Property 
Clause powers is perhaps best illustrated by United States v. Grirna~i ,"~~ 
where the broadly phrased language of the National Forest Organic Act of 
1897 was tested and upheld by the Supreme Court against a nondelegation 
challenge.467 The Act, designed "to improve and protect the forest and to 
secure favorable conditions of water flows," states that the Secretary "may 
make such rules and regulations . . . as will insure the objects of such 
reservation; namely, to regulate their occupancy and use, and to preserve the 
forests thereon from d e s t ~ c t i o n . " ~  To achieve these ends, persons entering 
forest reservations must comply with the Secretary's r eg~ la t ions .~~  
- - - -  - 
public lands or of mineral, timber or grazing rights in such lands. is exempt . . ." from rulemaking 
requirements. Wilkinson, srcpra, at 303 n.149 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE. ATTORNEY 
GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 27 (1947)). 
462. Wilkinson, supra note 461, at 303 (citing Ferry v. Udall, 336 F.2d 706, 711 (9th Cir. 
1964)); see aLso Linn Land Co. v. Udall, 255 F. Supp. 382, 386 (D. Or. 1966) (expressing 'grave 
doubts as to a court's jurisdiction to review the power of the Secretary to classify the lands pursuant 
to . . . [the Taylor Grazing Act]" (citing Ferry)). For more extensive treatment of this topic, see 
srrpra, Part 1V.A. 
463. See Wilkinson, supra note 461, at 303; see also Udall v. Tallman, 280 U.S. 1, 7 (1965) 
(finding that the Secretary had broad authority to issue oil and gas lease on public lands); Dorothy 
Thomas Found., Inc. v. Hardin, 317 F. Supp. 1072, 1076 @.N.C. 1970) (holding that agency had 
broad authority over timber sales). 
464. 42 U.S.C. 84332 (1994). 
465. 16 U.S.C. 8 1601 (1994); 43 U.S.C. 8 1701 (1994). The enactment of NEPA, the 
National Forest Management Act ("NFMA"), and FLPMA, along with the Wilderness Act of 1964, 
established that the federal govenunent has duties to the public in its role as sovereign, as well: 
"[r]ulemaking is required, records are open, decision-making is shared, and the courts are available 
because public lands business is public business. It is the public to whom public lands managers are 
ultimately accountable." Wilkinson. supra note 461, at 304. 
466. 220 U.S. 506 (1911). 
467. Id. at 522. 
468. Id. at 515. 
469. See id. at 515. The provision at issue is currently codified at 16 U.S.C. 5 478 (1994). 
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Mr. Grimaud was indicted for grazing sheep on a forest reserve without 
permission of the Secretary of ~griculture.~~'  In defense, he claimed that the 
Act was unconstitutional in that it delegated legislative functions-the power 
to make rules and regulations-to an executive entity.47' The Court found 
that the delegation of power was permissible; it provided sufficient guidance 
to the Secretary and therefore avoided the pitfalls of excess delegation." 
Although Congress cannot delegate to "other tribunals, powers which are 
strictly and exclusively legislative," it may give authority to those who are 
directed to act under general legislative provisions "to fill up the details."473 
Foreshadowing Chief Justice Rehnquist's "rule of necessity," the Court 
recognized that it was "impracticable" for Congress to specify various details 
of management or determine when activities might be harmful in one forest 
but not in another, given the stage of timber growth or the season of the 
year.474 Accordingly, it held that the Organic Act had adequately defined the 
subjects on which the Secretary could reg~late.~" "Thus the implied license 
under which the United States had suffered its public domain to be used as a 
pasture for sheep and cattle . . . was curtailed and qualified by Congress, to 
the extent that such privilege should not be exercised in contravention of the 
rules and regulations. "476 
Similarly, in Butte City Water Co. v. ~aker," the Supreme Court 
rejected a nondelegation challenge to a provision of the General Mining Act 
which allowed Congress to entrust "minor and subordinate regulations . . . 
to the inhabitants of the mining district or state in which the particular lands 
are situated. "478 Even though the provision transferred power to non-federal 
entities, the Court found that the delegation of Property Clause power "is not 
of a legislative character in the highest sense of the term, and, as an owner 
may delegate to his principal agent the right to employ subordinates . . ., so 
it would seem that Congress might rightfully entrust to the local legislature 
the determination of minor matters respecting the disposal of these lands. "479 
Notably, Butte City was later distinguished in Schechter Poultry, where the 
Court remarked that, unlike public lands management, it could not "be 
seriously contended that Congress could delegate its legislative authority to 
470. Grimand, 220 U.S. at 5 14. 
471. Id. at 513. 
472. Id. at 522. 
473. Id. at 5 17 (citing Wayrnan v.  Southard, 23 U.S. 1,42 (1825)). 
474. Id. at 516. 
475. Id. at 522. 
476. Id. at 521 (citations omitted). 
477. 196 U.S. 119 (1905). 
478. Id. at 126. 
479. Id. 
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trade or industrial associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the 
laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion 
of their trade or industries. 
Executive power to protect federal property has been upheld in the face of 
nondelegation challenges even when the regulations pertain to activities off 
the federal lands. For example, in United States v. ~rown,4'' the Eighth 
Circuit held that regulations prohibiting hunting on nonfederal waters within 
the boundaries of Voyageurs National Park were enforceable as a proper 
delegation of congressional The court gave the nondelegation 
argument short shrift, satisfied that the regulations were "founded upon a 
rational basis: hunting on adjacent waters could "significantly interfere 
with the use of the park and the purpose for which it was established. n484 
Likewise, in Stupak-Thrall v.  United States,'" the Forest Service's 
regulations prohibiting the use of houseboats and sailboats on Crooked Lake, 
most of which was within a designated wilderness area, were upheld.486 
There, owners of recreational and resort properties along the lakeshore, who 
also held water rights pursuant to Michigan state law, alleged that the Forest 
Service had acted beyond its Property Clause powers and its statutory 
authority under the Organic Act and the Wilderness Acts, in that it had 
unlawfully infringed on plaintiffs' valid existing riparian rights.487 The court 
- - 
480. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495. 537 (1935). 
481. 552 F.2d 817 (1977) 
482. Id. at 823 n.8 (citing United States v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868, 872-77 (4th Cir. 1970)); 
see also Udall v. Wash., Va. and Md. Coach Co.. 398 F.2d 765. 769-70 @.C. Cir. 1968)). The 
coun went on to state that the regulations, "which are not overbroad or vague, cannot be 
invalidated merely because they are penal in nature." Brown, 552 F.2d at 823 n.8 (citing United 
States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506,521 (191 1)). 
483. Id. 
484. Id. at 822 (citing United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264. 266-67 (1927); and McKelvey 
v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 359 (1922)). The court specifically referred to the National Park 
Service Act, as well as the Voyageurs Park enabling act: "[tlhe fundamental purpose of national 
parks, including Voyageurs Park, is to 'conserve the scenery and the natural historic objects and the 
wildlife therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as 
will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.'" Id. at 822 n.7 (citing 16 
U.S.C. 55 1, 160). In comparison, the Department of the Interior's authority over nonfederal lands 
is far more circumscribed outside of the Property Clause context. See generally South Dakota v. 
United States Dep't of the Interior, 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995). 
485. 843 F. Supp. 327 (W.D. Mich. 1994). a f d ,  89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996). Plaintiffs' 
nondelegation claims were assessed in an Eighth Circuit panel decision which was vacated when the 
coun accepted a petition for rehearing. Stupak-Thrall v. United States. 70 F.3d 881 (6th Cir. 
1995). The district coun opinion was affirmed by an equally divided vote of the en bunc court. 
Stupak-Thrall v.' United States, 89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996). 
486. Snrpak-i'7irall, 843 F. Supp. at 330-3 1. 
487. Sncpak-Thrall, 70 F.3d at 887; see also Organic Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. 8 551 (1994) 
(authorizing the Secretary to 'regulate [national forest] occupancy and use and to preserve the 
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rejected the challenges, finding that Congress had the authority to regulate 
non-federal lands in order to protect federal property under the Property 
The court went on to say that "the scope of [the Forest Service's] 
authority-except to the extent that Congress may expressly limit it-is 
coextensive with Congress' own authority under the Property Clause. "489 
Even a leading critic of delegations, Professor David Schoenbrod, 
concludes that the management of government property is distinct from the 
governance of private conduct: "[fJor Congress to manage public property 
through agents having broad discretion rather than through narrowly 
legislated rules is not just convenient but necessary."490 Thus, a liberalized 
construction of Property Clause legislation and regulation, i.e., "loose" 
nondelegation review, may be warranted under a "rule of necessity," given 
the unique nature and history of the Property Clause power, even if the 
American Trucking decision is upheld. 
2. Plenary Power and the Public Trust 
The Supreme Court has observed that federal land management agencies 
possess "plenary authority over the administration of public lands. "491 This 
- 
forests thereon from destruction"); Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. 5 1133(b) (1994) (agencies 
shall administer wilderness areas with a view toward "preserving the wilderness charactern); 
Michigan Wilderness Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-184, Q 5, 101 Stat. 1274, 1275-76 (making 
certain Forest Service regulations subject to "valid existing rights"). 
488. Stupak-Thrall, 70 F.3d at 888. 
489. Id. Reminiscent of the Supreme Court's opinion in Camfield v. United Stares, 167 U.S. 
518, 525 (1897). Judge Moore's concurring opinion on rehearing characterized the delegation as 
one of police powers under the Property Clause. Shcpak-Z7traN, 89 F.3d at 1271 (Moore, J., 
concurring). In his dissenting opinion, Judge Boggs agreed that there was no need to reach 
"extreme constitutional questions" such as nondelegation, because in his view, the Forest Service's 
regulations couid not be sustained under Chevron as they violated a clear congressional mandate by 
infringing on valid existing rights. Id. at 1284-85. 1300. Judge Boggs nonetheless surmised that 
the nondelegation doctrine was not totally dead: although 'Congress could not enact the text of 
Joyce's FINNEGAN'S WAKE and then delegate to the Forest Service the power to administer it" 
because such a statutory standard would truly be "meaningless," the statutes at issue were not 
meaningless. Id. at 1300. 
490. Schoenbrod, supra note 75. at 1268 (concluding that many delegations regarding property 
'must be under goals statutes that grant broad discretion. Consider the example of building 
construction . . . . The legislature cannot deal with the myriad details involved in designing private 
buildings. How then could Congress write a set of rules that would positively tell the General 
Services Administration how to go about building the many govenunent buildings?"). 
491. Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336 (1963) (emphasis added). The 
Best decision reviewed the Secretary's authority under the General Mining Act, 30 U.S.C. 8 22 
(1994), as well as the general powers over public lands granted in Title 43 of the U.S. Code. Id. 
Although federal power is regularly characterized as "plenaryn in the mining context, the plenary 
nature of the power has been noted in a variety of other circumstances. See Kleppe v. New 
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broad-sweeping power flows from the Property Clause and more specific 
congressional directives. The Forest Service has received explicit 
congressional delegations and directives in the National Forest Management 
Act ( "NFMA") ,~~~  and Title 7 of the U.S. Code.493 Likewise, Congress has 
provided Interior agencies with express delegations of authority to manage 
public lands and resources in various sections of Titles 16 and 43 of the U.S. 
code .494 
Although some scholars have suggested that the Property Clause power 
derives its plenary nature and escapes the constraints of the nondelegation 
doctrine due to its placement in Article IV of the Constitution, rather than 
Article this is probably a distinction of little significance. Article I lists 
a variety of law-making powers, while the provisions of Article IV govern 
relations with the states, including the full faith and credit clause, provisions 
for the admission of new states, and the privileges and immunities clause.496 
Yet Congress acts in a legislative capacity whenever its action has "the 
-- - - -- 
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 54041 (1976) (noting that Congress, as both proprietor and sovereign, has 
"complete powern to protect public lands and resources, including wildlife); Ideal Basic Indus.. Inc. 
v. Morton, 542 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1976) (recognizing that "the Secretary of Interior has 
broad plenary powers over the disposition of public lands" (citing Cameron v. United States, 252 
U.S. 450, 459-64 (1920); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 177 (1891); and 
United States v. Williamson, 75 I.D. 338, 342 (1%8))); see also Robert L. Glicksrnan & George 
Cameron Coggins, Hardrock Minerals, Energy Minerals, and Orher Resources on the Public 
Landr: The Evolution of Federal Natural Resources Law, 33 TULSA L.J. 765, 781 (1998) (noting 
that Camfield, 167 U.S. 518, and Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (191 I), neither of which 
involved mining, "confirmed that congressional Property Clause power is plenary, unlimited, and 
preemptive"). 
492. 16 U.S.C. 1600 (1994 & Supp. 111 1997). 
493. 7 U.S.C. 6912 (1994). The Secretary of Agriculture has delegated authority to 
administer the national forests to the Under Secretary for Natural Resources and Environment, 7 
C.F.R. 8 2.20(a)(2)(ii) (2000), who has in turn delegated that power to the Chief of the Forest 
Service, 7 C.F.R. 8 2.60(a)(2) (2000). The Chief has delegated the authority for forest regions to 
regional foresters, and for individual units of the National Forest System to the forest supervisors. 
36 C.F.R. 8 200.2 (1999). The Secretary may still exercise those powers which have been sub- 
delegated. 7 C.F.R. § 2.12 (2000). 
494. E.g.,  16 U.S.C. 5 1 (1994) (directing the Secretary and the National Park Service 'to 
promote and regulate the use o f  national parks, units and monuments); 43 U.S.C. 8 1457 (1994) 
(charging the Secretary "with the supervision of public business relating to the following subjects 
and agencies: . . . 12. Petroleum conservation. 13. Public lands, including minesn). The enactment 
of FLPMA in 1976 added more specific provisions regarding public lands. See 43 U.S.C. 
1732(b) (1994) ("In managing the public lands the Secretary shall, by regulation or otherwise, take 
any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands."), 1733(a) (1994) 
("The Secretary shall issue regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this Act with 
respect to the management, use, and protection of the public lands, including the property located 
thereon"). 
495. See Schoenbrod, supra note 75, at 1265- 1266. 
496. U.S. CONST. art. IV, 8 1, cl. 1 (full faith and credit); id. 8 2, cl. 1 (privileges and 
immunities); id. § 3, cl. 1 (admission of states). 
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purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons 
. . . outside the Legislative Branch," whether the power to act flows from 
Article I or Article I V . ~ ~ ~  
Moreover, along with public lands management, a handful of Article I 
powers have been described as plenary in nature, including immigration, 
national security and military matters, taxation, foreign trade, and relations 
with American Indians.498 Whether Article I or Article IV powers are 
involved, the plenary power doctrine has been held to support broad 
delegations of legislative-like authority, and Congress's ability to delegate its 
plenary powers to the executive branch is generally considered concomitant 
with its own broad power.499 
497. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 
U.S. 252, 276 (1991) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952-55 (1983)); see also Eugene R. 
Gaetke. Refuhng the 'Classic' Properg Clause neory ,  63 N .  C. L. REV. 6 17, 658 n. 129 (1 985). 
In Metropolitan Washington Airports, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress must follow 
constitutionally acceptable legislative procedures when it transferred federal lands to an airport 
governing board. Metro. Wash. Airports, 501 U.S. at 274. Although it found that the process of 
delegating power to the board violated separation of powers under Chndha, 462 U.S. at 951, 
because congressmen sat on the board and maintained veto power over decisions of local 
authorities, it implied that the substantive scope of the delegation at issue was acceptable: 
'Congress itself can formulate the details, or it can enact general standards and assign to the 
Executive Branch the responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformance with 
those standards." Metro. Wash. Airporrs. 501 U.S. at 272, 277. For dicta regarding the 
constitutionality of section 204(e) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 
U.S.C. 8 1714(e) (1994). which requires the Secretary of Interior to temporarily withdraw lands at 
the direction of a congressional committee, see National Wildlife Federationn v. Watt, 571 F .  Supp. 
1145, 1155 (D.D.C. 1983). and Pacific Legal Fowzddion. v. Wan, 529 F. Supp. 982, 1002 (D. 
Mont. 1982). 
498. See South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998) (describing 
relations with American Indian tribes as a plenary power (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 
436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978))); Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 441 (1987) (citing U.S. CONST. 
art. I, f 8, cl. 14, as providing plenary power regarding 'Rules for the Government and Regulation 
of the Land and Naval Forces"); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178 (1974) (citing 
U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 9 cl. 7. regarding the reporting of expenditures of appropriated funds and the 
exemption of certain "secret activities" from public reporting); Palmore v. United States, 41 1 U.S. 
389, 397 (1973) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, 8 8, cl. 17, regarding legislation for the District of 
Columbia); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753. 766 (1972) (describing immigration power as 
plenary). In addition, the power to prohibit obstructions in navigable waters, United States v. 
Appalachian Elec. Power Co. ,  3 11 U.S. 377, 424 (1940). to tax income, Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 
188, 194 (1938), to exclude or regulate merchandise brought from foreign countries, Buttfiekf v. 
Strunahan, 192 U .S. 470, 492 (1904). and to dictate "the coining of money, the establishment of 
post-offices and post-roads, the declaring of war, etc.," The Civil Righs Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18 
(1883), have been described as plenary in nature. 
499. Kleindierut. 408 U.S. at 769 (holding that 'the Attorney General Dad] validly exercised 
the plenary power . . . delegated to the Executive" in the immigration context); Sabin v. Berglund, 
585 F.2d 955. 958 (10th Cir. 1978) (finding that Congress may delegate its plenary power over 
public lands to the Secretary of Agriculture (citing Best v. Hurnboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 
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The plenary power doctrine declares broad authority over the subject of 
the power, typically insulating the action at issue from probing judicial 
review; as a result, it is frequently criticized for fostering abusive 
government a ~ t i o n . ~  However, in the Property Clause context, the 
delegation of plenary power is arguably tempered by special duties regarding 
public lands and resources. Executive branch officials, while having wide 
latitude to make all needful rules regarding the public lands, may have a 
countervailing trust-like responsibility to protect those resources on behalf of 
the public."' 
The idea that governments have a "public trust* duty regarding certain 
natural resources flows from ancient Roman and English law.'02 The public 
trust doctrine was invoked by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois 
Central Railroad Co. v. Illinoi.? to set aside the state's disposition of 
submerged lands because the sale would interfere with the public's rights to 
access and enjoy Lake M i ~ h i g a n . ~ ~  "[Sluch property is held by the state, by 
334, 336-38 (1963); and Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 28 (9th Cir . 1970))); see also Snaider, 
supra note 128, at 107 (discussing plenary nature of immigration powers). 
500. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law Afir a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom 
Conrtiturional Norms and Srahctory Interpretation. 100 YALE L. J. 545. 547 (1 990); see also Frank 
Pommersheim, Tribal Cows and the Federa! Judiciary: Opporrunities und Challenges for a 
Conrtiturional Democracy. 58 MOM. L. REV. 313. 320 (1997) (stating that the doctrine "ratified 
the absorption of Indian tribes physically and politically into the national republic . . . . The brutal 
effect . . . was both to strip tribes of their constitutional status and to make their sovereignty subject 
to the unconstrained (and extra-constitutional) authority of the federal government."). Professor 
Pommersheim notes that the doctrine is often used for the benefit of tribal interests. Id. at 323-324. 
But "of course, extensive power is like that; it can be used for good or ill." Id. at 323. 
501. See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536-38 (1911) (upholding the Forest Service's 
power to protect forest reserves from trespass under a broad delegation from Congress to regulate 
the use and occupancy of said reserves, and stating that "the public lands of the nation are held in 
trust for the people of the whole country"); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 
177. 181 (1891) (stating the Secretary of Interior is a guardian of the public lands with an obligation 
to "see that the law is carried out, and that none of the public domain is wasted or is disposed of to 
a party not entitled to it"); see also Mansfield, supra note 284, at 47 (discussing public trust 
concept as applied to public lands). Plenary power is tempered by a trust responsibility in the 
Indian law context as well, although this trust relationship flows from treaties, tribal sovereignty 
and "the special place of aboriginal people in international jurisprudence;" as such, it should not be 
confused with the public trust concept. Wilkinson. supra note 461. at 275 & n.23. 
502. See Joseph L. Sax, The P&lic Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Elfeive Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); Charles F. Wilkinson. m e  Headwaters of the Public 
Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 E N V n .  L. 425, 
429-3 1 (1989). 
503. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
504. Id. at 460. 464. The states hold title to the beds of navigable waterways received at 
statehood under the "equal footingw doctrine. Id. at 465 (Shim, J., dissenting); see also Pollard v. 
Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 224 (1845); Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 
(1842). 
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virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for the public. The ownership of the 
navigable waters of the harbor and of the lands under them is a subject of 
public concern to the whole people of the State . . . . n SOS 
The public trust doctrine enunciated in Illinois Central is not strictly 
applicable to federal lands, given that Congress retains explicit constitutional 
power to dispose of thern.'O6 In addition, inland public lands would not be 
considered trust resources under the traditional formulation of the doctrine, 
which is limited to navigable and tidal waters and submerged lands.s07 
Nonetheless, the public trust doctrine has endured over time as a living, 
evolving concept, and, even though the duties of federal agencies are distinct 
from the duties of states, "public trust notions have charged and vitalized 
public land law, particularly in the modem era. "50' 
Some of the earliest Supreme Court cases to address disputes over inland 
public lands characterized the government's responsibility as a In 
Dred Scott v. S a n d f ~ r d , ~ ~ ~  the Court noted that new territory is "acquired by 
the General Government, as the representative and trustee of the people of 
the United States, and it must therefore be held in that character for their 
505. Id. at 455. The Court defined the state's power over navigable waters as 'the 'jus 
regium.' the right of regulating, improving and securing them for the benefit of every individual 
citizen . . .: 'The sovereign power, itself, therefore, cannot consistently with the principles of the 
law of nature and the constitution of a well-ordered society, make a direct and absolute grant of the 
waters of the State, divesting all the citizens of their common right.'" Id. at 456. 
506. Given the explicit authorization in the Property Clause, and the history of public lands 
management and sale, there can be no serious argument that the federal government may not 
"dispose of" public lands. Wilkinson. s q r a  note 461. at 276. Most of the nineteenth century was 
marked by an active campaign to dispose of the public lands, but federal policy began to shift 
toward retention during the late 1800's. While the President had withdrawn and reserved vast areas 
of land for various purposes throughout the nineteenth century, the congressional shift toward 
retention most likely began with the creation of Yellowstone National Park in 1872. See id. at 280 
n.44. Congressional retention policy was explicitly incorporated into FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. 8 
1701(a)(l) (1994). 
507. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484 (1988); 111. Cent. R.R. 
Co., 146 U.S. at 435, 452-53; . 
508. Wilkinson, supra note 461, at 278; see also id. at 304, 3 10-15. Professor Sax has 
explained that the core concepts of the American trust doctrine are not limited by Roman and 
English law. Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 
U.C. DAVIS L.REV. 185, 192-93 (1980). Instead, the trustee's obligations should be viewed in an 
evolutionary fashion "with an eye toward insulating those expectations that support social, 
economic and ecological systems from avcirfable destablization [sic] and dis~ption." Id. 
509. E.g. ,  Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (191 1); Camfield v. United States, 167 
U.S. 518, 524 (1897); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 177-78 (1891); Pollard, 
44 U.S. (How. 3) at 222; see aLro Wilkinson, supra note 461, at 281 n.45 (citing additional cases, 
issued between 1888 and 1970, which describe the United States' role in terms of a trust). 
510. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
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common and equal benefit."'" Of course, the Dred Scott opinion is better 
known, and justly vilified, for holding that Scott was not a citizen entitled to 
invoke diversity jurisdiction, but its discussion of the public trust doctrine is 
illuminating. 
Congress has, from time to time, considered its Property Clause powers 
and responsibilities to be akin to those of a trustee.'13 The strongest 
congressional statement of a federal trust duty can be found in NEPA: "it is 
the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable 
means . . . [to] fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the 
environment for succeeding generations. "'I4 Taken together, the complex 
modem "legislative matrix" governing public lands and resources provides 
fairly compelling evidence of some sort of a trust responsibility: the lands 
cannot be sold except in "limited and exceptional  circumstance^";"^ the 
public resources-wildlife, watersheds, forage, minerals, timber and 
aesthetics-are to be utilized, but also nurtured and sustained for future 
generat i~ns;~ '~ and "the public is to play a . . . significant role in decision- 
51 1. Id. at 448. However, the Court also noted the United States' role as a temporary 
custodian of the lands, holding them until they could be sold so that new states could enter the 
nation not as mere "colonies" but on equal footing with original states. Id. at 447-48; David E. 
Engdahl, Stare and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARlZ. L. REV. 283, 293-96 (1976). 
512. The Court held that Mr. Scott, once enslaved in Missouri, did not enjoy one of the most 
basic rights of the "people of the United Statesw-that to invoke the power of the courts to ensure 
his own freedom. Dred Scon, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 453-54. The Dred Scott opinion is also known 
for invalidating the Missouri Compromise on grounds that it interfered with the Fifth Amendment 
due process rights of citizens who owned slaves as property. Id. at 449-52. The case was 
overturned by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of privileges and immunities and equal 
protection. and the Thirteenth Amendment, which ended slavery. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, ?j 1. 
513. See, e.g., The Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. 5 1131(a) (1994) (requiring that 
wilderness areas shall be "administered for the use and enjoyment of the American people in such 
manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as  to 
provide for the protection of these areas"); National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. g 1 
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (stating that lands within the national park system shall be managed "to 
conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for 
the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the 
enjoyment of future generations"). 
514. 42 U.S.C. ?j 4331(b) (1994). The provision further characterizes the trust duty as 
requiring the government to "attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without 
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences." Id. But 
in spite of its lofty substantive objectives, NEPA requires only procedural duties. See 42 U.S.C. ?j 
4332(a) (1994 & Supp. 111 1997); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council. 490 U.S. 332, 
350 (1989). 
515. 43 U.S.C. 8 1701(a)(l) (1994); see also Wilkinson, supra note 461, at 299. 
516. See Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act (MUSYA), 16 U.S.C. fj 528 (1994); National 
Forest Management Act (NFMA). 16 U.S.C. 88 1600, 1604(e) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. 8 1701(a)(7)-(8) (1994); cf. Endangered 
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making."s17 "The whole of these laws is greater than the sum of its parts. 
The modern statutes set a tone, a context, a milieu. When read together they 
require a trustee's care. "'18 
The public trust concept has been invoked to justify the vesting of plenary 
powers over public lands in executive agencies as proper recipients of broad- 
sweeping congressional  delegation^.^'^ But along with this power comes a 
duty "to protect the public domain from trespass and unlawful 
appr~priation."'~~ Although the exact parameters of a public trust as a duty 
of care for managing public lands and resources are not defined, the concept 
has great potential as a tool for measuring executive activities. Even in its 
most general sense, a trust duty would prevent executive agencies from 
unreasonably exploiting public resources to promote the private gain of any 
particular industry or fa~tion.~" Equally important, the public trust doctrine 
could provide a basis for the judiciary to engage in "hard look" review of 
agency action, even when the statutory standards governing a particular 
category of public lands or activities are relatively vague, for a protective 
standard of care would be required as the default-a baseline to fill any 
congressional gaps .522 
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 8 1531(b)-(c) (1994) (placing duties on all federal agencies to conserve 
listed species and their ecosystems). 
517. Wilkinson. supra note 461, at 298-99 (discussing statutes); see e.g., National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 42 U.S.C. 8 4332 (1994 & Supp. 111 1997); National Forest 
Management Act (NFMA), 16 U.S. C. 8 1604(d) (1994); Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. $8 1701(a)(5)-(6), 1712(a) (1994). 
518. Wilkinson, supra note 461, at 31 1-13. A counter-argument can be made that the 
comprehensive array of federal statutes governing public lands curtails the operation of a common 
law doctrine like the public trust. See id. at 298-99; see d o  Richard J .  Lazarus. Changing 
Conceptions of Properfy and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public T r w  
Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 633, 710-16 (1986) (arguing that the public trust ought not apply 
to natural resource management, in part because it relies too heavily on the judiciary to further its 
goals; as such, "the doctrine amounts to a romantic step backward toward a bygone era at a time 
when we face modem problems that demand candid and honest debate on the merits, including 
consideration of current social values and the latest scientific information," better served by 
legislation than common law). Wilkinson concludes. however, that the public lands laws can be 
supplemented with the public trust concept as a rule of statutory construction. Wilkinson, supra 
note 461, at 299, 311-13. 
519. See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 534 (191 1) (citing United States v.  Grimaud, 
220 U.S. 506, 522 (1911)). 
520. Id. at 536 (quoting United States v. Beebee, 127 U.S. 338, 342 (1888)). 
521. See Wilkinson, supra note 461, at 310-11 (explaining that express legislative authority 
would be required to support such decisions). 
522. See id. at 310-13 (arguing that the public trust doctrine could serve as a rule of 
construction for public lands statutes); see also David H .  Getches, Managing the Public LMdr: The 
Authority of the Executive to Withdraw Lands, 22 N A T .  RESOURCES J. 279. 334 (1982) (concluding 
that the public trust doctrine could require courts to demand greater justification for extractive 
activities on public lands). 
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The doctrine has been raised in court both as a shield, to justify extensive 
executive power to protect the lands and resources, and as a sword, to 
prohibit agencies from allowing extractive or destructive activities on and 
near public lands. Notions of public trust and stewardship powers are woven 
throughout the Court's opinion in Light v. United States,5n upholding Forest 
Service regulations requiring that grazing only occur under permit.5" In the 
Monongahela National Forest caseVs" the court, noting the historic role of 
the Forest Service as "custodian and protector" of the forest reserves, 
implicitly relied on public trust concepts to construe the "broad and 
ambiguous" language of the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act ("MUSYA") 
as precluding even-aged management or c lear-c~t t ing.~~~ In the Redwood 
National Park cases, the court expressly relied on the public trust doctrine to 
require affirmative action to protect park resources from external threats.527 
Although the courts have not considered the public trust doctrine in the 
context of a nondelegation challenge, it may mean that executive agencies 
have greater latitude to prevent the destruction or impairment of public lands 
and resources.sz8 As a result, separation of powers is in no way offended 
when an agency acts in this fashion, for the judiciary can review the action 
under the Administrative Procedure Act in light of statutory objectives and 
standards (generic though they may be), with the extensive history of public 
lands management as the backdrop and the public trust doctrine to provide 
context and fill in the gaps. In addition, so long as the decision in question is 
preservation oriented, such that resources are not irreparably damaged or 
523. 220 U.S. 523 (1911). 
524. Id. at 536-38; see idso Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409-11 
(1917) (affirming injunction against trespass on.public lands for the generation of power). 
525. W. Va. Div. of Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 
1975). 
526. Id. at 948, 950-55 (construing the requirements of MUSYA and the 1897 Organic Act, 
16 U.S.C. 5 476 (1994), which required trees to be mature, and that they be individually marked, 
before harvest). This provision was repealed by NFMA, 16 U.S.C. 5 1604@(3)(F), (m) (1994). 
527. Sierra Club v. Dep't. of the Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172, 174-75 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sierra 
Club v. Dep't. of Interior. 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Sierra Club v. Dep't. of the 
Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90, 95-96 (N.D.Cal. 1974). The Sierra Club alleged that the Secretary of 
the Interior had failed to protect Redwood National Park from adjacent logging operations. See 
Sierra Club. 398 F .  Supp. at 294. However, other courts have not been so willing to impose 
affirmative trust-like duties. See Sierra Club v. Andrus. 487 F. Supp. 443, 449 (D.D.C. 1980) 
(holding that the Department of the Interior had no duty to take further action to protect reserved 
water rights). 
528. See Getches, supra note 522, at 333 (stating that "[slo long as the volume and thrust of 
statutory law is directed at protection and judicious use of public lands, it is reasonable to expect 
more deferential treatment of interpretations that deny development, demand caution in use, or 
prefer nondamaging uses than of interpretations that err on the side of facilitating development"). 
32:941] BEYOND THE NEW DEAL 1037 
conveyed away, Congress can change course by stepping in with legislation 
to specify its intentions and constrain agency discretion in a particular area. 
B. Executive Withdrawals and Reservations 
Withdrawals of public lands under the Antiquities Act are among the most 
unconstrained exercises of executive power over public lands and resources. 
Nonetheless, given the plenary nature of the Property Clause power, the 
government's historic and dual roles as proprietor and sovereign, and the 
countervailing notion of a public trust responsibility to temper abuses of 
discretion, delegations to effectuate public lands withdrawals satisfy the first 
step of a contextual Chevron-based inquiry. The presidential designation of 
national monuments, however, lacks the. procedural safeguards necessary for 
the meaningful application of step two-plus. Although this does not 
necessarily mean that Antiquities Act decisions fail nondelegation review, it 
does leave them open to criticism, albeit not as a matter of separation of 
powers or federalism but as one of due process and fairness. 
1. The History of Public Lands Withdrawals 
Many of the earliest presidential withdrawals reserved public lands from 
various disposal laws for military or American Indian reservations, bird 
reserves and various other public uses, with no explicit congressional 
authorization. 529 By 1867, the Supreme Court had already recognized that 
"from an early period in the history of the government it has been the 
practice of the President to order, from time to time, as the exigencies of the 
public service required, [federal lands] to be . . . set apart for public 
uses. 
In 1909, President Taft executed one of the most extensive withdrawals 
ever accomplished by a President, without any specific delegation of 
congressional power, by declaring over three million acres of public lands 
529. Id, at 283 (citing Wheatley, Study of Withdrawals and Reservations of Public Domain 
Lands 55 (rev. 1969), as 'the most comprehensive source on withdrawals"). 
530. Grisar v. McDowell, 73 U.S. 363, 381 (1867). In M a r ,  the plaintiff asserted title to 
lands reserved for military purposes, claiming that he had derived title fmm the City of San 
Francixo to lands formerly held by Mexican pueblos under the laws of Mexico. Id. at 365. The 
Court rejected plaintiffs argument that public lands "could only be reserved from sale and set apart 
for public purposes under the direct sanction of an act of Congress," and noted that Congress had 
implicitly recognized the President's withdrawal authority through numerous enactments dating 
back to 1830. Id. at 380-82. 
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"off limits" to oil and gas de~elopment.'~' In United States v. Midwest Oil 
Co. ,532 the Supreme Court upheld Taft's decision, finding that his authority 
was implicitly allowed by Congressional acquiescence based on the 
Executive's long continued practice of making withdrawals without express 
statutory The President's national perspective and direct 
accountability to the voters was specifically noted: "[he] was in a position to 
know when the public interest required particular portions of the people's 
lands to be" set aside.534 Such actions did "no harm to the interest of the 
public at large," given that the reservation, by denying use of the resource, 
simply preserved congressional prerogatives and could therefore be subject to 
legislative reversal. 535 
Congress itself has validated the practice of executive withdrawal through 
a variety of enactments going as far back as the early 1 8 0 0 ' ~ . * ~ ~  One of the 
most widely used withdrawal statutes was the 1891 General Revision Act, 
which authorized the President to "set apart and reserve . . . any part of the 
public lands wholly or in part covered with timber or undergrowth, whether 
of commercial value or not, as public reservations."537 Presidents withdrew 
more than 194 million acres of forest lands under this stat~te.'~' Congress 
did not always sit quietly on the sidelines, and although repeal efforts were 
generally rebuffed, presidential authority to create new reserves in six 
western states was ultimately revoked.539 Congress also passed the Pickett 
Act, in part to "restrict the greater power already possessed" by the 
Executive, by stating that "[tlhe President may, at any time in his discretion, 
temporarily withdraw from settlement, location, sale, or entry any of the 
public lands . . . and reserve the same for . . . public purposes."540 Instead 
531. United States v. Midwest Oil Co.. 236 U.S.  459, 467 (1915) (citing Temporary 
Petroleum Withdrawal No. 5 (1909)). 
532. 236 U.S. 459 (1915). 
533. Id. at 468-70. 
534. Id. at 47 1 .  
535. Id.; see also Getches, sqra note 522, at 287. 
536. Grisar, 73 U.S. at 381 (citing statutes). 
537. Ch. 561, !j 24, 26 Stat. 1095 (1891). 
538. Getches. supra note 522, at 286. 
539. Id. (citing Ch. 2907, 34 Stat. 1271 (1907). The evening before he signed the bill into 
law, President Theodore Roosevelt, with the advice of Gifford Pinchot, proclaimed 32 new forest 
reserves and enlarged existing reserves in the restricted states. PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF 
PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 580 (1968); Getches, supra note 522, at 286. 
540. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 421, $5 1-3, 36 Stat. 847 (1910) (emphasis added) (repealed 
by Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. 8 1714 (1994 & Supp. 111 
1997)). The Pickett Act further restricted presidential power, as withdrawals were to remain "open 
to exploration, discovery, occupation, and purchase under the mining laws." Id.; 43 U.S.C. Q 142 
(1994). 
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of restricting itself to temporary withdrawals, however, the executive branch 
continued to assert that it possessed all the implied withdrawal powers it had 
enjoyed prior to the Pickett Act, reserving millions of acres from disposition 
under mining laws and other public lands statutes, with no judicial 
curtailment. 541 
In the Antiquities Act of 1906, Congress further delineated the 
withdrawal power by authorizing the President, "in his discretion, to declare 
. . . historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects 
of historic or scientific interest . . . to be national monwnen t~ . "~~  This 
provision has served as one of the most powerful preservation tools in the 
federal arsenal, and the executive branch has exercised its Antiquities Act 
powers aggressively since the Act's inception, reserving vast areas of land 
for hundreds of national monuments.543 President Theodore Roosevelt 
utilized the Antiquities Act power almost immediately, creating the first 
national monument, Devils Tower, as well as one of the largest, the Grand 
Canyon National Monument, and dozens of others.544 Various congressional 
members have attempted to rescind or curtail this power over the years, with 
only minimal success. 54S 
The only true inroad on Antiquities Act power was effected when, in the 
wake of the Grand Teton National Monument designation, Congress forbade 
the President from creating any additional monuments in Wyoming absent 
express authori~at ion.~~~ Subsequently, when Congress enacted Federal Land 
541. Getches, supra note 522, at 293-98; Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Kleppe, 441 F. Supp. 
859, 861-62 (D. Wyo. 1977) (stating that even if the Pickett Act did curtail the President's implied 
authority to make withdrawals, congressional acquiescence over the course of more than sixty years 
had restored the power (citing 40 Op. Att'y. Gen. 73 (1941) in upholding temporary withdrawal of 
three million acres of oil shale lands from appropriation)). 
542. 16 U.S.C. 4 431 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
543. See 146 CONG. REC. S7030-7032 (daily ed. July 17, 2000) (statement of Sen. Nickles) 
(listing monuments by President and total acreage). President Franklin Roosevelt designated the 
greatest number of monuments (28). while Carter holds the record for amount of land withdrawn 
(55,975,000 acres, mostly in Alaska). Id. at S7031. President Clinton takes second place in terms 
of total acreage withdrawn (3,789,669 as of July 2000). Id. at S7031-32. 
544. Proclamation No. 794, 35 Stat. 2175 (1908) (creating Grand Canyon National 
Monument); Proclamation No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236 (1908) (creating Devils Tower National 
Monument); Getches, supra note 522, at 302. 
545. Justin James Quigley, Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monwnent: Preservation or 
Politics?, 19 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 55, 84-85. 93-96 (1999) (describing proposals to 
amend or rescind the Antiquities Act); James R. Rasband. Utah's Grand Srairccrse: m e  Right Path 
To WiIdemess Preservation?. 70 U .  COLO. L. REV. 483, 531-32 (1999) (describing congressional 
backlash and proposed bills in the wake of the Escalante National Monument designation). 
546. 16 U.S.C. § 431a (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Congress also restored some of the lands 
within the Grand Teton Monument to the Teton National Forest, while merging the remainder with 
the Grand Teton National Park. Id. 58 406d-1. 482111 (1994). 
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Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA") in 1976, it repealed the 
Executive's implied authority to make withdrawals and reservations but left 
Antiquities Act powers intact.547 FLPMA 9 1714 otherwise requires 
congressional approval for withdrawals over 5,000 acres if intended to last 
more than twenty years in duration.s48 It also specifies that notice and an 
opportunity for public hearing must be provided before a new withdrawal 
The Secretary of Interior may, however, take immediate, 
unilateral action to withdraw public lands for up to three years without public 
participation or congressional approval in situations where "extraordinary 
measures must be taken to preserve values that would otherwise be lost. 
2. Judicial Treatment of Monument Designations 
The courts have uniformly rejected challenges to monument designations. 
In Cameron v. United States,ss' the United States brought action to eject 
Ralph Cameron, a mining claimant, from a tract on the southern rim of the 
Grand Cany~n . "~  Cameron, in defense, challenged the Grand Canyon's 
designation, claiming that the area was not an object of historic or scientific 
interest, nor was the reservation the smallest area compatible with its proper 
care and management.ss3 A unanimous Supreme Court rejected the argument 
in one short ~aragraph."~ The Court noted that the presidential proclamation 
had expressly determined that the canyon "is an object of unusual scientific 
interest," and described it as the "greatest eroded canyon in the United 
States, if not in the world . . . . pt] has attracted wide attention among 
547. 43 U.S.C. 8 1714(a) (1994 & Supp. 111 1997) (delegating power to the Secretary of 
Interior "to make, modify, extend or revoke withdrawals but only in accordance with the provisions 
and limitations of this sectionn); see ulso Getches, supra note 522. at 308. 315 (noting that 
Congress, through FLPMA, intended to rein in executive withdrawal authority, even though it did 
not repeal the Antiquities Act). As originally enacted. f 1714(a) expressly stated that the 
President's "implied authority . . . resulting from acquiescence of the Congress (United States v. 
Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915)). . . [is] repealed." Pub. L. No. 94-579, f 704(a), 90 Stat. 
2744, 2792 (1976). 
548. 43 U.S.C. 1714(c)(l) (1994 & Supp. 111 1997). 
549. Id. 8 1714(b), (h) (1994 & Supp. 111 1997). 
550. Id. 8 1714(b)(2), (h), (i), (1994&Supp. 111 1997). 
551. 252 U.S. 450 (1920). 
552. Id. at 454. 
553. Id. ; Getches, supra note 522, at 303 11.131. 
554. Cameron, 252 U.S. at 455-56. Cameron argued that the President had set aside the 
enormous canyon simply because of it size, which, in and of itself, did not qualify the area as an 
object of unusual scientific interest within the meaning of the Antiquities Act. Getches, supra note 
522, at 303 n.131 (citing Brief for Appellant at 44-48). The coun did not address this issue. 
Cameron. 252 U.S. at 455-56. 
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explorers and scientists, affords an unexampled field for geologic study, 
[and] is regarded as one of the great natural wonders . . . . ""' The Court 
did not definitively address whether the Act authorized such a large 
~ithdrawal,"~ although the legislative history indicates that Congress 
intended relatively small areas to be set aside as necessary to protect 
archeological ruins and relics.557 
A challenge to the Grand Teton designation was also rejected in Wyoming 
v. ~ranke.'" The presidential proclamation establishing the monument 
addressed the statutory criteria in the most cursory manner: "the Jackson 
Hole country . . . contains historic landmarks and other objects of historic 
and scientific interest. "559 In order to satisfy the minimal standards provided 
in the Act, the United States was allowed to submit evidence of historic and 
scientific characteristics of the area.'@' The court concluded that the 
President had acted within his authority under the Antiquities Act, stating 
that "if the Congress presumes to delegate its inherent authority to Executive 
Departments which exercise acquisitive proclivities not actually intended, the 
burden is on the Congress to pass such remedial legislation as may obviate 
any injustice brought about."561 Expressing its belief that the decision could 
result in hardship and injustice to the state of Wy~ming , '~~  the court 
questioned the wisdom of the action but found that separation of powers 
555. Comeron, 252 U.S. at 455-56. 
556. Id.; Getches, supra note 522, at 303 n.131. 
557. Getches, supra note 522, at 302 m.124-27 (reviewing the legislative history of the Act, 
during which the floor manager, Representative Lacey, assured his colleagues that, unlike the forest 
reserves, '[nlot very much land" would be taken off the market as a result of the Antiquities Act, 
because it would involve only the "smallest area necesstry [sic] for the care and maintenance of the 
objects to be preserved . . . these old objects of special interest and the Indian remains in the 
pueblos of the Southwest" (citing 40 CONG. REC. 7888 (1906))); see also H.R. REP. NO. 59-2224 
(1905) ('The bill proposes to create small reservations reserving only so much land as may be 
absolutely necessary for the preservation of these interesting relics of prehistoric times."). 
hofessor Getches concludes that Congress likely intended that large reservations 'would become 
national parks through congressional action rather than [national] monuments withdrawn under the 
Antiquities Act. Getches, supra, at 490. 
558. 58 F. Supp. 890 @. Wyo. 1945). 
559. Id. at 894-95 (quoting Proclamation No. 2578, 47 Stat. 731 (1943)). The Grand Teton 
National Monument consisted of 221,610 acres of public lands, some of which had been donated for 
park purposes by John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Proclamation No. 2578, 47 Stat. 731 (1943); Getches, 
supra note 522, at 304. The evidence showed that the area included mineral deposits, important 
indigenous plants, glacial formations and historic trails and camps. Franke. 58 F. Supp. at 895. 
560. Franke, 58 F. Supp. at 895. 
561. Id. at 8%. The court added that 'the power and control over and disposition of 
government lands inherently rests in its Legislative branch." Id. 
562. Id. at 8%. The designation by President Franklin D. Roosevelt ended nearly two 
decades of congressional wrangling, which was largely the result of resistance by the Wyoming 
delegation. Getches. sqra  note 522, at 304. 
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necessitated deference to the President: "For the judiciary to probe the 
reasoning which underlies this Proclamation would amount to a clear 
invasion of the legislative and executive domains. "563 
Given the broad and relatively general criteria of the Antiquities Act, and 
the charged political context of executive withdrawals, it is not surprising 
that a court would be loath to second-guess a presidential determination that 
national monument lands possess some historic and scientific interest, but 
would instead leave it to Congress to remedy if it so chose.s64 The Franke 
court did suggest that "a bare stretch of sage-brush prairie . . . would 
undoubtedly be . . . outside the scope and purpose of the Monument Act," 
absent substantial evidence of historic or scientific objects.565 Yet if the 
President were to proclaim that a particular sage-brush prairie was unique in 
that it was undisturbed by grazing or mining, or that it contained indigenous 
vegetation or important soil or geological features, a court would be hard 
pressed to find a monument designation arbitrary and capricious, considering 
the extensive amount of discretion given by the 
Nondelegation challenges to executive withdrawals have fared no better. 
Reminiscent of the judicial deference given President Taft's withdrawals in 
Midwest in Linn Land Co. v. Uda11,568 the Secretary's power to 
- - -  
563. Franke, 58 F. Supp. at 896 (quoting United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 
371, 380 (1940)). 
564. Courts are generally reluctant to interfere in political controversies between the 
Legislature and the Executive Branch. See Dalton v. Spezter, 51 1 U.S. at 462, 476 (1994) (stating 
that the hesident's exercise of discretionary powers granted by Congress "is not a matter for our 
review"); George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. at 380 (holding that the exercise of presidential 
discretion does not raise any reviewable question of law); Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 
250 U.S. 163, 184 (1919) (stating that a claim concerning "mere excess or abuse" of presidential 
discretion over powers granted by Congress "involves considerations beyond the reach of judicial 
power"); Franke, 58 F. Supp. at 896; cf. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992) 
(given unique constitutional position of President, congressional silence is not enough to subject 
presidential decisions to Administrative Procedure Act review); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 
750 (1982) (the President's unique constitutional status distinguishes him from other executive 
officials). 
565. Franke, 58 F. Supp, at 895. 
566. Professor Getches notes that the history of expansive interpretation of authority, 
beginning with Cameron and including Congress's failure to rescind the Antiquities Act in FLPMA, 
"has legitimated a broad construction." Getches, supra note 522, at 308. 
567. See United States v .  Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459. 471 (1915). Although the Court 
did not explicitly address separation of powers or nondelegation in Midwest Oil, it noted both that 
the President was directly accountable to the public and that the government did not contend that it 
had "any general authority in the disposition of the public land which the Constitution has 
committed to Congress, and freely concede[d] the general proposition as to the lack of authority in 
the President to deal with the laws otherwise than to see that they are faithfully executed." Id. at 
505. 
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classify lands as vaIuable for grazing, production of crops or any other use, 
or to be exchanged for scrip rights, as provided in the Taylor Grazing Act 
and Executive Order 69 10, was found constitutional .M9 According to the 
court, the relevant statutory standards should not be piecemealed or viewed 
in isolation, as they "gain their vitality from the background and purposes of 
the entire Act. . . ," passed as part of a "general plan to protect the 
Government's lands. ""O The court further remarked that the few cases 
which did find nondelegation problems, namely Schechter Poultry and 
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, have been "questioned and seriously modified 
by later United States Supreme Court decisions. "'" 
3. Ascending the Grand Staircase 
As evidenced by Linn Land and Midwest Oil, the decisions to create the 
Grand Staircase-Escalante and Parashant National Monuments are less 
susceptible to nondelegation challenges under the first step of the proposed 
Chevron-based approach than Commerce Clause-oriented decisions, given 
their unique, multi-faceted Property Clause foundation with volumes of 
public lands history as their backdrop. However, the Antiquities Act lacks a 
key element fundamental to the satisfaction of step two-plus. Unlike the 
extensive administrative procedures afforded by the Clean Air Act,'" and, 
for that matter, other public lands statutes like NFMA and F L P M A , ~ ~ ~  
Antiquities Act withdrawals lack procedural safeguards. There are no 
formalized administrative processes required for monument designations,574 
568. 255 F. Supp. 382, 387-88 (D. Or. 1966). Linn Lund involved consolidated cases, see id. 
at 385, one of which was reversed on other grounds, see Udall v. Battle Mountain Co., 385 F.2d 
90 (9th Cir. 1967). 
569. Unn Land. 255 F. Supp. at 387 (citing 43 U.S.C. 8 315f and Exec. Order No. 6910, 
which withdrew western public lands from settlement, location, sale or entry pursuant to the Pickett 
Act of 1910. 36 Stat. 847). 
570. Id. at 385. 'Certainly, the Constitution does not require Congress to foresee the 
countless situations to which it may wish a particular policy to be applied and to formulate specific 
rules for each problem as it arises." Id. at 388. 
571. Id. at 387-88 (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 
(1935); and Panama Refming Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420 (1935)). The court noted 
approvingly that Professor Davis "is of the belief that neither Panumu Refining or Schechter would 
be followed today on the same facts." Id. (citing 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, $8 2.01--16). 
572. Seesupra Part I.C.2. 
573. See National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. 8 1600 (1994 & Supp. 111 
1997); Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U. S.C. 8 1701 (1994). 
574. Rasband. supra note 545, at 564-61 (concluding that either the Antiquities Act should be 
amended to include procedural safeguards or the President should voluntarily include the public in 
withdrawal decisions; '[alchieving preservation should not come at the expense of a fair process"). 
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and no statutory vehicle for challenging presidential designations as arbitrary 
and capricious in federal ~ourt.~'' 
The Antiquities Act provides no regular means for members of the 
interested public to receive notice of the decision-making process or to make 
their views known through public hearings or the submission of public 
In addition, when the President designates a new national 
monument, there is no requirement that environmental effects be assessed or 
that alternatives be considered because NEPA does not apply to presidential 
a ~ t i o n . ' ~  Notably, FLPMA's withdrawal provisians, which do require 
notice and an opportunity for public hearing,"' were enacted "to regularize 
administrative practice that had in the past been used to effect withdrawals 
which were 'not always in the best interest of all the pe~ple.'""~ Although 
the Clinton Administration has afforded some opportunities for public input 
with regard to most of the recent  designation^,^^" other administrations may 
not be as amenable to public processes. 
The lack of process is exacerbated by the lack of opportunity for judicial 
review. The Administrative Procedure Act provides for review of "final 
agency action," but the President is not an agency within the purview of that 
Act.'" Even if the review were allowed, courts would have little to assess 
other than the presidential proclamation itself, which will routinely state that 
the area being withdrawn is of scientific, historic or archeological interest.'= 
In the absence of regular predesignation processes, opposing viewpoints are 
575. See 5 U.S.C. 8 704 (1994). 
576. See 16 U.S.C. 8431 (1994&Supp. IV 1998). 
577. See 42 U.S.C. 8 4332(C) (1994 & Supp. I11 1997); Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155, 
1161-64 0. Alaska 1978) (finding that NEPA does not apply to monument designations because the 
President is not a federal agency). 
578. See43 U.S.C. 8 1714(b), (ti) (1994 & Supp. 1997). 
579. Getches, supra note 522, at 318 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1 163 (1976). reprinred in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6175). 
580. John D. Leshy, Nurural Resources Policy in the Clinton Administration: A Mid-Course 
Evaluation from the Inside, 25 ENVTL. L. 679, 681 (1995) (noting the Clinton Administration's 
efforts to engage the public and promote "cooperative federalism"). Executive branch officials 
have been criticized, however, for keeping the decision-making process for the Escalante National 
Monument quiet until just a few days before the designation was announced. See Rasband, supra 
note 545. at 484 n.5 (citing Tom Kenworthy, President Considers Carving Natoinal Monument out 
of Utah Land, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1996, at A3 (breaking the news about possible monument 
designation)). 
581. 5 U.S.C. 5 704 (1994); Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462. 468-470 (1994); Franklin v. 
Massachusetts, 505 U . S. 788,796,800-80 1 (1 992). 
582. See Wyoming v. Franke. 58 F. Supp. 890, 896 (1945) (admitting. in a pre- 
Administrative Procedure Act case, additional evidence of historic and scientific objects, in view of 
cursory statements contained in the proclamation, and determining that the President's decision was 
not arbitrary in that the statutory criteria were met). 
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less likely to be publicly aired and fully considered, and the court could be 
reduced to accepting post hoc rationalizations in an administrative record 
compiled solely for litigation purposes.583 Yet, taking their cue from the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Cameron, courts will rarely question the 
presidential findings.584 
If the Secretary were to make the designation decision rather than the 
President, the Administrative Procedure Act would allow review of the 
merits of the deci~ion. '~ NEPA would also apply, so the coua could review 
the environmental impact statement and the administrative record generated 
by the NEPA process.5B6 The authority to withdraw and reserve national 
monuments has been delegated to the Secretary of ~nterior, '~ and, in spite of 
NEPA and other procedural requirements, the Secretary possesses a great 
deal of latitude to effectuate the Antiquities Act's standards, given the Act's 
loosely phrased directives. Nonetheless, designations are almost always 
made by the President, likely to signify the political importance of the 
decision and to avoid the constraints of NEPA and the Administrative 
- - - -  -- - 
583. See id. 
584. See Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 455-56 (1920). 
585. Although the directive allowing the reservation of "historic landmarks, historic and 
prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest" is rather loosely phrased, 
designations are unlikely to be found wholly committed to agency discretion by law. The Act 
surely sets forth enough law to apply so that judicial review could go forward. See supra notes 
264-69 and accompanying text (discussing Administrative Procedure Act 8 701); supra notes 291- 
98 and accompanying text (discussing South Dakota v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 69 F.3d 878 (8th 
Cir. 1995). cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 5 19 U.S. 919 (1996), where the court concluded 
that a lack of judicial review under the Act, which addresses tribal lands and interests, as opposed 
to public lands, contributes to a nondelegation problem). 
586. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 336 (1989). Although 
a few courts have held that environmentally beneficial actions do not trigger NEPA, e.g . ,  Douglas 
County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495. 1507 (9th Cir. 1995), others refuse to recognize any such 
exception, e.g. ,  Catron County Bd. of Com'rs v. U.S., 75 F.3d 1429, 1436 (10th Cir. 1996). 
587. The President's authorities to withdraw or reserve federal lands were delegated to the 
Secretary of the lnterior by executive order. Exec. Order No. 10.355, 17 Fed. Reg. 4831 (May 
26, 1952); see 43 C.F.R. 8 2300.0-3(a)(l)(iii), (2). One district court, however, has assumed, 
without analysis, that because the Antiquities Act refers expressly to the President's power to 
declare national monuments, 'apparently this authority cannot be delegated." Alaska v. Carter, 
462 F. Supp. 1155, 1159 (D. Alaska 1978). This conclusion is likely erroneous; other courts have 
regularly upheld delegations to agencies even though the statutory language refers to the President's 
power to take action. See Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting 
that, although the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
specifically grants authority to the President, 42 U.S.C. $4 9604, 9606, that authority was delegated 
to the EPA in Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987), and therefore the agency was 
entitled to Chevron deference). 
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Procedure Act, as well as FLPMA's withdrawal provisions, which 
specifically speak to secretarial d~ties.~" 
Procedural safeguards could be formalized through regulations to avoid 
due process concerns. Establishing regular means for public input would not 
only provide the executive branch with more complete information from a 
variety of perspectives, at least some of which will flow from local interests 
knowledgeable about the land base in question, but it would also heighten 
public acceptance of designation decisions.5s9 Judicial review could then 
enhance the legitimacy of the decision-making process and the ultimate 
outcome, in keeping with the purposes of the second step of the proposed 
approach. 
As a practical matter, the executive branch will be reluctant to adopt the 
suggested regulations, in part because regulations have become increasingly 
difficult to promulgate.590 A substantive draw-back is that the imposition of 
extensive preliminary requirements may result in fewer designations, and 
less federal land ultimately placed in protective status. The cumbersome 
nature of NEPA and other public processes could have a chilling effect on 
executive withdrawals, and the delay caused by public involvement and other 
procedural requirements may result in harm to the resources in question. 
However, if extractive activities were imminent, the regulations could 
include emergency procedures similar to those found in FLPMA, allowing 
temporary withdrawal until public processes are complete.591 This proposal 
588. See 43 U.S.C. 8 1714 (1994 & Supp. 111 1997); Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155 
(1978); see also Rasband, supra note 545, at 505-61 (noting that, to avoid having to comply with 
NEPA, executive branch officials wanted a letter from President Clinton to Secretary Babbitt 
regarding the suitability of Utah lands for designation as the Escalante National Monument). 
589. See Rasband, srcpra note 545. at 560 (extolling the virtues of public process, and noting 
that, though the Escalante National Monument may well be regarded as one of the "jewels" of our 
national monument system, 'like the collection of old world antiquities in the British Museum . . . 
[it] is forever tarnished by its method of acquisition"). Notably, the Secretary has responded to 
nondelegation concerns by promulgating regulations to constrain the exercise of review, and thereby 
hasten judicial review, in at least one other context. See supra notes 291-98. 
590. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law Afer the Cowuer-Reformation: Restoring 
Faith in Pragmaric Government, 48 U .  K A N .  L. REV. 689, 709 (2000) (describing legislation and 
executive orders which require agencies to assess the costs and benefits of proposed and final rules, 
along with the rules' impacts on federalism, small businesses. intergovernmental interests, property 
rights and environmental justice). Of course, procedural requirements could be effectuated by a 
legislative amendment to the Antiquities Act, see Rasband, supra note 545, at 555, and several bills 
have been proposed to that effect, e.g., H .R. 1487, 106th Cong. (1999), H. REP. 106252 (passed 
the House Sept. 24, 1999); S. 729, 106th Cong. (reported by committee Aug. 25, 2000). The 
labyrinthine nature of congressional processes and the risk entailed in bringing this highly 
beneficial, long-standing statute up for amendment in the current political climate, with Congress 
touting private property rights as one of its primary values, make regulation a better bet. 
591. See43 U.S.C. 8 1714(e) (1994& Supp. I11 1997). 
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would in many ways emulate FLPMA's withdrawal provisions, with one 
critical distinction-by utilizing the Antiquities Act power, the executive 
branch frees itself from FLPMA's congressional approval req~irement."~ 
Absent formalized procedural safeguards, monument designations may 
implicate due process issues,593 but they do not trigger the separation of 
powers and federalism concerns raised in American Trucking and especially 
evident in Schechter Poultry. As noted in Midwest Oil and, more recently, 
in Brown & Williamson Tobacco, the President is acutely accountable to 
political processes, and, consequently, his or her cabinet members are as 
well.'" Moreover, given the federal government's plenary power over 
public lands and resources, the expectations of both state and private entities 
in having a say over the use of those resources are less compelling.595 
Finally, because Antiquities Act withdrawals are preservation-oriented, 
preventing extractive or destructive uses which are inconsistent with 
monument designation, Congress has ample opportunity to step in and 
correct any situations it determines are unfounded or improperly motivated. 
But the ends do not wholly justify the means. If the executive branch, 
acting through the Department of Interior, were to adopt regulations 
providing for more meaningful and predictable administrative procedures, 
allowing for public input and judicial review, designation decisions could 
effectuate preservation objectives in a more open and publicly acceptable 
way. 
592. See id. 8 1714(c) (1994 & Supp. 111 1997). 
593. The concern noted here is one of fairness and public buy-in rather than constitutional law. 
An analysis of whether the lack of procedures and judicial review in the public lands context 
actually violates constitutional due process under the Fifth Amendment is beyond the scope of this 
article. However, courts have tended to reject such claims. See Fed'l Lands Legal Consortium v. 
United States. 195 F.3d 1190. 1197-1200 (10th Cir. 1999); Clouser v. Espy. 42 F.3d 1522. 1540- 
41 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Lim Land Co. v. Udall. 255 F. Supp. 382, 388 (1966) (noting that, 
once plaintiffs' nondelegation challenge to the withdrawal of lands under the Taylor Grazing Act 
had been rejected, their due process claims must also fall "when viewed in the light of the [Property 
Clause] power of the Congress and the Secretary . . . to dispose of and regulate lands belonging to 
the United States"). 
594. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1330-31 (2000) (Breyer, 
J.. dissenting); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 471 (1915). Arguably, a lame 
duck President is less accountable than one who acts during the first term, but presidential action is 
likely to be constrained by the knowledge that controversial decisions will be attributed to the 
President's political party regardless of timing. 
595. See United States v .  Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 104-105 (1985) (noting that unpatented mining 
claims are held with knowledge of the federal government's 'substantial" regulatory power; thus, 
no reasonable expectation had been impaired when Congress exercised that power by requiring that 
claims be filed); United States v .  Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 494 (1973) (holding that the govenunent 
need not compensate rancher for loss of value added to his fee lands by adjacent federal grazing 
lands in light of clear congressional intent that grazing permits create no right, title or interest in the 
federal lands). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The' revival of the nondelegation doctrine goes hand in hand with the 
recent hue and cry for regulatory reform, i.e., less regulation and, 
consequently, less federal interference with states' rights and private 
economic interests. Yet the concerns evidenced by the D.C. Circuit in 
American Trucking do not justify the resurrection of an antiquated doctrine 
premised on an elusive quest for intelligible legislative nomenclature. Unless 
Congress has completely side-stepped its legislative responsibility by failing 
to make a fundamental policy choice and handing a "blank check" to an 
executive agency, thereby abdicating-not delegating-its law-making 
functions, separation of powers concerns are scarcely implicated, and the 
concerns that are raised by ambiguous statutory provisions can be better 
addressed through other means. In the regulatory context, reviewing courts 
need not, and should not, reach constitutional issues when established 
principles of administrative law provide less drastic and, in many ways, 
more meaningful means to scrutinize agency action and set aside abusive or 
irrational decisions. 
With regard to the American Trucking controversy, although the EPA 
may find itself rewriting the national ambient air quality standards 
("NAAQS") or providing a more detailed explanation of its choice in the 
administrative record, the Clean Air Act itself, a long-standing regulatory 
statute and venerable member of the "first generation" of federal 
environmental laws, should not be struck down on nondelegation grounds. 
The statutory objectives and standards do not reflect an abdication of 
legislative power, particularly when considered in the context of the Act as a 
whole. Instead, the Act specifies policy goals and provides appropriate 
legislative parameters, allowing the EPA to fill in the details within those 
parameters, an activity especially well suited for an executive agency with 
technical expertise in environmental quality. 
The Clean Air Act and many other regulatory statutes enacted under the 
Commerce Clause provide substantive law for the courts to apply in 
reviewing agency action, while affording procedural safeguards to both the 
regulated community and the interested public through the administrative 
rulemaking process, and, ultimately, judicial review. When faced with 
statutory ambiguity in this context, the court should assume that Congress 
intended to delegate regulatory authority to the agency, as noted in Chevron, 
but scrutinize the agency's ultimate decision using the principles of "hard 
look" review, all the while conscious of the overall context of the regulation 
at issue, including other constitutional ramifications. Agencies would be 
then required to articulate and support their decisions based on all relevant 
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legislative objectives and factors in an open and complete administrative 
record. As a result, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches could 
each effectuate their primary constitutional functions, and the public would 
gain the assurances of impartial, reasoned and predictable regulation and 
accountable decision-makers. 
The merits of nondelegation arguments outside of the Commerce Clause 
context should be considered in light of the source of constitutional power 
giving rise to the executive decision in question. Under the first step of the 
proposed approach, certain subjects may warrant heightened vigilance to 
nondelegation issues, while in other areas, congressional intent to delegate 
extensive powers can be presumed, and such delegations will call for less 
constitutional interest. In the public lands context, Congress's explicit 
Property Clause power to make all needful regulations respecting public 
lands and resources includes the plenary power to delegate extensive 
regulatory duties to executive agencies to manage those resources. Public 
lands statutes generally do not raise the constitutional concerns evident in the 
early New Deal cases-separation of powers, federalism, and due process- 
nor do they have the pervasive effects on the whole economy noted in those 
cases. This is especially true when the Executive implements the laws in a 
protective manner, preserving options for the future. Judicial review of a 
complete administrative record resulting from open and regular decision- 
making processes under the second step of the proposed approach serves to 
enhance reasonable and unbiased outcomes. 
Under this formula, Antiquities Act withdrawals will withstand 
nondelegation challenges as appropriate exercises of the Property Clause 
power, but they come up short under the second step of the proposed 
alternative, as they lack formalized procedural safeguards. This shortcoming 
does not require invalidation on constitutional grounds, but it diminishes 
public confidence in the executive action, and creates opportunities for abuse 
with no judicial corrective check. As for other public lands decisions, where 
Congress has provided the basic policy objectives, and opportunities for 
public participation and judicial review are available, the powers and 
prerogatives of all three branches remain intact and the interests of the 
affected public are adequately protected. 
